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Abstract
Agency attribution is the ability to distinguish between events that occur as a
result of our own actions and events that occur as a result of the actions of
other people. Previous accounts of agency attribution have been mainly divided
into two camps, either explaining agency in terms of high-level conscious
processes (Stephens and Graham, 2000) or low-level Comparator Model (CM)
processes (Frith et al. 2000). Recently, however, theorists have begun to
incorporate these two approaches, but as the bulk of previous experiments fail
to specify which aspects of agency are investigated, little empirical evidence
exists to inform us about how these different mechanisms interact.
The aim of the current thesis was to tease apart these processes by examining
high-level self/other judgments and low-level motor responses to actual and
perturbed visual feedback of self-generated actions. Results from Chapters 3, 4
and 5 suggest that low-level (CM) agency mechanisms are situated in right
hemisphere regions, disruption of which can reduce high-level self-judgments
(Chapter 5). Proprioception was also found to negatively inform high-level
judgments, as reducing proprioceptive signals increased self-judgments and
visual-proprioceptive incongruence increased other judgments (Chapters 6 and
7). In terms of low-level agency mechanisms, however, visual-proprioceptive
congruence was found to enhance low-level correction of visual perturbations
(Chapter 8). Results from Chapter 8 and Chapter 9 provide evidence for a lack
of high-level conscious awareness of low-level motor responses, as participants
failed to notice their own low-level corrections (Chapter 8) and as a result
failed to recognise their own actions (Chapter 9). Therefore, the current body
of research provides evidence for a visual-proprioceptive comparison as an
integral component of low-level (CM) agency mechanisms, and that these CM
processes do not produce feelings of agency per se, but identify mismatches
that inform and are then interpreted by conscious awareness.
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List of Figures
Figure 1.2: Starting from the top left of the diagram and working down the 8
left hand side: the intended goal of an action is necessary to
specify the desired (next) state of the limb and also the
movement required to achieve that state. At this stage a motor
command is generated to execute the necessary movements and
a parallel efference copy is sent to the predictor in order to
calculate the consequences of that particular motor command.
In addition to this, and following on from the motor command,
there is the [estimated] actual state of the motor system based
on the outgoing motor commands and sensory feedback. This
is an iterative loop and is constantly active both before and
throughout the movement and as the movement unfolds there
are a number of comparisons that can be made in order to
monitor and update it. Comparisons (represented by crossed
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circles) can be made between the desired state and the
predicted state, between the desired state and the actual state
and between the actual state and the predicted state. Any
discrepancies can be used to modify and correct the motor
command on-line during the movement and so make it as
accurate as possible. Thus, feelings of agency are apparent
when the comparisons match, but if the discrepancies between
any of the comparisons become too large then the CNS may
treat any observed or internally monitored self movement as
belonging to, or being under the influence of, an external agent.
When the system dysfunctions, therefore, perhaps through
brain abnormality or lesion, misperceptions of agency can
occur. Adapted from Frith et al. (2000).
Figure 1.2: Schematic representation of comparator model lesions for 10
schizophrenic delusions of control. An impaired predicted state
representation leads to false mismatches with the estimated
actual state.
Figure 1.3:
a) Schematic representation of comparator model lesions for
18
alien limb syndrome. The patients movements are no longer
controlled by intentions but by visual affordances. Patients are
completely aware of the discrepancies present between
intentions and actions because they have no deficit in feelings
of agency. b) Schematic representation of lesions of the
comparator model for utilisation disorders. No intentions are
formed so that movements are initiated based on visual
affordances only. No discrepancies are present between actions
and intentions as there were no intentions to begin with.
Figure 1.4
Schematic representation of comparator model lesions 23
explaining anosognosia. Movement intentions and predicted
state representation formed as normal. However, no
movements are actually performed and discrepancies between
the estimated actual state and predicted and desired state are
ignored.
Figure 1.5: Classic neglect tests completed by patient L.S., an 81 year-old 25
male neglect patient tested at the University of Nottingham. a)
Line bisection task. When asked to mark the middle of the line
L.S.s responses were heavily biased towards the right. b) Star
cancellation task. When asked to cancel out all the small stars,
L.S. only marked the stars to the right of centre. c) Picture of a
clock drawn from memory: detail is clearly lacking on the left
hand side of the picture.
Figure 1.6: Schematic representation of the proposed two aspects of 29
agency, a sense of movement initiation and a sense of a
movement being ones own. Adapted from de Vignemont and
Fourneret (2004).
Figure 2.1 Schematic representation of a linear perturbation. The lateral 46
shift increases with the size of the movement. Therefore
smaller perturbation sizes are required for large compared to
small movements to obtain the same size lateral shift at
endpoint
Figure 2.2: Schematic representation of experimental set up. When looking
into the mirror, images projected into the upper screen appear
to be in the same plane as the table surface. Thus, an
unperturbed image of a virtual hand appears to be in the same
location as the participants actual hand.
48
Figure 2.3: percent self-responses for all five perturbation sizes for
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GAUSSIAN (filled squares) and NON-GAUSSIAN (open
circles) training periods. The larger the perturbation size leads
to fewer self-responses. The asterisk denotes a significant
difference revealed by the planned comparisons. Error bars
show standard error.
51
Figure 3.1: Schematic representation of lateralisation of the visual field.
The left hemisphere processes information from the right
hemifield, whilst the right hemisphere processes information
from the left hemifield.
59
Figure 3.2: a) MRI images of A -TCA and B  age and gender matched
control reveal a clear and complete absence of the corpus
callosum for TCA. b) The DTI images of the same participants
show the probst fibres, which run from occipital -parietal areas
to frontal regions. From these images it appears that there are
no connections between the probst fibres and the anterior
connections of the corpus callosum or the anterior commissure.
61
Figure 3.3: Schematic representation of a) linear and b) curvilinear
perturbations. Solid lines represent the unperturbed cursor
trajectory. Dashed lines represent perturbed cursor trajectories.
63
Figure 3.4: Schematic representation of a curvilinear perturbation in which
the position of the cursor relative to the limb is dependent on
the distance travelled along the Y axis. The maximum
deviation between the cursor position and the limb position
(max) occurs at the mid point between the start point (S) and
target location (T). The solid line depicts the actual movement
trajectory and the dashed line depicts the cursor trajectory.
64
Figure 3.5: Schematic representation of the four spatial conditions RH and 66
LH refer to the reaching hand (right and left respectively). RP
and LP refer to the location of target presentation. These four
conditions were performed with both linear and curvilinear
perturbations with central fixation for all participants (eight
blocks). TCA also performed these conditions with free gaze
allowed (total of sixteen blocks) in which the information was
available to both hemispheres.
Figure 3.6: Graphs depicting percent correct responses for crossed spatial 68
conditions of control group (CONTROL) in addition to TCA
whilst fixating (TCA FIX) and free gaze (TCA FREE). Error
bars show 95% confidence intervals. a) LHLP left hand
reaching in the left hemifield (both visual and proprioceptive
feedback received by the right hemisphere). In the free gaze
conditions TCA performed within the control groups 95%
confidence intervals at all perturbation sizes. Whilst fixating,
TCAs scores only fell outside the normal range with the zero
degree perturbation performing better than the control group.
b) RHRP right hand reaching in the right hemifield (both
proprioceptive and visual information received by the left
hemisphere). TCAs free gaze conditions fell within the control
group confidence intervals for all perturbation sizes. Whilst
fixating TCAs performance falls below that of controls for
both the zero and sixteen degree perturbations
Figure 3.7: Graphs depicting percent correct judgments for crossed spatial 69
conditions of control group (open circles) in addition to T.C.A.
whilst fixating (black crosses) and free gaze (filled squares).
Error bars show 95% confidence intervals. a) LHRP left hand
reaching in the right hemifield (right hemisphere receives
proprioceptive feedback and left hemisphere, visual). In the
free gaze conditions T.C.A. performed within the control
groups 95% confidence intervals at all perturbation sizes.
Whilst fixating T.C.A.s scores fell outside and below
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confidence intervals for the SIXTEEN-degree perturbation,
outside and above confidence intervals for the FOUR-degree
perturbation, whilst performance was as controls at the ZERO-
degree perturbation. b) RPLP right hand reaching in the left
hemifield (left hemisphere receiving proprioceptive feedback,
right hemisphere, visual). T.C.A.s free gaze conditions fell
within the normal range for all perturbation sizes. When
fixating T.C.A.s performance was as controls for the ZERO-
degree perturbation and falls below that of controls at FOUR
and SIXTEEN-degree perturbations.
Figure 3.8: Typical velocity profiles from curvilinear perturbations. Grey 74
line represents velocity of the actual movement whilst the
black line represents the velocity of the cursor movement. The
cursor has a greater peak velocity than the actual movement.
Figure 4.1: Schematic representation of experimental setup. a) The 90
COINCIDENT conditions, in which visual feedback of the
participants actual movements was projected onto a horizontal
mirror so that it appeared in the same spatial plane as the
participants own movements. b) The PERPENDICULAR
conditions in which visual feedback of the participants own
movements was projected onto a mirror resting at a 45°
angle
from the participants gaze so that it appeared in the mirror to
be perpendicular (90°) from the participants actual
movements. c) The COMPUTER condition in which the
participant made no movements but the movements of the
virtual hand were projected to appear in the same plane as the
tabletop and were completely controlled by the computer.
Figure 4.2: At the beginning of each trial a red target bar appeared for 91
500ms and then disappeared again before movement onset.
During the reach, participants saw the virtual hand pass
beneath a virtual occluding bar before re-emerging on the other
side. On 50% of trials the hand was perturbed from its veridical
position while occluded by either 4 (25% of trials) or 16 (25%
of trials) degrees. At the end of the trial participants made a
verbal self /other judgment.
Figure 4.3: Schematic representation of perturbed hand path. Horizontal 92
solid lines represent edges of occluding bar. The dashed white
line represents actual limb trajectory, solid red lines represent
perturbed trajectory of visual feedback equivalent to a 4-degree
perturbation commencing at the beginning of the movement
(demonstrated by the dotted white line). 16-degree
perturbations were applied in the same way
Figure 4.4: Schematic representation of the hand path curvature applied 93
(0,3 and 9cm) to externally-generated (computer controlled)
trajectories of the virtual hand.
Figure 4.5: FEEDBACK*PERTURBATION interaction. Participants have 96
higher percent correct judgments at the ZERO-degree
perturbation with physically coincident visual feedback
compared to visual feedback presented perpendicular to the
actual movements. Higher percent correct judgments are also
produced by visual feedback entirely controlled by the
computer compared to coincident self-generated feedback. The
single asterisk (*) denotes significant differences at p<0.05,
whilst the double asterisks (**) denote a significant difference
of p<0.01.
Figure 5.1: Schematic representation of experimental set up. When looking 108
into the mirror, images projected into the upper screen appear
to be in the same plane as the table surface. Thus, an
unperturbed image of a virtual hand appears to be in the same
location as the participants actual hand.
Figure 5.2: At the beginning of each trial a red target bar appeared for 109
500ms and then disappeared again before movement onset.
During the reach, participants saw the virtual hand pass
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beneath a virtual occluding bar before re-emerging on the other
side. TMS was applied on 50% of trials at random while the
hand was occluded. On 50% of trials the hand was also
perturbed from its veridical position while occluded. At the end
of the trial participants made a verbal self vs. other judgment.
Figure 5.3: Percent correct judgments for ZERO -degree (self) and FOUR 113
degree (other) perturbations when TMS was delivered (open
circles) or not delivered (filled squares) over rIPL (left figure)
or vertex (right figure). Asterisks denote significant differences
revealed by planned comparisons.
Figure 5.4: Schematic representation of the comparator model. Frith et al. 116
(2000) explained the passivity symptom in schizophrenia
(delusions of control), in which patients perceive self-
movements to be produced by other agents, to be a result of
impaired predicted state representations. Disruption to the
predicted state representation causes the CNS to loose track of
what self is so that even when actions are carried out as
intended the comparator detects a false discrepancy between
the predicted and estimated state representations (comparisons
represented by the crossed circles). The current results also
demonstrate an increase of inaccurate other judgments as a
result of the rIPL TMS, suggesting that TMS over the rIPL is
also disrupting the predicted state representation. Figure
adapted from Frith et al. (2000).
Figure 6.1: Schematic representation demonstrating the rotations evident in 128
a reaching movement involving the entire limb. Rotation takes
place at the shoulder, elbow and wrist.
Figure 6.2: Schematic representation of experimental set up. Images 132
projected onto the projection screen are reflected in the mirror
to appear in the same spatial plane as the actual movements.
The robot recorded the active movements and produced the
passive movements.
Figure 6.3: a) Passive conditions in which all targets were red and
movements were created by the robot, using minimum jerk
algorithm. b) Active conditions in which participants reached
toward the prior location of the green target.
134
Figure 6.4: Percent correct judgments for main effect MOVEMENT.
Passive movements (open bar) revealing a lower percent
correct score than the active movements (filled bar). The
asterisk denotes a significant difference and error bars
represent standard error.
136
Figure 6.5: Percent correct judgments for 0 (self) 4 (other) and 16 (other)
degree perturbations with movements actively produced by the
participant (filled squares) or passively produced by the robot
(open circles). The asterisk denotes a significant difference.
Error bars show standard error.
137
Figure 6.6: a) Comparison between predicted state and estimated actual
state found in comparator model (Frith et al. 2000). b)
Proposed comparison between proprioceptive and visual
signals.
139
Figure 7.1: MRI scans of A.B. reveals a small lesion in his left thalamus
and internal capsule.
150
Figure 7.2: Percent correct judgments for patient A.B. (open circles) and
controls (filled squares) for the ACTIVE conditions. a) RIGHT
(impaired) LIMB: A.B.s scores are significantly lower than
that of the control group for both the FOUR and SIXTEEN-
degree perturbations. There is no significant difference at
ZERO-degrees b) LEFT (unimpaired) LIMB. A.B.s score is
greater for the ZERO-degree perturbation and reduced for
FOUR-degree perturbation when compared to the control
group. There is no significant difference at SIXTEEN-degrees.
Page 8
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Error bars show 95% confidence intervals. Asterisks denote
152
significant differences.
Figure 7.3: Percent correct judgments for patient A.B. (open circles) 153
against the control group (filled squares) for the PASSIVE
conditions. a) RIGHT (impaired) LIMB: A.B.s score on the
ZERO-degree perturbation is significantly greater than controls
whilst performance for both the FOUR and SIXTEEN-degree
perturbations falls below that of the control group. b) LEFT
(unimpaired) LIMB: A.B.s score is significantly greater than
controls for the ZERO-degree perturbation, but reduced for the
FOUR-degree perturbation. There is no significant difference
at SIXTEEN-degrees. Error bars show 95% confidence
intervals. Asterisks denote significant differences.
Figure 7.4: Absolute reaching error for A.B. LEFT and RIGHT LIMB. a) 154
Endpoint error; there is no significant difference between
conditions in which A.B. reached with the LEFT (unimpaired)
compared to RIGHT (impaired) LIMB. b) Error at 25% of the
reach; there is no significant difference between conditions in
which A.B. reached with the LEFT (unimpaired) compared to
RIGHT (impaired) LIMB.
Figure 7.5: The intra-limb differences calculated for A.B. (filled bar) and 157
control group (open bar) a) the ACTIVE conditions, A.B.
demonstrates a greater difference between his hands than
controls, with his right hand performing significantly worse
than his left (negative scores) in comparison to controls for all
perturbation sizes. b) PASSIVE conditions A.B. demonstrates a
greater difference between his hands than controls with his
right hand performing significantly worse than his left in
comparison to controls for the 16-degree perturbation only.
Asterisks denote significant differences, error bars show 95%
confidence intervals.
Figure 7.6: The Omax physiotherapy vibrator. Three-speed (40Hz, 75Hz 163
and 100Hz) rechargeable handset with revolving counterweight
system in the head. Figure adapted form omax website.
Figure 7.7 Interaction VIBRATION * MOVEMENT: Vibration frequency
166
has more effect on percent correct scores for the ACTIVE
conditions than compared to the passive conditions. Percent
correct scores for LOW ACTIVE are greater than those
recorded for HIGH ACTIVE.
Figure 7.8: Planned comparisons between HIGH (100Hz) and LOW 167
(40Hz) FREQUENCY for each PERTURBATION size. a)
ACTIVE: LOW (filled squares) FREQUENCY percent correct
scores were significantly greater at the FOUR-degree
PERTURBATION than with HIGH (open circles)
FREQUENCY vibration. There were no significant differences
at ZERO or SIXTEEN. b) PASSIVE: There were no significant
differences between HIGH (open circles) and LOW (filled
squares) FREQUENCY at any PERTRUBATION sizes. The
asterisk denotes significant differences.
Figure 7.9: Absolute reaching error for HIGH (100Hz) and LOW (40Hz) 168
vibration frequencies. a) Endpoint error; there is no significant
difference in reach accuracy when the vibrators were
oscillating at the HIGH FRQUENCY compared to when
oscillating at the LOW FREQUENCY. b) Error at 25% of the
reach; there is no significant difference in reach accuracy when
the vibrators were oscillating at the HIGH FRQUENCY (filled)
compared to when oscillating at the LOW FREQUENCY
(open).
Figure 8.1: Schematic representation of the four different conditions V1 183
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and V0 referring to the presence and absence of a visual
perturbation respectively (white arrow) that pushed the cursor
(white circle) away from the robot arm (open circle). P1 and
P0 referring to the presence and absence of a physical
perturbation (yellow arrow) that pushed the robot arm away
from the target (T). Solid lines represent limb position at the
beginning of the movement. Dashed lines represent the relative
limb position at the end of the movement.
Figure 8.2: Table depicting the key features of each of the four different 185
trial types. V1 and V0 referring to the presence and absence of
a visual perturbation respectively whilst P1 and P0 refer to the
presence and absence of a physical (proprioceptive)
perturbation respectively.
Figure 8.3: Self-judgments for all four conditions. V1 and V0 refer to the 187
presence and absence of a visual perturbation respectively. P1
and P0 refer to the presence and absence of a physical
perturbation respectively. Error bars show standard error.
Graph depicts the percent self-scores for all four conditions.
Condition V0-P0 (unperturbed) produces significantly more
self-judgments than both V1-P1 and V1-P0. No significant
difference was found between V0-P0 and V0-P1.
Figure 8.4: Error results for all four conditions. V1 and V0 refer to the
presence and absence of a visual perturbation, respectively. P1 188
and P0 refer to the presence and absence of a physical
perturbation respectively. Error bars show standard error.
Graph depicts degrees of error for the cursor relative to the
target for all four conditions at both 25% and 100% of the
reach. No difference was found between V0-P0 and V1-P1 at
either 25% or 100% (accurate visual feedback). Condition V0P0
demonstrates significantly less error than both V1-P0 and
V0-P1 at 25% of the movement and less than V1-P0 at 100% of
the reach. No difference was found between V0-P0 and V0-P1
at 100% of the reach.
Figure 8.5: Schematic representation of actual limb trajectory (solid line),
cursor trajectory (dashed line) and perceived limb trajectory 195
(dotted line) relative to the target (T) for a) condition V1-P1
and b) V1-P0.
Figure 8.6: Graph depicting the significant VISUAL PERTURBATION * 196
PHYSICAL PERTURBATION interaction for error at 25% of
the reach  error at 100% of the reach (25%-100%). This
measure represents the amount of correction participants made
during the movement. Conditions V0-P0 and V1-P1
demonstrate little online movement correction whilst
conditions V0-P1 and V1-P0 demonstrate relatively large
connections. Error bars show standard error.
Figure 9.1: Schematic representation of the experimental set up. The 214
camera (a) was angled at a 75º angle pointing towards the
down-facing mirror (d) so that it captured the participants
actual movements, which when presented on the computer
screen were reflected in the up-facing mirror (c) so as to
appeared in the same spatial location as the actual movements.
The infrared diodes (b) allowed tracking of the infrared
reflective marker (e) attached to the index finger of the
reaching hand (brightest point of the image). The angle and
positioning of the CCD camera (a) and mirrors (c) (d) allowed
viewing of real time video footage of the actual reaches from
the same perspective as if viewing the actual hand.
Figure 9.2: Example of distribution of perturbations over trials for a) 216
incremental and b) random conditions. The data in both graphs
is equivalent, only differing by the order of the trials.
Figure 9.3: Graph showing percent self-judgments for each BIN NUMBER 218
of the RANDOM (open circles) and INCREMENTAL (filled
squares) conditions. Self-judgments were significantly fewer
for the unperturbed trials (ZERO) when the perturbed trials
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were presented in incremental steps (with an unperturbed trial
embedded with in each step) than when all perturbations
(including 0-degree perturbations) were presented randomly.
Small to medium sized perturbations for both conditions
produced a high percentage of self-judgments, whilst for the
larger perturbations a greater number of self-judgments were
produced for the incrementally presented perturbations
compared to when randomly presented. Error bars represent
standard error and asterisks denote significant differences (*=
p<0.05, **=p<0.001).
Figure 9.4: Hand paths from Participant 7 of the visual feedback on 3 220
consecutive trials in the INCREMENTAL condition. The first
reach (black solid line) is the trajectory of a reach that was
adapted to the perturbed visual feedback (10-degree
perturbation) and was most accurate to the target (black circle)
in response to which the participant gave a self-judgment. The
second reach (grey solid line) is an unperturbed trial
(participants saw their actual inaccurate movement) in response
to which an other judgment was given. The third trial (dashed
line) is the subsequent perturbed trial in which the participant
misreached in the opposite direction and also gives an other
judgement. Note: hand paths illustrated do not show reaches
from a fixed start point as reaches are shown in relation to a
fixed target location (actual target location shifted) and the
experimental set up prevented recordings of the beginning of
the reach.
Figure 9.5: Re-plotted data of mean percent self-judgments for the 222
perturbed trials (open circles) unperturbed trials (black crosses)
and also incorporating data points for the perturbed trials that
immediately followed the unperturbed trials (filled squares).
Note that the crosses and squares follow a very similar pattern,
both falling outside the 95% confidence intervals (error bars)
calculated for the circles. Asterisks denote significant
differences
Figure 9.6: a) Original data from Chapter 2 with percent self-judgments 226
collapsed across perturbation direction. The number of self-
judgments decreases with size of perturbation so that the
highest number of self-judgements was given in response to the
smallest (0-degrees) perturbation. b) Predicted curve of self-
judgements based original graph from Chapter 2 (black line)
and actual percent self-judgements from the current experiment
(open circles). In the current experiment the highest number of
self-judgments is found in bin TWO (3 and 4-degrees) opposed
to bin ZERO (0-degrees).
Figure 9.7: a) Data from Chapter 2 were re-plotted so that each 227
perturbation has a separate data point (negative values refer to
leftward perturbations, positive refer to rightward
perturbations). The new graph reveals a normal distribution, it
is clear from the graph that the highest number of self-
judgments is given in response to the 0-degrees perturbation
which is also the mean. b) RANDOM data from the current
chapter. Peak self-judgments approaches the mean.
Figure 9.8:
The centre of the diagram is equivalent to the original
comparator as described by Frith et al. (2000) with the
surrounding elements added on the basis of evidence from the
current thesis. High-level judgments are mainly informed by
the desired-[estimated] actual state comparison (solid black
arrow) and negatively informed (dashed arrows) by low-level
mechanisms and the visual-proprioceptive comparison. Low-
level agency mechanisms are informed by the predicted-actual
state comparison and the visual-proprioceptive comparison.
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The visual-proprioceptive comparison is an integral part of the
comparator model, under normal circumstances there is no
conflict and these signals form the estimated actual state.
Figure 9.9:
Neglect tests completed by patient L.S. on the day of testing a)
Line bisection task: L.S. marks the middle of each line to be
significantly over towards the right and completely misses the
most leftward line (second from bottom). b) Star cancellation
task: L.S. only cancelled out stars on the right hand side of the
sheet.
Figure 9.10:
L.S. percent self-judgments (black crosses) are only
significantly different from that of the control group (open
circles) on bin FOUR. With L.S.s scores falling outside and
above the 95% confidence intervals. The asterisk denotes a
significant difference.
229
237
238
Figure 9.11: a) In the first 40 trials of the experiment L.S. over self240
attributes compared to controls on 2 of the 4 bins, bin 1
(L.S.=88.9% self, controls=74.8% self) and bin 4 (L.S.=77.8%
self, controls=30.8% self) which are the smallest and the largest
perturbation sizes respectively. b) In the last 40 trials L.S.s
performance is in line with that of the control group. Asterisks
denote significant differences.
Figure 9.12: Schematic representation of the comparator model with neglect 242
lesion. Whilst the comparator model itself is functioning
normally, evident by neglect patients ability to adapt to
prisms, high-level conscious mechanisms have difficulty in
interpreting the comparator output. This is evident from the
increased percentage of self-judgments in response to perturbed
visual feedback recorded with neglect patient L.S. in the
current experiment.
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Chapter 1
General Introduction
Agency is the sense that you yourself are the cause of an action or event. For
example, knowing that you touched your own arm, rather than your arm being
touched by someone else or knowing that the image of an object moving across
your retina is the result of your own head or eye movement rather than the
object itself moving. Agency attribution is the ability to identify the source
of
an event as either yourself or an external agent and is crucial to the survival
of
every biological being. Attribution of movement agency is also crucial for
normal human social interaction, as before we can attribute intentions and
desires to other people, we must first be able to determine whether a perceived
action or event has been caused by ourselves or by another person.
1.1: Recognising the Self Through Action and the Experience of Agency
There is a great similarity between our own actions and those of other people,
not only in terms of the movements characteristics, but also in the way that
the
movements are processed in the brain. For example, research in monkeys has
identified neurons in the brain that respond to both performed and observed
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actions (e.g. Rizzolatti, et al. 1996). Similar neurons have also been
identified
in humans. Georgieff and Jeannerod (1998) highlighted these common areas,
which are frontal parietal networks, including the ventral premotor area, part
of
the supplementary motor area (SMA) and the inferior parietal lobe. They
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interpreted these overlapping areas of activation to reflect shared
representations of actions. That is, action representations that are shared
between several individuals. Such shared action representations allow for
interpretation and prediction of other peoples actions and social phenomena
such as empathy. However, before we can do this we need to be able to
distinguish the movements that are made by ourselves from those produced by
other people. The ability to correctly identify our own actions from those
produced by others (agency attribution) is therefore a fundamental component
of human social interaction and while ambiguity of this experience is rare, the
process can become compromised in specific presentations of psychosis or
following brain injury if mechanisms associated with self-awareness and
agency attribution become disrupted.
Gallagher (2000) defined a sense of agency as the sense that I am
causing an action. Such feelings are likely to depend strongly on the actors
intentions. The way that humans process observed actions of other people has
been found to change dependent on the observers intentions. Grézes et al.
(1999) conducted a Positron emission tomography (PET) study in which the
participants observed video clips of meaningless hand actions. In one group the
participants were instructed to pay attention to the movements for a later
recognition task, whilst others were told they would later be required to
imitate
the actions. Although there were many common networks activated between
the two groups the intention to imitate group demonstrated bilateral increases
in regional cerebral blood flow of the dorsal pathway including premotor and
prefrontal areas when compared to the recognition group. All such activations,
although bilateral, were more pronounced in the right hemisphere and in
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addition the inferior parietal lobe demonstrated greater activation only on the
right side. Such a change in processing between the groups indicates that high-
level intentions can have a direct effect on how the observed action is
processed within the brain. Notably, this effect of intentions seems to have
greatest impact on right hemisphere structures particularly the right inferior
parietal lobe.
1.2: Agency Attribution and the Right Hemisphere
There is significant evidence in the literature implicating the right
hemisphere,
specifically frontal parietal networks (Decety and Chaminade, 2003), with self-
awareness and other aspects of self-processing including self and self-body
representations. For example, Fink et al. (1996) conducted a PET study in
which participants were exposed to sentences that were either describing their
own autobiographical experiences or those of another person. When the
sentences were of their own experiences an increase in blood flow was found
in right hemisphere structures compared to at rest and exposure to
descriptions of others experiences. These structures included the right
prefrontal and posterior cingulate areas and the right insula. It was suggested
that this activity could correspond to representations of the self embedded in
such memories.
In a further demonstration of self-representations being situated in the
right hemisphere, direct cortical stimulation of the right angular gyrus of a 43
year-old female epileptic patient was found to induce out-of-body experiences.
In these experiences the patient felt as though she was floating above the bed
Page 13
Preston_Thesis
and could see herself from outside of her body. At higher-level stimulations
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she then reported feeling as though her limbs were shrinking and when her legs
were bent at the knee she felt as though her legs were moving towards her face
(Blanke et al., 2002). These illusions produced by the cortical stimulation were
confined only to the patients own body parts and as such implicates the right
angular gyrus to be specifically involved in self-body representation. In
addition to these examples, neurological deficits characterised by deficits in
own-body perception are predominantly associated with damage to the right
hemisphere (e.g. anosognosia, discussed below).
In terms of the feeling of agency the right hemisphere has been found to
correspond with making self/other attributions of observed actions. For
example, Farrer and Frith (2002) conducted an fMRI experiment in which the
participants had to guide a cursor along a T-shaped path. When the cursor
reached the junction of the path, at which one branch went to the left and the
other to the right, the participants then guided the cursor down one of the
branches as indicated by the spatial position of a cross (which had appeared at
the beginning of the trial). However, the movements of the cursor were not
always controlled by the participant. In these conditions the cursor was
controlled by the computer and travelled down the opposite branch to that
indicated by the cross.
It was found that when the cursor was controlled by the computer
(other) there was increased activation in the right inferior parietal lobe and
when the participant was in control, greater activity was observed in the
anterior insula. In a similar follow up study using PET, Farrer et al. (2003a)
were able to replicate these findings. In this study the other movements were
produced by applying varying degrees of angular perturbation between
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physically coincident actual and virtual feedback and the activity observed in
the rIPL was found to increase with the increasing size of perturbation. A PET
study by Spence et al. (1997) associated schizophrenic delusions of control
(discussed below) with the rIPL. These patients lay in the scanner and
performed random movements with a joystick. The movements made did not
differ from movements made by controls and were performed as instructed
(matched intentions) yet the patients reported feeling that they were under
external control. Whilst this was happening, the PET results recorded
hyperactivity in the right inferior parietal lobe. Additionally, Maruff et al.
(2005) found reduced cortical volume in the rIPL of such patients. (Note that
the insula and particularly the right inferior parietal lobe have been
associated
in many studies investigating different elements of self-processing).
However, high-level self-awareness (Morin, 2002) and agency
experiences have been related to inner speech (Stephens and Graham, 2000),
which is associated with left hemisphere regions (McGuire et al., 1996). In
addition to this, other studies have implicated agency attribution with the left
inferior parietal lobe, using patients with left parietal damage (Sirigu et al.,
1999) and rTMS on neurologically intact participants (MacDonald and Paus
2003). However, because of left inferior parietal lobes associations with
movement production, its contribution to experiences of agency may be more
associated with issuing the appropriate motor commands as opposed to feelings
of agency per se. This highlights an inherent problem with agency attribution
research as the experience of agency may be influenced by many mechanisms,
which are likely to account for the conflicting results.
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1.4: Current Perspectives in Agency Attribution
Current theories on agency attribution disagree about the extent to which the
sense of agency is a result of bottom-up or top-down processes or a mixture of
the two. Outlined below are two perspectives on agency attribution, one
centred on high-level processes, and one on low-level processes.
The Narrative Approach to Agency
A high-level explanation of agency relies on the human narrative, an action
occurs and feelings of agency are implied retrospectively, rationalised by the
actor to fit in with their beliefs and prior knowledge about themselves. This
approach has been advocated by Stephens and Graham (2000), who described
the way in which we feel a sense of agency over our actions to be similar in
principle to how we infer the attitudes and intentions of others. They stated
that
our perception of intentional movement is based on inferences from the
knowledge about ourselves with important reference to inner speech. It was
suggested that inferences of our intentions based on our inner dialogue are
formed in much the same way as inferences based on the overt dialogue of
other people. If the actions we perform fit in with our previous knowledge of
ourselves then intention, and thus wilful causality and agency, is inferred.
The results of a study by Libet et al. (1983) support the narrative
explanation of agency. Participants were required to make finger movements,
the frequency and exact timing of which, were to be decided by the individual,
with the instructions placing a specific emphasis on spontaneity. The perceived
intention to act, measured by the exact position of a second hand on the clock
(actual time corresponding to far less than a second) as reported by the
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participant when they experienced the urge to move, was compared to the
cerebral readiness to act, measured by EEG readiness-potentials from the
cortex. It was found that the cortical readiness-potentials preceded the
reported
urge to move by a mean time of 350ms. This suggests by the time we feel the
urge to move, the decision to move has already been made by the motor
system.
The narrative definition of agency draws parallels to utilisation
syndrome (see below) in which patients perform actions in direct response to
visual cues and then appear to justify their behaviour based on retrospectively
implied intentions (confabulation). However, Bayne and Pacherie, (2007)
criticised this approach by highlighting that patients who have suffered sever
amnesia, and so lack this prior knowledge of their beliefs, do not seem to have
deficits of agency. Similarly, many examples of patients with disrupted
experiences of agency (excluding schizophrenic patients), do not appear to
have problems with internal narrative. For example, the apparent lucidity of the
anosognosia patients described by Ramachandran, (1995, 1996), who, despite
having a good knowledge of their personal history, including other medical
conditions, deny their left sided paralysis.
The Comparator Model
A different standpoint is based on low-level comparator mechanisms of motor
control. The comparator model explanation of agency as described by Frith et
al. (2000) (see Figure 1.1) consists of an inverse loop, which executes the
action, and a forward model that predicts the consequences of that action
(based on efference copy of the original motor commands).
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Figure 1.1: Starting from the top left of the diagram and working down the left
hand side: the
intended goal of an action is necessary to specify the desired (next) state of
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the limb and also
the movement required to achieve that state. At this stage a motor command is
generated to
execute the necessary movements and a parallel efference copy is sent to the
predictor in order
to calculate the consequences of that particular motor command. In addition to
this, and
following on from the motor command, there is the (estimated) actual state of
the motor system
based on the outgoing motor commands and sensory feedback. This is an iterative
loop and is
constantly active both before and throughout the movement and as the movement
unfolds there
are a number of comparisons that can be made in order to monitor and update it.
Comparisons
(represented by crossed circles) can be made between the desired state and the
predicted state,
between the desired state and the actual state and between the actual state and
the predicted
state. Any discrepancies can be used to modify and correct the motor command
on-line during
the movement and so make it as accurate as possible. Thus, feelings of agency
are apparent
when the comparisons match, but if the discrepancies between any of the
comparisons become
too large then the CNS may treat any observed or internally monitored self
movement as
belonging to, or being under the influence of, an external agent. When the
system dysfunctions,
therefore, perhaps through brain abnormality or lesion, misperceptions of agency
can occur.
Adapted from Frith et al. (2000)
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In this account feelings of agency are derived from matching the actual
movement with the predicted consequences. Small mismatches of the
comparator are also used for motor learning purposes, adapting the motor
commands in order to successfully achieve the intended outcome. Larger
mismatches, however, are interpreted as being the action of another agent.
Frith et al. (2000) related the predicted representations of actions (predicted
state representation) to the action representations of imagined movements
because they share similar properties and are processes in similar places within
the brain (e.g. Decety et al., 1994). The comparator model was also used to
explain schizophrenic delusions of control in which a specific deficit with the
predicted state representation was described.
1.3: Abnormal Experience of Agency
Under normal circumstances humans have little difficulty in discriminating
between the actions produced by ourselves from those produced by other
people. However, certain pathological conditions can disrupt self-awareness
and self/other attribution in numerous and variable ways. In the current section
an outline will be given of some of the most documented of these pathologies.
Schizophrenic Delusions of Control
Delusions of control, otherwise known as passivity is one of the first order
positive symptoms of schizophrenia. This particular type of symptom is
characterised by the patient feeling as though they are not in control (the
agent)
of their actions. Although passivity can also present for thoughts and/or
emotions, for the relevance of the current research the description here will
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relate only to delusions of control for actions. Such patients appear to have no
significant deficit in action production and interestingly the alien actions
appear to successfully comply with the initial intentions, yet feelings of
agency
are absent (Frith, 2002).
The comparator model explanation of schizophrenic delusions of
control describes a malfunctioning predicted state representation. By lesioning
the comparator model at this area (see Figure 1.2) so that the comparator no
longer produces an accurate prediction of the next state of the motor system
means that a mismatch would be detected between the predicted state
representation and the estimated actual state, even when the action is self-
produced and conforms to prior intentions.
Figure 1.2: Schematic representation of comparator model lesions for
schizophrenic delusions
of control. An impaired predicted state representation leads to false mismatches
with the
estimated actual state.
Frith et al. (2000) connected the predicted state representation with
motor imagery due to the similarities found between real and imagined actions.
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For example, imaginary movements can affect motor learning in a similar way
to actual movements (Mendoza and Wichman, 1978). Similarities are observed
in timing of actual and imagined movements (Decety and Michel, 1989) and
similar neural activity is also shared between the two (Decety et al., 1994)
(Jeannerod, 1994 for review). Wilson et al. (2003) even documented patient
C.W., a 67 year-old man who, following bilateral parietal damage from two
separate strokes, was found to accidentally act out his imagined movements.
Schizophrenic patients have been found to have deficits with mental
imagery of body parts and motor imagery of self-produced movements. For
example, de Vignemont et al. (2006) found that schizophrenic patients were
impaired in comparison to controls in a mental rotation task. Although they
found the same pattern in reaction time (increases in reaction time correlated
with increases in image rotation), overall reaction time and error rate was
greater for schizophrenic patients when identifying if a rotated image was of a
left or right hand. Similarly, imagined movements are restricted by the same
constraints as actual movements (Decety and Michel, 1989). This is not the
case, however, with schizophrenic patients suffering from passivity whose
movements have been found to be unaffected by factors such as distance and
target size (Maruff et al., 2003). In addition, these patients also had
difficulty in
answering questions that required them to imagine performing simple gestures
(e.g., when using a pair of scissors what is nearer to the floor, your index
finger
or your thumb?). If the imagined movements are representative of the predicted
state representation these findings support the idea that it is impaired in this
specific patient group.
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However, schizophrenic patients also have delusional beliefs, which
may indicate a deficit in high-level processing and crucially for Stephen and
Grahams (2000) narrative approach to agency, schizophrenic delusions of
control often co-occurs with auditory hallucinations (Jones and Fernhough,
2007). In addition to this, other studies have found schizophrenic patients to
be
able to successfully control their movements suggesting low-level mechanisms
to be intact. For example, Soud at al. (2000) found that reaching movements of
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schizophrenic patients exhibited the same speed/ accuracy trade off as found
with non-schizophrenics, demonstrating that they are taking into account the
external contextual cues. Similarly an experiment conducted by Fourneret et al.
(2001) required participants to direct a visually presented cursor towards a
target. The experimenters applied an angular perturbation to the visual
feedback so that the participants had to deviate the trajectory of their actual
movements (hidden from view) to one side, in order to accurately guide the
visual feedback towards the target. Both schizophrenic patients and controls
were successfully able to adjust their movements in this way, the difference
between the two groups only becoming apparent after the movement was
completed. At the end of each movement participants were presented with
feedback of their actual hand position in relation to the target, which was
inaccurate due to compensating for the perturbation. The control group
recognised that the inaccuracy was due to manipulations by the computer,
whilst the schizophrenic patients attributed the inaccuracy to themselves
(blaming tiredness etc). This experiment clearly shows that the schizophrenic
patients can successfully make online adjustments to their movements in
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accordance with visual feedback, suggesting that the actual deficit may only
involve higher-level attribution.
Further experiments, however, have revealed that in the absence of
vision, error correction of movements is impaired in schizophrenic patients
(Frith and Done 1989). For example, Mlakar et al. (1994) found that when
drawing geometric shapes in the absence of vision schizophrenic patients
performed worse than controls. These results suggest schizophrenic patients do
have a deficit in low-level control of action, specifically in proprioceptive
monitoring of self-produced actions (explaining why the aforementioned
studies using visually guided movements found no impairment). In addition to
this, schizophrenic patients appear to lack some of the implicit advantages of
self-producing a movement. For example, the enactment effect describes the
advantage of remembering phrases describing previously performed actions in
comparison to recall of action phrases that were not performed. Daprati et al.
(2005) compared the free recall of performed action phrases in comparison to
non-performed action phrases in schizophrenic patients and in a non-
schizophrenic control group. Each group was exposed to 30 phrases all of
which were presented aurally and visually (video clip of an actor performing
the action). In half of the trials the participants were also required to act
out the
movements themselves, whilst in the remaining trials they made no
movements. The control group demonstrated an enactment effect,
remembering significantly more of the action phrases that were also performed.
However, the schizophrenic group did not have this advantage, demonstrating
no difference in recall of acted or non-acted phrases. The authors argued that
this was not a result of a general memory impairment as there was no
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difference between the control and schizophrenic groups for the non-performed
phrases and there was also no difference in an additional recognition task
(same phrases used). Therefore, it was suggested that the schizophrenic
patients failed to gain the benefit of enactment due to a failure to correctly
bind
representations of the action with the self.
Similarly, schizophrenic patients have also been found to rate the
intensity and ticklishness of self-produced stimuli to be in line with that
which
is externally produced (stroking the left palm with a piece of foam either
controlled by the right hand -self-produced, or the experimenter -externally
produced) whilst control participants rated self-produced stimuli as less
intense
and ticklish (Blakemore et al. 2003). The interesting finding from these studies
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is that the reduced sense of agency felt by the schizophrenic patients appears
to
be also affecting low-level processes. That is, not only do the high-level
beliefs
of the patients fail to feel a sense of agency but the low-level processes of
the
motor system also interpret the actions as externally produced.
Another example of Schizophrenic patients demonstrating a deficit in
low-level agency processes, directly associates their deficits with action
prediction mechanisms (predicted state representation). Bulot et al. (2007)
conducted an experiment in which the participants were required to stop the
movements of a swinging pendulum by applying sufficient grip force onto a
load cell. The participants were instructed to be as efficient as possible
applying only the minimum grip force required, whilst not letting it slip
through their fingers. The experiment was completed both when the pendulum
was released by the participants free hand and when it was released by the
experimenter. The non-schizophrenic control group showed an advantage in
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the trials in which the pendulum was released by themselves, in that they were
able to stop the pendulum whilst applying less grip force than when the
pendulum was released by the experimenter. The schizophrenic patients,
however, failed to show this advantage, demonstrating a similar degree of grip
force in the self releasing trials as in the experimenter releasing trials.
These
findings suggest that although schizophrenic patients have abnormal beliefs
that may contribute to delusions of control, they also have a deficit in
low-level
processing of self-generated movement.
Anarchic Limbs
A disorder in which patients are recorded to deny agency over their own limb
movements is alien or anarchic limb syndrome. This is described as a motor
phenomenon in which the actions of the affected hand are not under voluntary
control. Although patients with an anarchic limb are generally under no
illusion that the limb is their own, they often refer to it in the third person,
and
as such movements are distressing to the individuals, there is often negative
feelings towards the limb (Muangpaisan et al., 2005). Anarchic limbs are most
commonly a result of damage to either the supplementary motor area (SMA) or
the corpus callosum (Della Sala, 2005). Interestingly, these two anatomical
locations have been differentiated in terms of the nature of the alien
movements. Anarchic limbs following frontal lesions incorporating the SMA,
have been described as performing stereotyped actions in direct response to
visual stimuli grasping and groping at objects. Following lesions to the corpus
callosum, however, the involuntary movements are more often described
mirroring movements of, or making movements that are the opposite to, those
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performed by the unaffected limb. For example, doing up buttons with the
unaffected hand whilst immediately undoing them with the anarchic hand
(Geschwind et al. 1995)
Crucially the reduced sense of agency evident in patients with alien limb
syndrome demonstrates a key difference from the lack of agency experienced
in schizophrenic delusions of control (described above). Patients with alien
limbs carry out unintended movements with the affected limb for which they
fail to feel agency towards, whilst schizophrenic patients with delusions of
control claim absence of feelings of agency for movements that were intended.
Due to this important distinction it is stated by Frith et al. (2000) that
whilst
delusions of control reflect a deficit with the experience agency, the presence
of an alien limb does not. When the motor system initiates a movement an
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efference copy of the issued motor commands is used to form the predicted
state representation. However, afferent signals from the movement and the
environment help to fine-tune the motor commands in order to make a
successful and accurate reach. One example of such influences on the motor
commands is affordances (e.g. graspable objects) in the surrounding visual
environment. It was claimed by Frith et al. (2000) that patients with alien limb
syndrome make actions with the affected limb that are no longer controlled by
their intentions but are instead initiated by affordances in their environment,
thus producing discrepancies between their actions and intentions.
However, since there is no deficit in feelings of agency these patients are
aware of the discrepancies as well as being aware that it is their own limb i.e.
they have no deficit in either agency attribution or in the sense of ownership
(Figure 1.3a). This point is used as an explanation for why alien limb syndrome
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is associated with the SMA and the corpus callosum opposed to parietal areas.
The SMA being linked to motor selection processes (Leuthold and Jentzsch,
2001) and damage to the corpus callosum is suggested to prevent inhibition of
the affected limb from initiating movements already completed by the
unaffected limb (Frith et al., 2000).
Another disorder in which the patients actions appear to be initiated by
visual affordances, is utilisation disorder. These patients produce stereotyped
behaviours that were not intended but if questioned about their actions they
attempt to rationalise them as if they were intended. For example, Lhermitte
(1983) described a 62 year-old woman, who following a ruptured aneurysm,
showed utilisation behaviour towards numerous objects including picking up a
knife and fork and making cutting movements (nothing to cut). This can be
explained within the framework of the comparator model in a similar way to
that of alien limb syndrome. The utilisation behaviour is triggered by
environmental affordances as opposed to being produced in accordance with
prior intentions. However, unlike alien limb syndrome, these patients are not
aware of their lack of agency as they retrospectively devise intention. This is
explained by a failure to form intentions, so that no discrepancies of the
comparator are detected because there were no intentions for the actions to be
discrepant against. Hence, in absence of any information to the contrary, the
patient assumes agency (see Figure 1.3b).
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Figure 1.3: a) Schematic representation of comparator model lesions for alien
limb syndrome.
The patients movements are no longer controlled by intentions but by visual
affordances.
Patients are completely aware of the discrepancies present between intentions
and actions
because they have no deficit in feelings of agency. b) Schematic representation
of lesions of
the comparator model for utilisation disorders. No intentions are formed so that
movements are
initiated based on visual affordances only. No discrepancies are present between
actions and
intentions as there were no intentions to begin with.
This latter example is interesting as it suggests a role for the internal
narrative in the attribution of agency. Frith et al. (2000) admitted that in
most
cases people are largely unaware of their actions, as is shown by experiments
in which participants make significant alterations to their movements without it
reaching awareness (Fourneret et al, 2001). In fact in most cases it is likely
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that
humans only become aware of their actions when a discrepancy is detected.
Whilst utilisation disorder appears a prime example of the narrative
explanation of agency in which it is claimed that intentions are retrospectively
inferred to our actions (see above), such behaviour seems to also rely upon
GENERAL INTRODUCTION CHAPTER 1
output from the comparator. Stephens and Graham (2000) claimed that our
own intentions (and hence agency) are inferred in a similar manner to inferring
the intentions of other people, based on prior behaviour. Utilisation
behaviours,
however, are by nature out of character and often inappropriate, yet the
patients
presenting with such symptoms are often lucid with good past and recent
autobiographical memory from which such inferences are said to be made
(Lhermitte 1983). Therefore, although these patients appear to confabulate
intentions for their actions subsequent to the event, it is unlikely to be due
to
inferences based on prior behaviour but instead due the comparator not
detecting a discrepancy and thus not alerting the patient to their otherwise
unconscious intentions.
Anosognosia
Anosognosia has been described in conjunction with several disabilities (e.g.
anorexia -Vandereycken, 2006, hemianopia and aphasia -Bisiach et al., 1986),
but for the current purposes this description will focus on anosognosia for
hemiplegia (one sided paralysis). Anosognosia for hemiplegia can occur in
varying severities from indifference towards the paralysis to consistent denial
despite being presented with irrefutable evidence to the contrary. The disorder
is most frequent following right hemisphere damage predominantly including
the parietal area (Pia et al., 2004). The denial of disability can occur despite
normal intelligence and lucidity of the patient and can be specific to one form
of illness whilst awareness of other conditions is unaffected. For example,
Ramachandran (1995) described a patient B.M., a 76 year-old woman who,
following a right hemisphere stroke, denied her left sided paralysis yet
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admitted that she was in hospital due to a stroke and who also was in no denial
of her additional diabetic condition.
One previous explanation given for anosognosia is that because it often
presents alongside hemispatial neglect (see below), in which the patient is not
aware of the contralesional (left) side of space, the hemiplegia, like most on
the
left, is ignored. However, double dissociations between neglect and
anosognosia are common, suggesting that, although in some cases neglect
might contribute to the lack of awareness of hemiplegia, anosognosia is a
functionally separate disorder (Bisiach et al., 1986). A further explanation is
that because such patients do not attempt to move their limb they never receive
information confirming the paralysis (Heilman, 1998). Often when asked to
move their paralysed limb patients attempt to talk their way out of the
question.
For example, Ramachandran (1995) described patient O.S. a 65 year-old
woman, who, when asked whether she could move her left, hand responded
did you know my farther was left handed?... to deflect from the emphasis
away from the question. In other examples patients have claimed tiredness or
additional ailments that would excuse them from using their paralysed hand.
For example, patient L.R., a 77 year-old woman described by Ramachandran
(1996) who, when asked to point with her left hand and failed to do so, claimed
it was because she had arthritis in her left shoulder.
However, some patients claim agency over movements of their
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paralysed hand that were never made. The following examples are taken from
Ramachandran (1996) who described the anosognosia symptoms patient F.D.,
a 77 year-old woman who, despite being highly lucid and intelligent, claimed
to be moving her left arm that lay paralysed in front of her.
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Experimenter: Mrs D can you clap?
F.D.: of course I can clap
Experimenter: can you clap for me?
F.D.: (she proceeded to make clapping movements with her right hand as if
clapping with an imaginary hand near the midline).
Experimenter: Are you clapping?
F.D.: Yes, Im clapping. Ramachandran (1996)
In a further example;
Experimenter: Can you point to my nose with your right hand?
F.D.: (she followed his instructions and pointed to the experimenters nose).
Experimenter: Mrs. D, point to me with your left hand.
F.D.: (her hand lay paralysed in front of her).
Experimenter: Mrs. D, are you pointing to my nose?
F.D.: yes.
Experimenter: Can you clearly see it pointing?
F.D.: yes its about two inches from your nose. Ramachandran (1996)
Patient F.D. had no problems with vision and no hemispatial neglect, yet in
both instances she was claiming agency over movements she did not make and
in the latter example even claimed to see her limb pointing. These descriptions
do not follow the assumption that the paralysis is not realised because
movement is not attempted and suggest that the patient, on at least some level,
GENERAL INTRODUCTION CHAPTER 1
had the experience of her limb moving. In addition to this, some patients with
anosognosia have been found not only to be unaware of their own disabilities
but also those of other patients (Ramachandran and Rogers-Ramachandran,
1996), suggesting that in some patients at least the disturbed body
representation also extends to other peoples bodies.
Frith et al. (2000) stated that the urge to move is a result of forming a
representation of the intended next position of the limb (desired state
representation). Following this, the individual then perceives the initiation of
that movement, which is distinct from actual movement initiation and occurs as
a result of forming a representation of the predicted next state of the motor
system that is based on the efference copy of the motor commands (predicted
state representation). This was supported by a study conducted by Haggard and
Magno (1999), in which they found that by applying TMS to the motor cortex
they could delay the actual initiation of the movement whilst having little
affect on the perceived initiation, demonstrating that the two are dissociable.
Thus, if a patient successfully plans a movement and forms a predicted state
representation, then even with paralysis, the experience of initiating the
movement would be obtained. However, following perceived movement
initiation the patient continues to believe that the movement is occurring
despite making no actual movement. Therefore, the discrepancies between the
estimated actual state and both the predicted and the desired state
representations, are ignored (see Figure 1.4).
Somatosensory impairment and neglect of the paretic side, which
commonly occur in conjunction with anosognosia, are likely to contribute to
the patients lack of awareness of these discrepancies. However, not all
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present with all three deficits (patient F.D. described above being an example)
so Frith et al. (2000) claimed that anosognosic patients are likely to have an
additional deficit resulting in the poor conscious self-monitoring of movements
that is already apparent in neurologically intact individuals (Fourneret et al,
2001) becoming exaggerated. Therefore, the deficit with anosognosia is not
within the comparator itself, but in high-level conscious awareness of
comparator output.
Figure 1.4: Schematic representation of comparator model lesions explaining
anosognosia.
Movement intentions and predicted state representation formed as normal.
However, no
movements are actually performed and discrepancies between the estimated actual
state and
predicted and desired state are ignored.
Hemispatial Neglect
Hemispatial neglect is a disorder affecting self-awareness that shows close
association with anosognosia as both disorders often occur in conjunction with
one another and are associated with similar lesion locations (Pia et al., 2004).
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This disorder is characterised by the patients failure to acknowledge objects
on, or orient towards, the contralesional side. The anatomical location most
associated with neglect syndrome is generally the right hemisphere with
lesions particularly involving the parietal lobe (Driver and Mattingley, 1998).
As such, the neglected side of space is usually the left side. Although in most
cases neglect symptoms do not persist more than a few weeks (Cassidy et al.,
1998), in some patients it is a more permanent condition and can be a predictor
of general poor prognosis and resistance to rehabilitation (Denes et al., 1982).
Classic neuropsychological tests for neglect include line bisection (Figure
1.5a)
in which a patient is presented with horizontal lines and asked to mark each
one at the centre. In this test a patient with neglect will mark the line
significantly over towards the ipsilesional side (most often towards the right
side). Another classic test is star cancellation (Figure 1.5b) in which a
patient is
presented with an array of small and large stars that are evenly distributed
across the page. The patient is then asked to mark all the small stars they see.
A
typical neglect patient will only cancel out stars to the right (ipsilesional)
overlooking ones on the far left (contralesional) of the page. This right-sided
bias even occurs when producing images from memory. For example, when
asked to draw a clock face, a neglect patient is likely to either miss the
detail
off the left side of the image (e.g. only include numbers 12  6, (for example
see Figure 1.5c) or attempt to fit all the numbers on the right hand side.
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Figure 1.5: Classic neglect tests completed by patient L.S., an 81 year-old male
neglect patient
tested at the University of Nottingham. a) Line bisection task. When asked to
mark the middle
of the line L.S.s responses were heavily biased towards the right. b) Star
cancellation task.
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When asked to cancel out all the small stars, L.S. only marked the stars to the
right of centre. c)
Picture of a clock drawn from memory: detail clearly lacking on the left side of
the picture.
In relation to self-awareness, many neglect patients fail to acknowledge
or use body parts on the contralesional side. For example, patients described as
having motor-neglect will use their contralesional limb when prompted but
without prompting they will ignore it and favour using the ipsilesional limb
even if the ignored limb if fully dextrous (Punt et al., 2005). An example of
self/other attribution deficits in neglect comes from observations during
rehabilitation. Neglect symptoms have been found to be reduced following
prism adaptation, in which the individuals visual field is shifted resulting in
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objects in their visual world appearing to one side of their actual physical
location. Therefore, in order to interact with this optically shifted world, the
individual has to realign their visual and proprioceptive representations. For
example, a participant wearing prism goggles with a 10-degree rightward
optical shift, when reaching towards a visual target will misreach to the right
by an almost equivalent amount (some online correction). After several trials,
however, the participant will become accurate with their reaches. Following
removal of the prisms, the participant will again misreach, this time in the
opposite direction; this second misreach is known as the negative aftereffect.
For neurologically intact individuals the aftereffect lasts only a few minutes.
With neglect patients, however, (using rightward prisms so that the aftereffect
shifts them towards their neglected side  e.g. Luaute et al. 2006) the
aftereffect has been found to last for up to four days, reducing their rightward
bias on numerous neglect tests such as the ones mentioned above (Pisella et al.,
2002). The size of the aftereffect of neglect patients has also been found to be
greater in magnitude than found with controls (Rossetti et al., 1998).
Interestingly, in relation to agency, the neglect patients do not appear to
be aware of the perturbations and exhibit what has been described as
hypernosognosia, which refers to a self-attribution of the prismatically induced
errors (Michel et al., 2007). With neurologically intact participants, Michel et
al. (2007) have been able to increase the magnitude of the prism-induced
aftereffects by incrementally increasing the size of the prismatic perturbation
over a series of trials. This mimicked the hypernosognoisa seen with neglect
patients, as the participants awareness of the perturbations was reduced.
Therefore, the exaggerated prismatic aftereffect observed with neglect patients
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may be due to underlying problems with self/other attribution and, furthermore
such deficits are unlikely to be centred in low-level mechanisms due to the
ability of these patients to adapt to prisms. Therefore, the reduced awareness
seen with these patients may be due to a decreased self-monitoring of action,
such as that described above for anosognosia.
1.3: The role of Proprioception in Agency
A recent criticism of the comparator model is that it underestimates the role of
proprioceptive signals (Synofzik et al., 2007) the main role of which is
restricted to formation of the estimated actual state rather than contributing
directly to experiences of agency. Some previous studies have found
deafferented patients to be impaired in self/other attribution of action (Farrer
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et
al., 2003b and Balslev et al., 2006), which may suggest that proprioception
plays a greater role. In addition to this, the previously discussed experiments
examining schizophrenics with delusions of control suggest that they have a
deficit in monitoring the proprioceptive feedback of their own movements.
However, as well as high and low-level agency mechanisms there are also
further aspects of self-awareness that are likely to be intrinsically linked to
agency whilst remaining fundamentally distinct, such as the sense of
ownership. This was defined by Gallagher (2000) as the sense that my body is
moving and, unlike with agency, ownership does not require intentions and the
active planning of a movement. For this reason, a feeling of ownership cannot
depend on efference signals from the motor commands but is more likely to be
informed by sensory feedback from the actual movements such as
proprioceptive signals and visual-proprioceptive congruence.
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Tsakiris et al. (2005) criticised many of the previous agency
experiments as not controlling for feelings of ownership and so
overemphasising the role of proprioception. In their study they compared the
self/other responses of active movements, for which intentions and motor
commands are formed in the usual way, to passive movements with no
intentions or motor commands so that responses were based on the matching of
visual and proprioceptive signals only. The participants right index finger was
lifted on a level that was controlled by either their own left hand (active) or
the
experimenter (passive). Visual feedback was provided of a video image of
either the participants right index finger moving (self) or the experimenters
finger undergoing the same movement (other) and over which they had to
make a self/other judgment. It was found that accuracy of self/other judgments
were greatly reduced with passive movements reaffirming the emphasis on
efferent signals for determining agency. However, due to the nature of the task
(the moving finger being lifted by a lever) it is most likely that judgments
were
made primarily on temporal differences between movement onset of the visual
feedback and the actual movement (movements were small and unlikely to
have additional spatial deviations due to being passively moved on a lever).
Frith et al.s (2000) claimed that awareness of initiating a movement
precedes actual movement initiation, before any sensory input is received,
therefore such judgments cannot involve proprioception. This was supported
by results from Haggard and Magno (1999) (see above) who found that TMS
over the primary motor cortex delayed button press reaction times in response
to a tone (go signal), with little affect on their perceived reaction times.
This
finding suggests that awareness of initiating a movement does not come from
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sensory feedback, as this would occur after the movement onset, and so
perceived reaction time would be delayed to the same extent as the actual
reaction time. Although feelings of agency are heavily based upon feelings of
movement initiation, it follows on that feelings of control over the entire
trajectory are of equal importance, for which proprioception is likely to play a
larger role.
De Vignemont and Fourneret (2004) differentiated these two aspects of
agency suggesting that movement initiation is accomplished by matching the
intended state with the predicted state whilst a sense of ones own movement is
accomplished by matching the predicted state with the sensory feedback (see
Figure 1.6). However, despite such a distinction it does not necessarily follow
that the role of proprioception should extend beyond forming the estimated
actual state. Therefore, one of the main aims addressed throughout the current
thesis was to investigate to what extent proprioception contributes to the
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experience of agency and how it might inform both high and low-level agency
mechanisms.
Figure 1.6: Schematic representation of the proposed two aspects of agency, a
sense of
movement initiation and a sense of a movement being ones own. Adapted from de
Vignemont
and Fourneret (2004).
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1.4: Conscious Awareness of Action
Most of the evidence discussed thus far is compatible with a low-level account
of agency opposed to high-level processes. However, our day-to-day
experiences of agency are high-level conscious judgments and it is exactly this,
that is measured in the majority of previous agency experiments. There is a lot
of evidence to suggest that humans are not consciously aware of precise low-
level mechanisms of their movements, which may present a problem with low-
level explanations of agency, in how low-level mechanisms inform higher-
level conscious awareness.
A paper by Georgieff and Jeannerod (1998) highlighted the important
differences between automatic actions, which are performed in response to
environmental cues and for which the agent has no conscious awareness of the
intentions, and voluntary actions that are purposeful and deliberated based
firmly on conscious intentions. This dissociation produces a clear distinction
between action awareness and the sense of agency as latter can be experienced
over movements for which the former is absent. Frith et al. (2000) stated that
for the most part, individuals are in fact not consciously aware of their
actions
until their awareness is captured by unexpected consequences (e.g. a disruption
to the sense of agency). This idea is supported by numerous experiments in
which participants made alterations to their movements yet remained unaware
of them. For example, Goodale et al. (1986) conducted an experiment in which
participants had to reach towards targets whilst vision of the reaching arm was
occluded. Part way through the reach the target location was shifted. The
participants were successfully able to adjust their movement trajectory in order
to accurately reach the target without the aid of vision, whilst remaining
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unaware of either the target movement or the adjustments made to their own
reach.
Further experiments have been completed also demonstrating a lack of
conscious monitoring of our movements. In a study by Fourneret and
Jeannerod (1998) participants were asked to draw straight lines with a stylus on
a graphics tablet, the visual feedback for which was presented so that it
appeared in the same spatial location as their actual movements. During the
experiment angular perturbations were applied to the visual feedback (the size
of which was variable between trials) so that in order to produce a straight
line
with the visual feedback, participants would have to make angular deviations
(away from a straight line trajectory) to their actual movement. Following each
trial the participants were then asked to indicate the direction of their actual
reach. In one condition this was done verbally by reading out the number of a
line from a response card that was perceived to correspond most accurately to
the movement they actually made. In an additional condition the participants
were required to indicate the trajectory of their movement by making a motor
response (recreating their movement with eyes closed). Not only were the
participants successfully able to make the motor adjustments so that perturbed
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visual feedback closely followed the sagittal line, but they were also largely
unaware of these alterations, underestimating the angle of their hand deviation,
with one group even perceiving their movement to be in the opposite direction.
This lack of conscious awareness of actual movements was evident even with
motor responses, participants tending to favour a straighter trajectory (closer
to
visual feedback) than the one actually generated.
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In another similar experiment by Slachevsky et al. (2001) it was found
that participants were unaware of the changes made to the direction of their
reaches up to approximately 14-degrees angular deviation following the
application of perturbations that increased in size over consecutive trials.
These
instances show us that we can have a full sense of agency over an action and
yet not be fully aware of what that action entails. This implies that feelings
of
agency may, in part at least, derive from higher processes than those directly
involved in the updating of the motor commands.
1.5: Thesis Aims
Previous experiments in agency attribution often reveal contradictory results,
which may be explained by differing paradigms investigating differing aspects
of agency. Although recently, theorists have identified a distinction between
high and low-level processes, it is as yet unclear how they may interact to
produce the experience of agency as we know it. The main aim of this thesis
was to investigate interactions between high and low-level agency mechanisms
in terms of experience of agency during a movement. To examine this
effectively the current thesis is divided into three sections, the first of
which
(Section 1) examined the relationship between agency attribution and the right
hemisphere. This was achieved by testing a patient with callosal agenesis
(Chapter 3), determining the reliability of the spatial perturbation paradigm
for
agency (Chapter 4) and using single pulse TMS over the right inferior parietal
lobe (Chapter 5). Section 2 specifically investigated the role of proprioceptive
feedback in the experience of agency, by comparing self/other judgments of
active and passive movements (Chapters 6), and with reduced proprioceptive
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feedback by testing a patient with somatosensory loss (Chapter 7a) and healthy
controls with tendon vibration (Chapter 7b). Finally, Section 3 related these
findings in terms of high and low-level mechanisms by measuring low-level
motor responses as well as high-level self/other judgments in response to both
visual and physical perturbations to reaching movements (Chapter 8). This was
also investigated by examining self/other judgments during covert adaptation
of the motor system (Chapter 9a), and finally relating these findings to a
patient with hemispatial neglect (Chapter 9b).
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Chapter 2
General Methods Section
2.1: MiniBIRD
The miniBIRD 800 is a motion-tracking device with six degrees of freedom. It
consists of up to four sensors each 8.1mm x 8.1mm x 8.1mm which are
connected via a 4mm diameter 3m cable to an electronics unit (transmitter).
The miniBIRD uses electro magnetic principles to measure the position and
orientation of the sensors respective to the transmitter. It has a static
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accuracy of 0.05mm RMS and position resolution of 0.18mm RMS and is able
to determine position and orientation by pulsing a DC magnetic field from the
transmitter, the characteristics of which are interpreted by the sensors. The
centre of transmitter is the origin and reference point for X, Y and Z
coordinates,
which radiate orthogonally out from it in the standard manner. As
with any electromagnetic recording device the workspace is required to be
devoid of materials that conduct electricity (metal) as it would interfere with
the magnetic field and so alter the recordings. The miniBIRD has a useful
recoding range of up to 760mm from the centre of the transmitter.
Within the current thesis the miniBIRD is only used for the experiment
in Chapter 3 in which X and Y position coordinates of one sensor were
measured in order to reproduce accurate online visual feedback of reaching
movements. The accuracy and reliability of the miniBIRD was analysed with
the following procedures: Two sensors were attached to a rigid body at three
different distances apart (50mm, 100mm and 150mm). The distance between
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the two sensors was recorded at 20 separate static locations within the
workspace that was used for the experiment (800mm x 450mm), which were
evenly distributed between lateral and radial orientations. For static marker
95% of the data was found to fall between ±0.26mm of the mean distance
between the markers. When a similar procedure was employed with the sensors
in motion (using various different velocities) it was found that 95% of the data
fell within ±1.23mm of the mean distance between the sensors (using distances
of 50mm, 100mm and 150mm).
2.2: Polhemus LIBERTY
The Polhemus LIBERTY 240/8 is a high-resolution, three-dimensional (3df)
motion tracking system. The system operates using electro magnetic principles
with a sampling rate of up to 240Hz. It consists of a host computer, a systems
electronic unit, a magnetic source and up to 8 independent sensors. The
systems electronic unit is a stand-alone device, which contains connector ports
for the sensors and the source as well as connections to relay data to the host
computer. The source is a 5mm cube (approx.) from which the electromagnetic
field is transmitted. This is positioned on a non-metallic surface close
to the sensors. The sensors themselves are small devices that can be attached to
the moving objects (hand or digits of the reaching limb) the position of which
is measured relative to the magnetic source. Each sensor is connected to the
Systems electronic unit, which can record the coordinates of up to 8 separate
sensors each at 120 or 240 Hz. The Polhemus can be connected to the host
computer via a USB or COM port and requires either Windows 2000 or
Windows XP and to have the Polhemus PiMgr GUI software installed.
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The Polhemus records with a latency of 3.5ms and also contains a built-
in adaptive filter designed to reduce noise in the data. In order to reduce lag
between the requesting and receiving data from the Polhemus, output record
length should be kept to a minimum and all non-essential software applications
on the host computer need to be disabled. Strength of the signal is indicated
via
the LED on the front of the systems electronic unit. The Polhemus provides all
altitude angular coverage, recording both position (X, Y and Z coordinates)
and orientation. It provides a static accuracy of 0.03 inches RMS for X, Y and
Z positions and 0.15 degrees RMS for orientation. At a distance of 300mm the
Polhemus records at a resolution of 0.038mm for X, Y and Z positions and
0.0012 degrees for orientation. Total recording range is 900mm at the above
specifications, with overall useful operation in excess of 1800mm.
Within the current thesis the Polhemus LIBERTY is used to record X
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and Y co-ordinates from one sensor (240Hz) for the experiments in Chapter 2 ,
Chapter 4 and Chapter 5. The data was used to provide real time visual
feedback of the movements. Reach length was approx. 300mm towards the
source, in order to fall well within useful recording range.
2.3: vBOT 2D Robotic Manipuladum
The vBOT 2D is a two-dimensional (2df) robotic manipulandum for motion
tracking and force generation, sampling at a rate of 1000Hz. The vBOT
consists of a manipulandum, controller and host computer. The manipulandum
is the robot arm component of the vBOT, which includes all associated
hardware; torque motors, encoders, pulleys and drive belts and the optional
force/torque sensor. The robot arm is also the location of the safety switch,
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which needs to be closed (along with the controller unit to be started) in order
for the vBOT to be active. The controller unit relays information between the
manipulandum and the host computer. It is connected via three ribbon cables
attached to a PCI card in the host computer and requires either Windows 2000
or Windows XP, a PCI card interface, 2PCI slots, a graphics adapter and at
least a 1GHz processor, 256 MB memory, and 1GB free disk space. All
applications for the vBOT need to be written using Microsoft Visual C++,
which must also be installed on the host computer.
The encoders attached to the manipuandum monitor the angular
rotations of the motors in order to measure the position of the robot arm. All
information to and from the manipulandum are analogue signals which are
interfaced with the digital signals from the host computer. Digital to analog
converters allow the torque levels of the motors to be set and analogue digital
converters read the analogue signals from the optional force/torque sensor and
relay that information back to the host computer.
In order to safely and accurately apply forces to the handle specific
timing is required. Whilst the vBOT is activated, the Forces Function
(responsible for applying the forces) is continuously receiving position
information of the arm and sending information about the desired forces. These
operations are interfaced using a high priority thread running at 1kHz, leaving
the main thread for other functions such as graphics, for which exact timing is
less crucial.
In the current thesis the vBOT 2D is used to record X and Y coordinates
from the manipulatdum (1000Hz) for the experiments in Chapters 6,
7, and 8. The data is used to examine reach accuracy in addition to providing
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real time visual feedback of the movements. The vBOT is also used to create
passive movements (Chapters 5 and 6) and physical perturbations (Chapter 7)
utilising the Forces Function component of the device. In order for the visual
feedback to appear in the same location as the actual movements a scaling
factor of 1/8 had to be used.
In order to determine the reliability of the vBOT manipulandum, it was
programmed to perform 16 passive movements to four separate locations
within the workspace. 95% of the data fell within ±0.15mm of the mean
endpoint of the X axis and ±0.12mm on the Y axis.
2.4: The Mirage System
The Mirage system consists of a monochrome Basler A601F firewire CCD
(charge-couple device) Camera with a Tamron 6mm fixed focal length lens, an
iMAC OSX 10.4.1, 2.8GHz computer, two mirrors, one down-facing and one
up-facing a short range 8 diode infrared camera with the a disabled light sensor
and a infrared reflective marker.
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The CCD camera is positioned on a tabletop at a 75-degree angle with
the lens facing towards the horizontal down facing mirror, which enables the
camera to pick up movements in the plane of the tabletop. The CCD camera is
attached to the iMAC OSX 10.4.1 computer via a standard firewire cable and
mounted on the back of the CCD camera is the 8-diode infrared camera. The 8
light emitting diodes reflect of the infrared reflective marker, making it the
brightest part of the image. The iMAC OSX 10.4.1 requires windows XP
compatibility to run LabVIEW 8.2 IMAQ vision software, which allows
tracking of the X and Y co-ordinates for the marker whilst in the image
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(brightest point of the image). Therefore, movements of the marker can be
tracked within a 225x290mm area sampling at 60Hz at 640 x 480 vga
resolution. A crucial component of the Mirage system is that it allows live
video feedback of actual reaching movements to be viewed in the same
physical location, and from the same perspective, as if viewing the actual hand.
Therefore instead of having a cursor representing the actual limb movements
the system allows real time video footage of the actual limb to be presented as
visual feedback, which then can be manipulated by the computer.
Within the current thesis the mirage system was used for the
experiments in Chapter 9 for which the X and Y position co-ordinates of the
marker were recorded in order to examine reach accuracy of the movements
and to apply angular perturbations to the movements. Accuracy of the setup
was achieved by placing the Mirage ultraviolet marker on top of a sensor from
the Polhemus LIBERTY from which calibration algorithms were produced for
the workspace.
2.5: Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation
For the experiment in Chapter 5 the Polhemus Liberty (above) was used in
conjunction with single pulse transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) applied
to the right Inferior parietal lobe (rIPL), in order to ascertain the functional
nature of this area in the task. Previous studies showed that activity in the
rIPL
is associated with making other judgments to visual feedback of actions in a
self/other judgment task. The benefit of TMS is that it allows for a causal
association to be established between brain and behaviour and can help
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determine specific functional properties of observed neuronal activations. For
these reasons a brief account of TMS is given below.
What is TMS?
TMS is a non-invasive technique that involves a brief, high-current pulse
produced from a coil of wire. From this a magnetic field is formed that is
perpendicular relative to the plane of the coil the strength and which can reach
up to 1.5 Tesla, equivalent to tens of thousands of times the strength of the
earths own magnetic field (George, 2003). When placed on the scalp the
current passes through it and disrupts the underlying neurons inducing a
transient lesion in the brain. These time-locked 'virtual lesions' when placed
over a specific region of interest on the cortex, can, if essential to the task,
alter
the participant's performance (Pascual-Leone et al., 2000).
TMS units are comprised of a stimulation coil, from which the pulse is
initiated and a main unit that contains at least one energy storage capacitor, a
charging system, discharge switch and circuits for pulse shaping, energy
recovery and control functions (Pascual-Leone, 1999). The stimulation coils
are either circular or have a figure 8 shape, the figure 8 coils generate a more
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focal pulse as the maximal current is localised to the intersection of the two
circular components. With circular coil, however, the maximal current is
around the coils entire circumference (Hallet, 2000).
The principle of TMS is based upon exciting the neurons in the brain
underneath the coil by inducing an electrical field that causes neurons to
depolarise and fire, thus disrupting normal brain activity. As such the TMS
pulse is taking advantage of the electrical processes already apparent within
the
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brain (George et al. 2003). Successful stimulation is dependent upon two
criteria; a large enough current to produce a magnetic field of suitable
intensity
and the rate of change of the magnetic field that is kept rapid by using a very
short rise time (the time taken for the magnetic field to develop). (Pascual-
Leone et al., 1999).
The TMS virtual lesions have many advantages over actual lesions
observed in brain damage patients. The spatial resolution of TMS is restricted
to approximately 1cm. This is much smaller than many lesions found in brain-
damaged patients, which can result in additional deficits that can also affect
performance on a given task. In addition to this, larger lesions can also make
functional assumptions towards anatomical structures more difficult. Similarly
due to the transient nature of the pulse effects, there is not time for cortical
reorganisation to take place, which is a normal process that occurs following
brain damage. For these reasons Walsh and Rushworth (1999) claim TMS has
high functional resolution and is useful tool in modern cognitive neuroscience.
Single pulse TMS has the advantage of producing neuronal interference
at a precise point in time (Pascual-Leone et al. 2000). This transient nature of
the stimulation allows specific processes within a task to be targeted which is
important for the use of TMS within this thesis. In addition to this, single
pulse
TMS is well established for its high safety record when applied to healthy
controls (Pascual-Leone et al. 2000). Repetitive TMS (rTMS) on the other
hand involves the application of multiple successive pulses, the effects of
which are far less transient and although useful for cognitive tasks, can cause
seizures with those particularly at risk, such as individuals with a personal or
family history of epilepsy. For these reasons The TMS experiment conducted
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within this thesis uses single pulse TMS, being a reliably safe method and
allowing precise timing of pulse delivery to be achieved.
Exclusion Criteria
Although single pulse TMS is considered completely safe all participants who
took part in TMS study (Chapter 5) were screened for contraindications using a
self-report questionnaire based on the TMS Adult safety Screen (Keel et al.,
2001). Due to the risks of seizures (although unlikely with single pulse TMS) a
history of epilepsy in the family is included as exclusion criteria. Additional
exclusion criteria includes the presence of pace makers, hearing aids and other
mechanical aids, because the strong electrical fields generated with TMS can
interfere with these devices as well as metallic materials within them posing a
risk due to the conductive properties of metal. For this reason metal implants
are also part of the exclusion criteria and all participants were asked to
remove
any metal jewellery before participating.
Placement of the coil
Many different methods exist to decide which area of the scalp relates to a
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particular brain area. One method is using a functional BOLD signal from
fMRI images for each individual participant (for example, Niyazov et al.,
2005). However, this method is both expensive and time consuming, without
being infallible as TMS and fMRI maps have been found to be consistently and
systematically inaccurate (Herwig et al., 2002). Significant results have been
found with other methods such as using an international 10-20 EEG system,
which has been found to be mostly accurate between individuals for larger
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scale areas (Herwig et al., 2003). The experiment described in Chapter 5 uses
co-ordinates from a previous successful study looking at the right parietal
area;
Nager et al.(2004) positioned the coil 5cm posterior to the site used to
determine the intensity of the TMS (motor hand area). Nager et al. (2004)
found that stimulation of this area resulted in reduced detection of
somatosensory stimuli on the contralateral side. This should not be a factor in
for the TMS experiment, as the participants will only be making reaches with
the ipsilateral limb.
2.6: Pilot Study
Introduction
Previous studies investigating self/other attribution have used a variety of
techniques to create the other movements. Sirigu et al., (1999) used video
images of the experimenter producing actions (forming finger postures) that
where either the same or different to those produced by the participant, whilst
both were wearing gloves to disguise morphological differences. In this
experiment the participants demonstrated a high level of accuracy in self/other
judgments over feedback that was either other and incongruent (the
experimenters hand performing a different action to that performed by
themselves) or self (an accurate representation of their own hand). However,
the trials in which they saw the experimenters hand conducting the same
movements as themselves produced more errors. Tsakiris et al. (2005) only
used this more difficult condition for their experiment but expanded on it by
ensuring that all seen movements were actually passive. The moving finger
being lifted by a lever that was controlled by either, the participants other
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hand that was hidden from view, or by the experimenter. With this method of
producing other visual feedback only small movements can be used otherwise
synchronisation of the participants and experimenters movement is too
difficult. In addition, the exact amount by which the self and other movements
differ is difficult to ascertain, so that it is almost impossible to establish
thresholds for what is accepted as self.
Other studies have used perturbed self-produced movements, providing
virtual visual feedback of the participants own actions but applying spatial
(e.g. Farrer et al., 2003a and Farrer et al., 2003b) or temporal (e.g. Macdonald
and Paus, 2003) perturbations to them. With this technique the other refers to
the computer and not another person, but it allows greater control over the
degree of discrepancy between the actual movement and the visual feedback
provided. This therefore allows easier identification of what specific aspects
are important for feelings of agency. Moreover, this method allows the use of
larger and more complex movements as the other movements are always based
on the participants actual limb position. However, unlike with the
aforementioned technique, which used video footage of the participants actual
hand, in most cases the visual feedback is not of the actual limb but of a
virtual
representation of the limb (a notable exception to this is the mirage system see
above).
Importantly with this latter method it allows investigation of the
separate aspects that may contribute to experiences of agency for example
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action initiation can be better examined using temporal perturbations whilst the
detection of spatial differences and the importance of endpoint accuracy can be
better examined using spatial perturbations. The reason for this is due to the
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crucial difference between these two types of perturbation, that with temporal
perturbation the perturbed action always reaches the desire endpoint of the
movement whilst spatial perturbations make the visual feedback inaccurate.
The benefit of the spatial perturbations is that the actual movement may only
differ in spatial parameters whilst temporal perturbations, in addition to the
temporal differences between the self and other movements there is also a
spatial deviation as the visual representation is either just ahead or just
behind
the actual movement. Therefore spatial perturbations allow the contributions of
spatial aspects of reaches, in feelings and judgments of agency, to be closely
examined whilst tightly controlling for all other factors.
Within the current thesis spatial perturbations were applied to visual
feedback of actual movements in order to produce the other conditions (visual
feedback is controlled by the computer). Previous experiments that used spatial
perturbations use cursor rotations in order to rotate the trajectory of the
visual
feedback of the movement away from the actual reach trajectory. For example,
with a leftward 4-degree perturbation the trajectory of the visual feedback
(cursor) is rotated by 4-degrees from the actual reach trajectory so that after
a
reach of 220mm the cursor will be approximately 150mm to the left of the
actual location of the limb.
Previous studies have used these rotations on small movements. For
example, Farrer et al. (2003a) and Farrer et al. (2003b) applied angular
perturbation to joystick movements involving the hand a wrist. The sizes of
perturbations used varied from 5 -50-degrees. Due to the nature of this type of
perturbation the lateral deviation of the visual feedback from the actual limb
position increases as movement length increases. Therefore whilst a 50-degree
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angular perturbation will produce a lateral shift of approximately 60mm over a
50mm movement for a larger movement of 220mm the lateral shift would be
260mm (figure 2.1).
Figure 2.1: Schematic representation of a linear perturbation. The lateral shift
increases with
distance through the movement. Therefore smaller perturbation sizes are required
for large
compared to small movements to obtain the same size lateral shift at endpoint.
The solid line
depicts the actual movement trajectory and the dashed line depicts the cursor
trajectory.
Because the current set of experiments uses large reaches (using the full
limb) smaller perturbation sizes were required than used by Farrer and
colleagues (Farrer et al., 2003a, Farrer et al., 2003b). The purpose of the
current experiment is to determine which size perturbations would be most
valuable in order to investigate agency attribution and this was achieved by
investigating the effects of Gaussian training on self/other judgments to an
array of perturbation sizes. The aim of the current experiment was to detect a
size of perturbation applied to full arm reaching movements, the responses to
which were most sensitive to experimental manipulation. Such perturbations
can be used for future experiments, so that any slight alterations to the
experience of agency are likely to be detected.
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In the current experiment participants were required to take part in a
self/other judgment task taken in two separate sessions with an array of
randomly presented perturbation sizes. Before each session, however, was a
training period in which the participants were asked to make reaching
movements that were similar to those used in the main task. In the training
period participants were informed that the feedback was always self, however,
in one training session the feedback was veridical, (an accurate representation
of the actual movements), whilst in the other session noise was introduced to
the trajectory of the feedback by applying small perturbations selected from a
Gaussian distribution. Planned comparisons were conducted between the two
sessions at each perturbation size in order to determine which perturbations
were affected by the type of training.
Method
Participants
A sample of six participants was used consisting of five females and one male
with a mean age of 25 years (age range 24-26 years). All were right handed
and had normal or corrected to normal vision.
Materials
Participants were seated in front of a horizontal mirror (450x300mm) placed on
a wooden board 300mm above a 900x900mm table. A projection screen
(800x540mm) was suspended horizontally 300mm above the mirror. A
Mitsubishi 750 projector was also suspended a further 910mm above the
projection screen. Thus, the image projected onto the screen appeared to the
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participant to be in the same plane as the table surface (see Figure 2.2). Hand
movements were recorded at 240Hz by an electromagnetic sensor (Polhemus
Liberty) attached to the index finger of the reaching (right) hand. A circular
plastic disc (10mm diameter) attached to the leading edge of the table was used
to mark the start point and a life-sized projected colour image of the
experimenters (female) hand positioned in a pointing posture (extended index
finger) was used as a representation of the participants own hand.
Figure 2.2: Schematic representation of experimental set up. When looking into
the mirror,
images projected into the upper screen appear to be in the same plane as the
table surface.
Thus, an unperturbed image of a virtual hand appears to be in the same location
as the
participants actual hand.
Procedure
Participants sat at the table and looked down into the mirror in which they
could see a black screen (a reflection of the image from the projector on the
projection screen). Participants placed their index finger on the start position
with their hand in the same posture as the image that represented their
movements (a pointing posture) and were required to return to the same start
position at the end of each trial. At the beginning of a trial a red target bar
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appeared for 500ms (bar: 160x20mm, with the inner edge 40mm from the
midline and 300mm from the start point). Immediately following removal of
the target bar image a tone indicated to the participant that they should make a
unimanual reaching movement with their right hand towards where the target
bar had been. In one fifth of the trials the trajectory and velocity of the
virtual
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hand was an accurate representation of the actual movement (calculated online
using position data from the motion tracker on the index finger of the actual
hand, delay <10ms). In the remaining fourth fifths of the trials the trajectory
of
the virtual hand was perturbed from the actual hand-path by an angular
perturbation, either 4, 8, 12 or 16-degrees all of which were presented equally
and randomly with the unperturbed trials. These linear perturbations were
created using with the following equation:
Xc =Xa + YaTan(P)
In which Xc refers to the X position of the cursor, Xa refers to the X position
of
the actual movement Ya refers to the Y position of the actual movement and P
is the perturbation size (0, 4 or 16-degrees).
At the end of each reach the participants were required to make a verbal
judgment as to whether the virtual hand trajectory was perturbed (self) or not
(other). Each participant took part in two separate experimental sessions, each
consisting of 120 trials (24 of each perturbation size  12 leftward and 12
rightward) conducted one day apart, the order of which was counterbalanced
between participants. In both sessions participants took part in an identical
agency task, prior to which was a training period. Both training periods
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consisted of 40 reaches completed in the same procedure as the reaches in the
agency task. In one of the training periods the trajectory of the virtual hand
was
always an accurate representation of the actual movement (zero degree
perturbation or self). In the other training period, however, noise was added to
the reach in the form of small linear perturbations selected from a Gaussian
distribution (mean=0, standard deviation=4). Participants were informed that
the training period was to obtain standardised reach trajectories and no
self/other judgments were required as there was no manipulation.
Results
Each participants results were converted into mean percent self-score (self was
the correct judgment for ZERO but incorrect for all other perturbation sizes) at
each perturbation size for the agency tasks following both perturbed and
unperturbed training periods. A 2x5 repeated measures ANOVA was
conducted with the factors TRAINING (GAUSSIAN and NON-GAUSSIAN)
and PERTURBATION (ZERO, FOUR, EIGHT, TWELVE and SIXTEEN). No
significant main effect was found of TRAINING (F(1,5)= 1.62,p=NS). A
significant main effect was found of PERTURBATION
(F(4,20)=51.91,p<0.001) and no significant interaction was found
(F(4,20)=1.98,p=NS).
Planned comparisons were conducted between PERTURBED and
UNPERTURBED TRAINING for each PERTURBATION. No significant
differences were found at the level of ZERO (F(1)=0.24.p=NS), EIGHT
(F(1)=0.21.p=NS), TWELVE (F(1)=0.6.p=NS) or SIXTEEN (F(1)=0.09.p=NS)
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degree perturbations. A significant difference was found at the level of the
FOUR degree perturbation (F(1)=7.79,p<0.05) with percent self-judgements
being greater following the GAUSSIAN (mean=84.83%) than NON-GAUSSIAN
(mean=72.22) TRAINING (see Figure 2.3).
Figure 2.3: percent self-judgments for all five perturbation sizes for GAUSSIAN
(filled squares)
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and NON-GAUSSIAN (open circles) training periods. The larger the perturbation
size leads to
fewer self-judgments. The asterisk denotes a significant difference revealed by
the planned
comparisons. Error bars show standard error.
Discussion
The type of training made no difference to the percent self-score for any of the
perturbation sizes except for the 4-degree perturbation at which training with
Gaussian noise lead to an increase in self-judgments. Therefore, it appears that
with this size of perturbation the feelings of agency can be readily influenced
by experimental intervention. The reason for this could be because the
participants find detection of the 4-degree perturbation difficult even with no
Gaussian training. In the no training condition the percentage of self-judgment
was in excess of 70% for the 4-degree perturbation so that even in normal
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circumstances, a discrepancy of this size is insufficient to consistently
produce
an other judgment. Following Gaussian training in which self feedback is
manipulated to vary from the actual self movement, the detection of the 4degree
perturbation is reduced further, with participants giving a correct other
judgment less than 20% of the time. However, self-judgments given in
response to visual feedback perturbed by 4-degrees are fewer in number in
comparison to that of the unperturbed trials demonstrating that detection of
such perturbations is not impossible. Therefore, from the current results it
could be argued that introduction of such a small perturbation to the visual
feedback introduces an element of uncertainty to judgments of agency and as a
direct result of this uncertainty that allows such judgments to be easily
manipulated.
In relation to findings by Farrer et al. (2003b) who also used several
perturbation sizes in a similar self/other judgment task using angular
perturbations, the data takes on a similar pattern. The greater the size of
perturbation leads to fewer self-judgments. The largest perturbation sizes
producing close to 0% self-judgments, whilst the unperturbed trials gave rise to
a percentage surpassing 90%. Aside from the 4-degree perturbation the
difference in percent self-judgments for all other perturbation sizes following
the different training sessions did not approach significance. Therefore, for
the
following experiments it was decided that in addition to the 4-degree
perturbation, for which agency is uncertain, to select the 0-degree
perturbations, to which participants responded consistently self and the
16degree
perturbation, for which participants responded consistently other.
Section 1
AGENCY ATTRIBUTION AND THE RIGHT HEMISPHERE
SECTION 1: AGENCY AND THE RIGHT HEMISPHERE CHAPTER 3
Chapter 3
Lateralisation of Agency in a Patient with Callosal
Agenesis.
3.1: Introduction
Functional imaging has implicated brain regions in the right hemisphere for the
successful discrimination between actions made by the self and those made by
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other people. For example, Farrer et al. (2003a) tested a sample of
neurologically intact participants making joystick movements in a scanner
while measuring brain activity using positron emission tomography (PET).
Participants were given visual feedback of their movements by the presentation
of a virtual hand and joystick on a mirror positioned in front of their moving
hand so that the virtual image appeared to be in the same spatial plane as the
actual hand and joystick. In some trials the visual feedback deviated from their
actual movements by 25, or 50 degrees (defined as other) while the remaining
trials were left unperturbed (defined as self). The results of this experiment
revealed an increase in blood flow to the right inferior parietal lobe (rILP)
when participants made other judgments and an increase in blood flow to the
insula (primarily right hemisphere) when participants made self-judgments.
The PET study was a follow-up to a previous functional magnetic resonance
imaging (fMRI) study that also highlighted the involvement of the anterior
insula and rIPL for self vs. other generated movements respectively (Farrer and
Frith 2002).
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Further evidence for right hemisphere dominance in the sense of agency
comes from neuropsychology. Symptoms following right hemisphere damage
frequently involve disorders of self-awareness. Such disorders include:
hemispatial
neglect, a disorder in which a patient is unaware of the side of space
contralateral to the lesion, often including their own body parts (Driver and
Mattingley 1998); anosognosia, in which the patient is unaware of their
contralesional disabilities (for example their hemiplegia) (Paysant et al. 2004,
Jehkonen et al. 2006) and asomatognosia, in which patients can deny
ownership of their own limb (Pia, et al. 2004,). Another patient group with a
disrupted sense of agency are those presenting with passivity (delusions of
control). This is one of the first order positive symptoms in schizophrenia and
involves the patient believing that his or her actions are being controlled or
influenced by an external agent. This specific symptom has been associated
with abnormal activity in the rIPL. For example, Spence et al. (1997) observed
hyperactivity in the rIPL using PET in schizophrenic patients experiencing
passivity compared to patients without this symptom and a non-schizophrenic
control group. This specific patient group has also been found to have reduced
cortical volume in the rIPL (Maruff et al., 2005).
There are, however, also some studies providing evidence for a connection
between agency attribution and the left hemisphere. Sirigu et al. (1999) found
patients with left inferior parietal damage to be impaired on a self/other
discrimination task. In this experiment participants were required to make
postures with their fingers behind a mirror on to which an image representing
their movements was projected so that it appeared to be in the same spatial
position as the actual hand. The image was either the participants own hand
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(self) or the hand of the experimenter (other). It was found that when the image
was other (experimenters hand) and the posture was incongruent to the actual
posture, all participants answered correctly. However, if the action of the hand
presented on the mirror was congruent with the intended action, significant
errors were observed in which patients with left parietal damage were more
likely to misattribute the action produced by the experimenter to self. This was
apparent even when the participants own action failed to successfully produce
the desired posture, therefore making the feedback incongruent with the actual
actions. However, producing finger postures involves very small movements
and the postures themselves are often meaningful (e.g. cross fingers for good
luck). This, therefore, may have resulted in the emphasis of the task to be
weighted towards the final position of the fingers (posture), rather than the
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actual movement itself. It has been suggested in previous studies that the left
hemisphere is involved with representing movement of our own body parts.
Tomasino et al. (2003) identified patient M.T., a 49 year old man with a large
left hemisphere lesion following a stroke, who had difficulty performing tasks
involving mental rotation of images of his own hands, particularly when
performing finger postures (e.g. victory sign). Moreover, patients following
left
hemisphere damage (specifically the left IPL) have been found to have
disorders of praxis, involving movement production and execution (e.g.
Goldenberg, 2001). This deficit seems to be particularly pronounced with
movements involving a high degree of precision and coordination of
independent finger movements (Hanna-Pladdy et al., 2002) such as those
required to make finger postures. Therefore, the findings of Sirigu et al.
(1999)
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could be explained by a deficit in movement production or representation
rather than a deficit in a sense of agency.
Another study by Macdonald and Paus (2003) looked at delay detection of
finger movements following application of repetitive transcranial magnetic
stimulation (rTMS) to the left superior parietal lobule (SPL). Participants were
subjected to two sessions of 15 minute low frequency (1 Hz) rTMS. In one
session the TMS coil was positioned over the experimental site (left SPL)
whilst in the other session the coil positioned over a control site (secondary
auditory cortex in the left temporal lobe). Participants were then required to
make active and passive finger movements whilst wearing a data glove, from
which online accurate representations of hand and wrist movements could be
relayed on to a virtual hand displayed on a computer monitor. In all trials
movement onset of the virtual hand was temporally asynchronous with the
actual movement onset, the size of which was variable between trials (60 
270ms pre or post actual movement onset). The task of the participants was to
indicate whether or not they had detected a delay between their actual
movement and that of the virtual hand. It was found that compared to the
control site, rTMS to the left SPL reduced the participants ability to detect
the
smaller delay sizes with active movements. This difference was not observed
with passive movements, indicating that the effect of TMS was not a general
impairment of visual processing of movement, but specifically an impairment
of processing self-generated movements. Disrupting the left SPL with rTMS
reduced participants ability to detect when the virtual hand was not accurately
reflecting the temporal aspects of their own movements and as a result
implicates this area in the attribution of agency.
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However, these results could again be explained by a deficit in movement
production. Because reaction times were not recorded it is unclear as to
whether the TMS had affected action execution mechanisms associated with
this region (Goldenberg, 2001) opposed to mechanisms involved in agency
attribution. Disrupting the execution of movements in this way, would of
course only have affected active and not passive movements, which were
executed by the experimenter (moving the participants finger).
Callosal Agenesis
A method frequently used to investigate the hemispheric asymmetry of
function is to observe patients who have a damaged or absent corpus callosum.
The corpus callosum is responsible for the transfer of cortical information
between the cerebral hemispheres. Cases in which this is disconnected (by
surgery) or absent (by agenesis) allow stimuli to be presented both visually and
(to large extent) proprioceptively to an individual hemisphere (Gazzaniga,
2000). Each hemisphere processes information from the contralateral visual
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field (see Figure 3.1), so when an acallosal individual fixates on a central
point
a visual stimulus presented to the left of centre is processed by the right
hemisphere and a stimulus to the right of centre by the left hemisphere. Unlike
with primates (Gazzaniga, 1965), this complete absence of visual information
to the ipsilateral hemisphere is apparent with humans, even with a fully intact
anterior commissure (Seymour et al., 1994).
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Figure 3.1: Schematic representation of lateralisation of the visual field. The
left hemisphere
processes information from the right hemifield, whilst the right hemisphere
processes
information from the left hemifield.
The processing of information from the muscles in the limbs is also largely
lateralised as sensation perception by the ipsilateral hemisphere is found to be
significantly reduced under normal conditions. For example, Stein et al. (1989)
examined intensity ratings of heat stimuli presented to a patient (J.W.) with
complete corpus callosum separation following surgery. When presented
ipsilaterally to the responding hemisphere, J.W. rated the stimuli as
significantly less intense than when presented to the contralateral hemisphere
and to ratings made by a control group. However, these differences
disappeared at the higher temperatures when the sensations were highly intense
and noxious. The current experiment involved reaching under normal
conditions, therefore it is anticipated that sensory information from the
reaching limb was largely unavailable to the ipsilateral hemisphere. A
disconnected hemisphere can, however, control both arms in reaching
movements, although dominance over the contralateral limb is still maintained
for precise and complex movements (Gazzaniga, 2000). The current
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experiment uses full arm reaching movements, therefore, each hemisphere
should successfully be able to guide the ipsilateral limb to a contralaeral
visual
target whilst fixating. This means that any effects observed are unlikely to be
a
result of deficits in action execution which may have been a factor using more
intricate finger movements.
The current experiment tested patient T.C.A., a 65 year-old male born
without a corpus collosum. T.C.A. only became aware of his callosal agenesis
at the age of 61 years following routine scans to investigate persistent chronic
headaches. Prior to this point he had no inclination of his condition, with no
obvious symptoms and an IQ score within the normal range (117). The current
study tested T.C.A.s performance on a self/other judgment task when visual
information was exposed to either his right or his left hemisphere. T.C.A. was
required to make unilateral reaching movements with each hand, either whilst
fixating on a central point or with free gaze allowed. Visual feedback about the
movement of his index finger was given in the form of a cursor presented using
a projector and mirror set-up (see Figure 2.4) so as to appear in the same
spatial location as his actual finger (vision of his real limb was occluded). At
the end of each movement T.C.A. had to make self/other verbal judgments as
to whether visual feedback of his movements was either an accurate
representation of the actual movements (self) or had an angular spatial
perturbation applied (other). T.C.A.s callosal agenesis allowed the comparison
of task performance of the separate hemispheres. It was predicted the isolated
left hemisphere (right hand reaching in the right hemifield while fixating)
would perform below that of a control group whilst performance of the isolated
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right hemisphere (left hand reaching in the left hemifield while fixating) would
not. In all other conditions no such pattern was expected.
3.2: Method
Participants
Patient: One male 65 year-old participant with callosal agenesis (T.C.A.) was
recruited. He was right handed, with corrected to normal vision and an IQ of
117. Structural MRI and DTI images show that T.C.A.s callosal agenesis is
complete except for a small anterior connection that serves ventral prefrontal
cortex and an enlarged anterior commissure. There are no connections that
serve parietal areas (see Figure 3.2).
Figure 3.2: a) MRI images of A -T.C.A. and B  age and gender matched control
reveal a
clear and complete absence of the corpus callosum for T.C.A.. b) The DTI images
of the same
participants show the probst fibres, which run from occipital -parietal areas to
frontal regions.
From these images it appears that there are no connections between the probst
fibres and the
anterior connections of the corpus callosum or the anterior commissure.
Control group: An opportunity sample of eight participants formed the control
group. Two of which were male and six female, with an average age of 23
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years (range of 21 -27 years). All were students at the University of
Nottingham with normal or corrected to normal vision and all except for one
21 year-old female were right handed.
Materials
The experimental set up was similar to that in Chapter 2 (Figure 2.2) except
that the movements were tracked using the miniBIRD 800. Participants were
seated in front of a horizontal mirror, raised on a wooden board 300mm above
a 900 x 900mm table. Attached to the nail of the index finger of the reaching
hand was an electromagnetic sensor from which movements were recorded
using a miniBIRD electromagnetic motion-tracking device (Ascension
Technologies Corporation) sampling at 86.1 Hz. The experiment was run on
LabVIEW 5 using a Macintosh, Powerbook, G3 series computer (233MHz).
The image was projected onto a screen 300mm above the mirror using a
Toshiba TLP560 projector suspended a further 910mm above it. A video
camera was also mounted on the wooden board in front of the participant to
monitor eye movements.
Procedure
The participants were required to sit at the table and look down onto the raised
mirror where they could see a blank (white) screen (a reflection of the image
from the projector on the projection screen). Participants placed their index
finger on the start position with their hand in a pointing posture (extended
index finger) and were required to return to the same start position at the end
of
each trial. At the beginning of each trial a red target bar appeared for 500ms
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(bar: 160x20mm, with the inner edge 40mm from the midline and 300mm from
the start point). The participants were required to make a reaching movement
toward where the target bar had appeared. Their movements were represented
by the movements of a black cursor that was projected along with the rest of
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the screen to appear in the same plane as their actual hand movements. The
visual feedback they received of the movements was either self (ZERO degree
perturbation); an exact representation of the participants own movements
which made up 50% of the trials, or other; their movements perturbed by either
a FOUR (25% of trials) or SIXTEEN (25% of trials) degree perturbation. In
half the trials the perturbations were linear and in the remaining trials they
were curvilinear (see Figure 3.3). All perturbations were angled toward the
centre of the screen in order to reduce the likelihood of any peripheral
effects.
Figure 3.3: Schematic representation of a) linear and b) curvilinear
perturbations. Solid lines
represent the unperturbed cursor trajectory. Dashed lines represent perturbed
cursor
trajectories.
With the linear perturbations, the distance between the actual limb and
the cursor increased with movement distance so that at the largest distance
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between the two occurred at the end of the movement (see Chapter 2). With the
curvilinear perturbations, however, the cursor was in the same position as the
actual limb at the start point and target location, with maximum deviation
occurring half way through of the reach. The maximum deviation between the
actual movement and the cursor position was determined by the perturbation
size (0, 4 or 16-degrees) and was reached at the mid point between the start and
target location. The cursor trajectory curves away from actual limb position
from the start to the mid point and back towards the actual limb position
between the mid point and the target location (Figure 3.4).
Figure 3.4: Schematic representation of a curvilinear
perturbation in which the position of the cursor
relative to the limb is dependent on the distance
travelled along the Y axis. The maximum deviation
between the cursor position and the limb position
(max) occurs at the mid point between the start point
(S) and target location (T). The solid line depicts the
actual movement trajectory and the dashed line
depicts the cursor trajectory.
There were four spatial conditions, two crossed and two uncrossed each
performed in a separate block (see Figure 3.5). In the uncrossed conditions the
target was presented on the same side as the reaching hand; the left hand
reaching to the target in the left hemifield (LHLP) and right hand reaching in
right hemifield (RHRP). In the crossed conditions the target was presented on
the opposite side of the reaching hand; the left hand reaching in the right
hemifield (LHRP) and the right hand reaching in the left hemifield (RHLP).
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Start points for the reach were on the same side as target presentation. The
four
spatial conditions were completed with linear and curvilinear perturbations
whilst maintaining central fixation. T.C.A. also completed the task with free
gaze allowed. In this condition information was available to both hemispheres
so that T.C.A. could act as his own control. Therefore control participants took
part in a total of eight blocks (four spatial conditions x two perturbation
types)
whilst T.C.A. took part in sixteen (four spatial conditions x two perturbation
types x fixation and free gaze), all counterbalanced within participants
(ABCDDCBA). Each block consisted of eight trials, four self and four other
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(two 4-degree and two 16-degree perturbations) presented in a pseudo-random
order. At the end of each trial the participants were asked to make a verbal
judgment as to whether the movement of the cursor was that of self (exactly
represented their actual movements) or other (had a spatial perturbation
applied). All participants were informed that the trials consisted of 50% self
and 50% other.
At the beginning of the experiment there was a short practice session to
allow the participant to become accustomed to the equipment and making a
self/other judgment. The number of practice trials was purely dependent on the
requirements of the individual. All participants gave informed consent and
were told they could leave at any point. Any trials in which the cursor
representing the movements crossed the mid-line, or a participant moved their
eyes (fixation conditions) were rejected and replaced with an identical trial at
the end of the block.
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Figure 3.5: Schematic representation of the four spatial conditions RH and LH
refer to the
reaching hand (right and left respectively). RP and LP refer to the location of
target
presentation. These four conditions were performed with both linear and
curvilinear
perturbations with central fixation for all participants (eight blocks). T.C.A.
also performed
these conditions with free gaze allowed (total of sixteen blocks) in which the
information was
available to both hemispheres.
3.3: Results
Each individuals responses were converted into percent correct scores (correct
judgments were self for ZERO degree perturbations and other for FOUR and
SIXTEEN degree perturbations). Scores were collapsed across perturbation
type and 95% confidence intervals were calculated from the control group for
each condition in order to compare T.C.A.s scores against them. The
experiment had three factors, SPATIAL CONDITIONS, with four levels
(LHLP, LHRP, RHRP, RHLP), PERTURBATION with three levels (ZERO,
FOUR, SIXTEEN) and for T.C.A. only, EYE MOVEMENT, with two levels
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(FIXATION, FREEGAZE). The control group demonstrated equivalent
performance irrespective of the side of target presentation or hand used
performing above chance for both the ZERO and SIXTEEN-degree
perturbations, only having difficulty with the FOUR-degree perturbation for
which their performance was poor (failing to detect the perturbation).
Uncrossed Conditions
In the fixation LHLP condition (right hemisphere) a significant difference was
found between T.C.A. and controls at the ZERO degree perturbation, T.C.A.s
score (87.5%) falling outside and above the 95% confidence intervals of the
control group (mean=73.21%). No significant differences were found between
T.C.A. and controls at either the FOUR or SIXTEEN degree perturbations
(Figure 3.6a). When freedom of eye movement was allowed T.C.A.s percent
correct scores were not found to be significantly different from controls (95%
confidence intervals) for any of the perturbation sizes.
While fixating in the RHRP condition (left hemisphere) T.C.A.s percent
correct score was significantly different from controls for the ZERO degree
perturbation with T.C.A.'s score (62.5%) falling below the control group's 95%
confidence interval (mean=79.46%). No significant difference was found at the
FOUR-degree perturbation. A significant difference was also found at the
SIXTEEN-degree perturbations with T.C.A.'s score (50%) again falling below
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the controls confidence interval (mean=78.57%)(see Figure 3.6b). While
allowed free gaze, however, T.C.A.s score did not fall outside the 95%
confidence intervals for any of the perturbation sizes.
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Figure 3.6: Graphs depicting percent correct judgments for crossed spatial
conditions of
control group (open circles) in addition to T.C.A. whilst fixating (black
crosses) and free gaze
(filled squares). Error bars show 95% confidence intervals. a) LHLP left hand
reaching in the
left hemifield (both visual and proprioceptive feedback received by the right
hemisphere). In
the free gaze conditions T.C.A. performed within the control groups 95%
confidence intervals
at all perturbation sizes. Whilst fixating, T.C.A.s scores only fell outside
the normal range
with the ZERO -degree perturbation, performing better than the control group. b)
RHRP right
hand reaching in the right hemifield (both proprioceptive and visual information
received by
the left hemisphere). T.C.A.s free gaze conditions fell within the control
group confidence
intervals for all perturbation sizes. Whilst fixating T.C.A.s performance falls
below that of
controls for both the ZERO and SIXTEEN -degree perturbations.
Crossed conditions
In the Fixation LHRP condition (Figure 3.7a) T.C.A.'s percent correct score
(75%) was significantly greater than the control group (mean=23.43%) for the
FOUR-degree perturbation. Whilst T.C.A.'s score (50%) is significantly lower
than controls (mean=75%) for the SIXTEEN-degree perturbation. No
significant difference was found at the ZERO-degree perturbation. Whilst
allowed free gaze T.C.A.s scores fell within the control groups 95%
confidence intervals for all perturbation sizes.
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Figure 3.7: Graphs depicting percent correct judgments for crossed spatial
conditions of control
group (open circles) in addition to T.C.A. whilst fixating (black crosses) and
free gaze (filled
squares). Error bars show 95% confidence intervals. a) LHRP left hand reaching
in the right
hemifield (right hemisphere receives proprioceptive feedback and left
hemisphere, visual). In
the free gaze conditions T.C.A. performed within the control groups 95%
confidence intervals
at all perturbation sizes. Whilst fixating T.C.A.s scores fell outside and
below confidence
intervals for the SIXTEEN -degree perturbation, outside and above confidence
intervals for the
FOUR -degree perturbation, whilst performance was as controls at the ZERO
-degree
perturbation. b) RPLP right hand reaching in the left hemifield (left hemisphere
receiving
proprioceptive feedback, right hemisphere, visual). T.C.A.s free gaze
conditions fell within
the normal range for all perturbation sizes. When fixating T.C.A.s performance
was as
controls for the ZERO -degree perturbation and falls below that of controls at
FOUR and
SIXTEEN -degree perturbations.
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In the fixation (Figure 3.7b) RHLP condition a significant difference was found
between T.C.A. and the control group at the level of the FOUR-degree
perturbation with T.C.A.'s score (12.5%) being lower than that of the controls
(mean=23.43%). A significant difference was also found at the SIXTEEN-
degree perturbation with T.C.A.'s score (50%) falling outside and below the
95% confidence interval of the control group (mean=68.75%). No significant
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difference was found at the ZERO-degree perturbation. When T.C.A. was
allowed free gaze no significant differences were found between his score and
the control group for any of the perturbation sizes.
3.4: Discussion
Uncrossed Conditions
T.C.A.'s results in the uncrossed fixation conditions demonstrate a clear
dissociation in task performance between the hemispheres. Control participants
seemed to have difficulty with this task only when the perturbation was small,
with their performance dropping close to chance regardless of the side of
presentation for 4-degree perturbations. T.C.A.s performance in the LHLP
condition (visual and proprioceptive information presented to the right
hemisphere) was very similar to that of control participants for all
perturbations
(in fact his performance was slightly better than controls for the zero-degree
perturbation). In the RHRP condition, however, (visual and proprioceptive
information was presented to the left hemisphere) T.C.A. performed
significantly worse than controls for both the 0 and 16-degree perturbations,
his performance on which, like for the 4-degree perturbations, was close to
chance. These findings support those of previous studies using similar
paradigms (e.g. Farrer et al., 2003) indicating that the processes involved with
attributing agency to action are lateralised to the right hemisphere.
Crossed Conditions
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Due to T.C.A.s callosal agenesis the RHLP fixation condition allows visual
information but not the majority of the proprioceptive information to be
available to the right hemisphere. Ipsilateral connections to the proximal
muscles of the limbs also allow the right hemisphere to successfully guide the
right arm toward the target presented in the left hemifield. Therefore, in this
condition, the right hemisphere, proposed to be responsible for attribution of
agency, can do so based on visual and efferent (motor command) signals only.
The absence of the proprioceptive information appears to have a detrimental
effect on performance. Although T.C.A.s responses are in line with controls
for the 0-degree perturbation they fall below the normal range for the 4 and
16degree
perturbations.
Previous studies have implicated proprioceptive information to have an
important role in attribution of agency. For example, Farrer et al. (2002)
conducted a similar study on patient G.L., who suffered deafferentation (loss of
proprioceptive feedback) from the nose down. G.L. made self/other judgments
of joystick movements, the visual feedback of which was either an exact
representation of her movements (self) or had an angular perturbation applied
(other). They found that G.L.s ability to detect the perturbations was
significantly reduced compared to controls, suggesting that proprioception is
important for the task. In the current experiment there are two key differences
between the fixation LHLP and RHLP conditions, that is the hand used (left
and right respectively) and that the latter has reduced proprioceptive
information available to the guiding (right) hemisphere. The results are not
likely to be a consequence of the reaching hand per se, as although there is
evidence of a general handedness effect for self-generated movement
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recognition (Daprati and Sirigu, 2002), it suggests that performance would be
higher for the dominant (in this case right) hand. Therefore, if the difference
in
T.C.A.s performance between the LHLP and RHLP was simply a function of
hand, it would be expected that performance on the LHLP condition would be
lower than RHLP, for which the opposite is true. Consequently, the current
results not only support the lateralisation of agency processes to the right
hemisphere, but also the significance of proprioceptive information in these
processes.
T.C.A.'s results for the fixation LHRP condition are more ambiguous.
In this condition it is the left hemisphere that receives the visual information
whilst the right hemisphere only receives proprioceptive feedback. If indeed
the right hemisphere is solely responsible for attribution of agency, it has no
information on which to do this, as all perturbations are applied to the visual
feedback, not accessible to the right hemisphere. Therefore, the results would
be expected at chance level (akin to the RHRP fixation condition). However,
although T.C.A.s performance is indeed at chance for the 16-degree
perturbation (significantly lower than controls) he performs normally for the
0degree
perturbation and significantly better than the control group for the 4degree
perturbation. These results seem counter-intuitive as in this condition
T.C.A. finds it easier to detect the small 4-degree perturbation than the
comparatively large 16-degree perturbation. Therefore, the isolated left
hemisphere performs at chance (RHRP fixation) except in the conditions in
which proprioceptive information is absent (LHRP fixation) when he is able to
accurately discriminate (greater than using both hemispheres and controls)
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between the 0 and 4-degree perturbations whilst continuing to perform at
chance at 16-degrees.
These results indicate a role for the left hemisphere in the specialisation
for detecting small discrepancies between the planned and actual movement.
There is a large body of evidence indicating the left hemisphere to be
specialised in executing precise movements (Gazzaniga, 2000) and it has been
found to have a functional advantage over the right hemisphere for controlling
the ipsilateral hand (De Stefano and Salvadori, 1998). Other findings with
neurologically intact participants using ERP (Yoshida et al., 2007) and fMRI
(Martinez et al. 1997) and also with brain-damaged patients (Robertson and
Lamb, 1991) suggest that the left hemisphere has an advantage for the
processing of high frequency spatial information. This means that the left
hemisphere is more refined in detecting the fine details of a scene rather than
the low frequency global features, which could explain the higher performance
at detecting the smaller 4-degree perturbation (high spatial frequency)
compared to the larger 16-degree perturbation (low spatial frequency).
A further explanation is that these results could be reflecting an
advantage of the left hemisphere for detecting temporal discrepancies.
Macdonald and Paus (2003) associated the left inferior parietal lobe with the
detection of temporal perturbations applied to self-generated movements. In
the current study there were two types of perturbation used, linear and
curvilinear. Linear perturbations (see Figure 3.3a) involve the cursor (visual
feedback representing the movement) trajectory to be rotated by a given angle
away from the actual limb trajectory. Thus, resulting in a spatial dissociation
between the two, which becomes larger with increasing reach distance, but
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importantly, the cursor moves at the same speed and for the same distance as
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the actual movement. With curvilinear perturbations the distance that the
cursor is perturbed away from the actual limb trajectory is also based on reach
distance. However, with these perturbations the size of the dissociation
between the cursor and actual limb position only increases in the first half of
the movement, decreasing back towards the limb in the latter half (total reach
distance assumed to be the target location). Therefore, in addition to the
curvilinear perturbation producing a spatial discrepancy, the cursor also has to
travel a greater overall distance than the actual reach (taking a longer route
to
the same destination). As a result the cursor moves at a faster velocity than
the
limb (see Figure 3.8 for example velocity profiles) Consequently, if the left
hemisphere has an advantage over the right for the detection the temporal
differences, this could have been manifested in the curvilinear trials of the
current experiment (results collapsed across perturbation types).
Figure 3.8: Typical velocity profiles from curvilinear
perturbations. Grey line represents velocity of the
actual movement whilst the black line represents the
velocity of the cursor movement. The cursor has a
greater peak velocity than the actual movement.
However, why any of the explanations would not be apparent with full
proprioceptive feedback (RHRP fixation) is unclear, perhaps the left
hemisphere specialises for comparing visual and efferent information, with
other afferent signals causing interference. Whatever processes are taking place
in this condition they clearly differ from when performing the task with both
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hemispheres (free gaze and controls) and when performing with his isolated
right hemisphere (LHLP fixation). As such, from the current results it appears
that the mechanisms involved in normal agency attribution are based in the
right hemisphere. Crucially, when T.C.A. was allowed freedom of eye
movements, so that visual information is available to both hemispheres, he
performed within the normal range for all perturbation sizes and spatial
conditions.
Free gaze conditions
When allowed freedom of eye movements T.C.A. performed as controls, not
falling outside of the normal range for any of the perturbation sizes for
crossed
or uncrossed spatial conditions. Free gaze allowed visual information to be
available to both of T.C.A.s hemispheres regardless of the side of target
presentation. Therefore, if right hemisphere is solely responsible for
attributing
agency, it would have had full access to the visual feedback of the reach even
with a right sided target. However, although visual information is available to
both hemispheres with free gaze, the same cannot be said for proprioceptive
feedback, the majority of which only being available to the contralateral
hemisphere. In the fixation RHLP condition the visual information is, like with
free gaze, available to the right hemisphere but due to reaching with the right
hand, proprioceptive information is not. In the equivalent free gaze condition
visual information is also available to the right hemisphere and similarly, due
to reaching with the right hand, proprioceptive information is not. However,
despite these similarities, T.C.A.s performance is different in these two
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conditions, performance being impaired in comparison to controls when
fixating, whilst with free gaze T.C.A. performs within the normal range.
The reduced performance evident in fixation RHLP was interpreted as
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the result of limited proprioceptive feedback being available to the right
hemisphere. However, if this was the case it would be expected that T.C.A.s
performance would also be impaired in the free gaze conditions that involved
reaching with the right hand, but these were not the findings of the current
experiment. One possible explanation for this is that the drop in performance
for condition fixation RHLP is not due to a reduction in proprioceptive signals
available to the right hemisphere, but due to the reduced ability of the right
hemisphere to control the left hand. Each hemisphere is less able to control
movements of the ipsilateral limb compared to control over the contralateral
limb. As the visual information required for accurate guidance of the
movement (target and cursor) was only availably to the right hemisphere, it is
likely that the right hemisphere was controlling the right limb. When allowed
free gaze this information was also available to the left hemisphere, which in
these conditions, could have helped guide the limb. Therefore, the reduction in
performance evident in condition RHLP when fixating, could be the result of
T.C.A. producing a less accurate movement than in the same condition with
free gaze, due to the former condition only being able to guide the movement
with the ipsilateral (right) hemisphere.
However, disconnected hemispheres have been found to maintain
control over movements involving the proximal muscles (such as those in the
current experiment), only showing a real deficit with intricate movements
using the distal muscles Gazzaniga (2000). Therefore, each hemisphere should
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be able to successfully guide the ipsilateral limb in a full arm reaching
movement. Moreover, an additional explanation for the results is that in free
gaze conditions T.C.A. is allowed to foveate the target, thus making vision
more dominant in that task. When maintaining central fixation, the target
appears in the visual periphery, so the emphasis of the task is shifted away
from vision and proprioception becomes more important. Previous studies have
found that the relative contributions of visual and proprioceptive signals in
the
guidance of human movement can vary dependant on the emphasis of the task
(Warren and Schmitt, 1978). In the current study when T.C.A. is fixating, the
visual feedback that appears in the periphery is less useful compared to with
free gaze and therefore increases the importance of proprioceptive signals.
General Discussion
The lateralisation effect observed in T.C.A. supports the functional imaging
evidence by Farrer and colleagues (Farrer et al., 2002 and Farrer et al., 2003)
as well as the majority of the neuropsychological data implicating a right
hemispheric dominance for self-awareness and agency attribution. However,
such findings do seem to contradict those studies implicating the left
hemisphere in a sense of agency due to T.C.A.s isolated left hemisphere only
performing at chance level. For example, MacDonald and Paus (2003) found
interference in the detection of temporal perturbations applied to
self-generated
movements apparent following left parietal rTMS. This could be explained by
the latter experiment disrupting movement production mechanisms as already
discussed, or there is an additional explanation for the results for which the
different laterality effects are dependent on the type of perturbations used. In
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the experiment by MacDonald and Paus (2003) the movements were perturbed
temporally with the movements of the visual feedback (virtual hand)
commencing prior to or post actual movement onset. The studies
demonstrating right hemisphere involvement, however, including the current
experiment used spatial perturbations to create the other movements.
Processing of spatial information has long been associated with right
hemisphere regions (e.g. Perenin and Vighetto, 1988), whilst temporal aspects
of movement, such as movement sequencing and temporal binding of spatial
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information, have been associated with the left parietal cortex (Weiss et al.,
2006). Therefore, it is possible to explain these findings, not in terms of the
feeling of agency, but in terms of the detection of visual-kinematic discordance
between the seen and felt position of the hand, for which the right hemisphere
specialises in detecting spatial discordance and the left, temporal. Lateralised
deficits in spatial processing have been found previously in patients with
callosal agenesis. Martin et al. (1985) found an acallosal patient to have
difficulty in localising a dot presented visually right of fixation (left
hemisphere). Presentation to the left of fixation (to right hemisphere), however
remained unimpaired. Similarly Meerwaldt (1983) found an 8 year-old girl
with callosal agenesis to have impaired spatial processing of tactile
information
with the right but not left hand (rod orientation test). Therefore, T.C.A. may
have a general spatial impairment when using his isolated left hemisphere,
which reduced his ability to detect the spatial perturbations in the RHRP
fixation condition.
The majority of neuropsychological evidence, however, finds
disruption of self and body awareness to occur following damage to the right
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hemisphere. Such disorders have been specifically related to damage of the
rIPL (Driver and Vuilleumier, 2001), the same area at which activation has
been observed when completing a spatial agency task (Farrer et al. 2003a).
Therefore, it seems more likely that this area is involved in feelings of agency
and agency attribution than its left hemisphere counterpart. Following on from
this, there is a further explanation that can account for both left and right
hemisphere involvement in agency, for temporal and spatial aspects
respectively. There are two components of a movement from which feelings of
agency can derive. Firstly, movement initiation, which can be related to
temporal perturbations, whether the time at which you feel that you have
initiated a given movement, matches the movement onset of the visual
feedback and which may be associated with left hemisphere structures.
Secondly, there is the feeling of agency during the movement, whether the
visual feedback accurately represents your actual movement trajectory. This is
more likely to depend on spatial aspects of the movement and it consequently it
is likely to be this aspect of agency that is associated with the right
hemisphere.
3.5: Conclusions
The findings from the current study show a clear dissociation between left and
right hemisphere performance in detection of the spatial perturbations applied
to self-generated movement. T.C.A.s right hemisphere performed as controls,
whilst his left hemisphere performed at chance level. This therefore, suggests
that mechanisms involved with self/other attribution of movement to be
lateralised to the right hemisphere. Previous studies investigating self/other
attribution of movement have identified the right inferior parietal lobe to be
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activated during detection of other movements (e.g. Farrer et al., 2003a) and
neuropsychological evidence has also associated this area with self-awareness
and experience of agency (e.g. Pia et al., 2004, Spence et al, 1999). However,
there have also been left hemisphere associations with agency tasks using a
different (temporal perturbations) paradigm. This can be explained by, the left
and right hemispheres specialising in to different aspects of agency, action
initiation and action during a movement respectively, or it may reflect each
hemispheres ability to detect different types of visual-kinematic discordance
(temporal and spatial respectively). In Chapter 4 the nature of the self/other
response in a cursor rotation paradigm is addressed explicitly by introducing a
physical dissociation between the visual feedback and the actual movement.
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This has the effect of reducing the spatial relationship between the visual and
proprioceptive feedback. Therefore, if the participants responses are based on
detection of visual-kinemetic discrepancies only, such a dissociation should
reduce detection of the spatial perturbations. In addition, participants
ability to
detect perturbations applied to externally generated movements (movements
produced by the computer) is examined, so as to assess the likelihood of
agency mechanisms being specialised only for self-generated movements.
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Chapter 4
Detecting Perturbations
4.1: Introduction
In Chapter 3 the percentage of correct self/other judgments of acallosal
participant, T.C.A., whilst fixating on a central point and with free gaze, were
compared against a fixating control group. Because of T.C.A.s callosal
agenesis, fixation on a central point allowed for experimental testing of the
individual hemispheres. Visual feedback presented left of centre was processed
by the right hemisphere whilst that presented to the right of centre was
processed by the left hemisphere, with a similar dissociation being present for
proprioception (Gazzaniga, 2000). It was found that when fixating and
reaching with his right limb to a right-sided target (left hemisphere), T.C.A.s
performance at detecting the perturbations applied to the visual feedback of his
movement dropped to chance level. In the analogous right hemisphere
condition (left limb reaching to a left-sided target), however, his performance
was found to be in line with the fixating control group and his own free gaze
conditions (visual feedback available to both hemispheres). This was
interpreted to represent a right hemisphere advantage in distinguishing between
self and other actions and, as such, was compatible with previous experiments
on agency attribution that also associate the right hemisphere with self/other
judgments (e.g. Farrer et al. 2003, Farrer and Frith 2002).
However, a criticism of this type of task, making self/other judgment
over actual and perturbed visual feedback of self-generated movement (see
Chapter 2), is whether or not it is a true reflection of agency. It could be
argued
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that the detection of the visual perturbations, such as the ones used in the
Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, may not be associated with feelings of agency over
the action but instead may represent the detection of visual-kinematic
discordances. As discussed in Chapter 3, this can also explain the right
hemisphere advantage found for detecting spatial perturbations, as the right
hemisphere has been found to be specialised for spatial processing (e.g.
Perenin and Vighetto, 1988). Therefore, the right hemisphere is likely to have a
general advantage for detecting spatial discrepancies. Furthermore, a study by
Balslev et al. (2006) examining the brain activation of participants making
self/other judgments of actual and perturbed visual feedback of finger
movements, found no difference between neural networks activated when the
participants actively produced their own movements, compared to when the
movements of their finger were passively produced by the experimenter. This
could be argued to be the result of the participants basing their judgments, not
on agency, but on the difference perceived between the proprioceptive and
visual feedback.
In the experiment by Balslev et al. (2006) the spatial relationship
between the action and visual feedback was removed, meaning that
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proprioception would be less useful for the detection of spatial differences.
This was achieved by the visual feedback being in a different spatial plane to
the actual movements and also the movements of the visual feedback were to
the left or the right, whilst the actual movements were either back or forth.
However, because the perturbations applied were temporal and not spatial, a
direct spatial relationship was not needed to detect the perturbations. The
participants only needed to match when they felt their finger moving with
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when they saw the cursor moving on the screen, regardless of what direction
that movement was in. However, despite no differences being detected in
neural activation, Balslev et al. (2006) did find a behavioural difference, in
that
correct judgments were greater with the active movements. This behavioural
difference suggests that the two tasks are not identical, the difference most
likely being due to the presence of the efferent signals in the active
conditions.
For detection of spatial perturbations a close physical relationship
between the action and the visual feedback is likely to be of key importance.
Clower and Baussaoud (2000) conducted a study investigating the effects of
actual and representational visual feedback on prism adaptation. Prism
adaptation occurs when a participants visual field is optically shifted
(normally from wearing prism goggles) so that visual objects or targets appear
to one side of their actual location. Therefore, as the participant reaches
toward
a target, they misreach in the direction of the visual deviation. The error,
however, gradually reduces over consecutive trials (reaches toward the
target/object) and participants are soon able to reach directly to the target
(become adapted). On removal of the visual shift (removing the goggles) the
participants again initially misreach on the first few trials, this time in the
opposite direction. This is known as the negative aftereffect and demonstrates
that the participant had successfully adapted to their optically shifted
environment. Clower and Baussaoud (2000) found the aftereffect to be reduced
using representational feedback from a computer, compared to when the visual
feedback received derived directly from the actual limb (LED attached to the
index finger of the pointing hand). The authors interpreted this to be as a
result
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of the perceived physical relationship between the visual feedback and the
actual movements (this being reduced with representational feedback).
The ability to spatially relate the visual feedback to the actual limb
position enables more proficient mapping between the limb movements and the
consequences of those movements. Therefore, more efficient correction
mechanisms can be implemented to the movements, which can explain the
greater degree of adaptation observed with such feedback. In this case, if there
is a physical dissociation between the action and the visual feedback it would
be more difficult to accurately determine the size of spatial differences, so
that
correction mechanisms implemented by the motor system would be less
precise and spatial perturbations would be more difficult to detect. Therefore,
if
participants base their self/other judgments over actual and perturbed visual
feedback on visual-proprioceptive discordance alone, reducing the physical
coincidence of the visual feedback would reduce detection of the perturbations,
thus leading to an increase in self-judgments.
However, removing the close physical relationship between the action
and the visual feedback also has the effect of moving the visual feedback
outside of peripersonal space. Peripersonal space is the multisensory space that
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immediately surrounds the body (Makin et al., 2007) and previous research has
identified differences in processing information from near and far space
relative to the body, in both brain-damaged patients (e.g. Cowey et al. 1994)
and in neurologically normal participants (e.g. Kaas and van Mier, 2006 and
Bjoertomt et al., 2002). An example of the importance of near/peripersonal
space in regards to self-processing comes from the rubber hand illusion. The
rubber hand illusion is induced by simultaneous stroking of an actual (hidden
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from view) and a rubber hand (in view) with the effect of the participants
feeling self-embodiment of the rubber hand. For example, the rubber hand
illusion has been found to alter perception of the actual limb position so that
it
is perceived closer to the location of the rubber hand (e.g. Tsakiris and
Haggard, 2005).
Lloyd (2007) found that the magnitude of the illusion can be drastically
affected by proximity of the rubber hand (visual feedback) to the actual limb
(proprioceptive feedback). Participants were subject to the rubber hand illusion
(simultaneous stroking of the rubber and actual hand) with the rubber hand
positioned in six separate locations relative to the limb (ranging from 175mm 
675mm). The participants were instructed to stop the trial when they felt as
though the touch felt to their actual hand was the result of the experimenter
touching the rubber hand, and were then asked to rate the intensity of this
feeling. It was found that the strength of the illusion declined significantly
at a
distance further than 275mm away from the actual limb. This was interpreted
as when the rubber hand was further than this distance from the limb, it fell
outside of peripersonal space and so was less likely to be incorporated as part
of self. This suggests that by removing visual feedback of reaching movements
outside of peripersonal space, it is likely to dissociate that feedback from
self.
Consequently, if the participants are making their judgments on agency
opposed to detecting visual-kinematic discordance, this would be likely to
reduce the sense of agency, thus leading to an increase in other judgments.
A further possibility for the nature of the task is that the perturbations
are detected by comparing the visual feedback to that predicted, regardless of
whether the movements were self-generated or not. Parietal areas have been
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associated with processing information of occluded moving objects (Olson et
al. 2004), which was suggested to reflect processes that are predicting the
location of unseen stimuli. Participants lay in the MRI scanner and observed
the movements of a virtual ball across a screen in the middle of which was an
occluding bar. In one condition the virtual ball was seen to pass behind the
occluding bar and re-emerge on the adjacent side. In a second condition the
ball travelled up to the bar, then abruptly disappeared to equally abruptly
reappear on the other side. Increased activity was observed in the intaparietal
sulcus in the occluding compared to disappearing condition. Interestingly,
similar to that observed in the agency experiments, this activity was more
pronounced in the right hemisphere. However, the right parietal areas similar to
that identified in self/other attribution tasks using a spatial perturbation
paradigm (Farrer et al., 2003a), have also been associated with disorders
specifically involving self-awareness. For example, Spence et al. (1997)
observed similar activity in the rIPL of schizophrenic patients experiencing
delusions of alien control over their actions, to that observed when detecting
spatially perturbed visual feedback applied to self-generated actions (Farrer et
al., 2003a), thus suggesting that the same processes are involved.
With self-generated movements, not only does the individual have
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access to information concerning initial reach trajectory and velocity from
observing the action, but also specific knowledge about the intended action
from having access to the efference copy of the motor commands that
produced the movement. Therefore, it is unlikely that, even if similar
prediction processes are used for predicting self-generated, as well as
externally generated movement, that the two processes are identical. Access to
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the efference copy of the motor commands is likely to result in more efficient
predictions in order to attribute that action, or not, to the self.
Consequently,
the extra information available to the participants in self-generated movement
should result in a higher detection rate of the spatial perturbations, thus
demonstrating a general increase in correct judgments.
The current experiment explicitly examined the nature of the spatial
perturbation paradigm for judgments of agency. Self/other judgments were
made over perturbed and unperturbed visual feedback of reaching movements.
In one condition the movements were self-generated and spatially coincident
with the participants actual movements such as that described in Chapter 3. In
a second condition the movements were self-generated but did not share spatial
coincidence with the actual movements in order to reduce the likelihood of the
participants basing their judgments on detection of visual and kinematic
discrepancies. Visual feedback was provided in the form of a virtual hand that
part way through the reach disappeared behind an occluding bar. In all trials
the movements of the virtual hand were veridical with the actual movements
up to occlusion and for half of the trials this was also true following
occlusion.
In the remaining trials, however, when occluded by the virtual bar, a spatial
perturbation was applied to the trajectory of the virtual hand so that when it
reemerged
from behind the bar it was to one side of the actual location of the
limb. Participants had to make self/other judgments as to whether the visual
feedback was an exact representation of their actual movements (self) or had a
spatial perturbation (4 or 16-degrees) applied (other). In a third condition,
the
task was identical, except that the reaching movements were produced by the
computer (participants made no movements). At the end of each trial, the
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participants were required to make a perturbed/unperturbed judgment as to
whether the movements of the virtual hand had been perturbed from their
initial trajectory (perturbed) or not (unperturbed) when they re-emerged from
behind the occluding bar. It was predicted that removing the direct spatial
relationship between the action and the visual feedback would not reduce the
participants ability to detect the perturbations, but would reduce the sense of
agency over the action so that percentage correct judgments would be lower for
the 0-degree perturbation compared to with physically coincident visual
feedback. Therefore, planned comparisons were conducted between percent
correct judgments for coincident and non-coincident feedback of self-generated
actions for each perturbation size. It was also predicted that detection of
perturbations would be reduced with computer-generated movements
compared to self-generated movements so that percent correct judgments
would be lower for the 4 and 16-degree perturbations. Therefore, planned
comparisons were conducted between the coincident self-generated movements
and the computer-generated movements for each perturbation size.
4.2: Method
Participants
An opportunity sample of 12 healthy participants was collected, consisting of
10 females and 2 males (mean age 24 years, range 19  29 years). All
participants gave informed consent and were right-handed with normal or
corrected to normal vision.
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Materials
For the physically coincident feedback the experimental set up was similar to
that described in Chapter 2 (see Figure 4.1a). Participants were seated in front
of a horizontal mirror (450x300mm) raised on a wooden board 300mm above a
900x900mm table. A projection screen (800x540mm) was suspended
horizontally 300mm above the mirror. A Toshiba TLP560 projector was also
suspended a further 910mm above the projection screen. Thus, the image
projected onto the screen appeared to the participant to be in the same plane as
the table surface (see Figure 5.1). Hand movements were recorded at 240Hz by
an electromagnetic sensor (Polhemus Liberty) attached to the index finger of
the reaching (right) hand. A circular plastic disc (10mm diameter) attached to
the leading edge of the table was used to mark the start point and a life-sized
projected colour image of the experimenters (female) hand positioned in a
pointing posture (extended index finger) was used as a representation of the
participants own hand. For the perpendicular feedback a second mirror was
used to replace the horizontal mirror (45x45cm) and placed at a 45-degree
angle from the participants gaze between the wooden board and the projection
screen so that the image, when viewed in this mirror, appeared perpendicular
(90-degrees) to the participants actual movements (Figure 4.1b). For the
externally generated movements the set up was the same as for the coincident
condition except that participants were not required to wear a movement sensor
as no movements were made (Figure 4.1c).
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Figure 4.1: Schematic representation of experimental setup. a) The COINCIDENT
conditions,
in which visual feedback of the participants actual movements was projected
onto a horizontal
mirror so that it appeared in the same spatial plane as the participants own
movements. b) The
PERPENDICULAR conditions in which visual feedback of the participants own
movements
was projected onto a mirror resting at a 45-degree angle from the participants
gaze so that it
appeared in the mirror to be perpendicular (90-degrees) from the participants
actual
movements. c) The COMPUTER condition in which the participant made no movements
but
the movements of the virtual hand were projected to appear in the same plane as
the tabletop
and were completely controlled by the computer.
Procedure
Self-generated Movements
Participants sat at the table and looked down into the mirror in which they
could see a black screen (a reflection of the image from the projector on the
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projection screen). Participants placed their index finger on the start position
with their hand in the same posture as the image that represented their
movements (a pointing posture) and were required to return to the same start
position at the end of each trial. At the beginning of each trial a red target
bar
appeared for 500ms (bar: 160x20mm, with the inner edge 40mm from the
midline and 300mm from the start point). Immediately following removal of
the target bar image a tone indicated to the participant that they should make a
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unimanual reaching movement towards where the target bar had been. During
the reach, participants saw the virtual hand image pass beneath a virtual
occluding bar (440x160mm) before re-emerging on the other side.
Figure 4.2: At the beginning of each trial a red target bar appeared for 500ms
and then
disappeared again before movement onset. During the reach, participants saw the
virtual hand
pass beneath a virtual occluding bar before re-emerging on the other side. On
50% of trials the
hand was perturbed from its veridical position while occluded by either 4 (25%
of trials) or 16
(25% of trials) degrees. At the end of the trial participants made a verbal self
/other judgment.
For the first 100mm of the movement the trajectory and velocity of the
virtual hand was calculated online using position data from the motion tracker
on the index finger and was thus the same as the actual movement (delay
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<10ms) before becoming occluded by the virtual bar. In half of the trials,
following occlusion, the virtual hand continued to accurately represent the
actual reach trajectory (self). In the other half, whilst occluded, the image
undertook a lateral shift (other) equivalent to a cursor rotation of 4-degrees
(25%v of the trials) or 16-degree beginning at the initial start location so
that
when the hand reappeared its spatial position was to one side of the actual hand
position (Figure 4.3). Perturbations were equally divided between leftward and
rightward directions. This task was completed with visual feedback that was
presented at a 90-degree angle to actual movements (PERPENDICULAR) and
feedback that was physically coincident (COINCIDENT).
Figure 4.3: Schematic representation of perturbed hand path. Horizontal solid
lines represent
edges of occluding bar. The dashed white line represents actual limb trajectory,
solid red lines
represent perturbed trajectory of visual feedback equivalent to a 4-degree
perturbation
commencing at the beginning of the movement (demonstrated by the dotted white
line). 16degree
perturbations were applied in the same way
Externally-Generated Movements
The third condition (COMPUTER) was identical in set up to the COINCIDENT
condition in which visual feedback was presented on a horizontal mirror in
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front of the participant so that it appeared to be in the same spatial plane as
the
table top. In this condition, however, participants were required keep their
hands stationary as the movement trajectories of the virtual hand were
completely controlled by the computer. Participants had to decide whether the
virtual hands trajectory had been perturbed or not during occlusion based on
its initial trajectory prior to occlusion, for which the participants made a
verbal
perturbed (4 or 16-degree perturbation)/ unperturbed (0-degree perturbation)
judgment.
Trajectory of the Virtual Hand
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The computer-generated movements of the hand were pre-programmed into the
computer. The Y data points of the reach were calculated using an integrated
Gaussian distribution, whilst the X data points were generated by fitting a
third
order polymodal interpolation on a start, end and central point. Moving the
central point towards the periphery (to the right of a right handed reach and to
the left of a left handed reach) allowed curvature to be applied to the hand
path
in an attempt to simulate noise similar to that found in normal, biological
reaches (Figure 4.4).
Figure 4.4: Schematic representation of the hand path
curvature applied (0, 3 and 9cm) to externally-
generated (computer controlled) trajectories of the
virtual hand.
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In one third of the trials there was no curvature on the hand path,
therefore, the central point was in a straight-line position with respect to the
start and end points. In another third of the trials the central point was moved
3cm from the straight-line position causing a small curvature to the handpath,
whilst in the remaining the central point was moved 9cm from the straight-line
position (see Figure 4.4). The 4 and 16-degree perturbations were then applied
(or not) to these pre-programmed trajectories.
The tasks were completed in six separate blocks (two of each condition, one
reaching with the left hand/ viewing movements of a virtual left hand and one
reaching with the right hand/ viewing movements of a virtual right hand)
counterbalanced within participants using an ABCCBA design and also
counterbalanced between participants. Each of the blocks for both the
COINCIDENT and PERPENDICULAR conditions consisted of 48 trials (total
of 96 trials per condition), 24 self and 24 other (12 four degree perturbations
and 12 sixteen). In the COMPUTER condition, however, each block consisted
of 72 trials (total of 144 trials), 36 unperturbed and 36 perturbed (18 four and
18 sixteen degrees). The additional trials present in the COMPUTER condition
were to control for the different hand-path curvatures (24 straight, 24, 3cm
curvature and 24, 9cm curvature) described above.
4.3: Results
Judgments were converted into percent correct scores with self being the
correct judgment for the 0-degree perturbation and other being correct
judgment for the 4 and 16-degree perturbation for the COINCIDENT and
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PERPENDICULAR conditions, whilst perturbed was the correct judgment for
the 4 and 16-degree perturbations and unperturbed the correct judgment for the
0-degree perturbation in the COMPUTER condition. The data were then
analysed using a 3x3 repeated measures ANOVA with the factors FEEDBACK
(three levels, PERPENDICULAR, COINCIDENT and COMPUTER) and
PERTURBATION (three levels, ZERO, FOUR and SIXTEEN-degrees).
There was a significant main effect of PERTURBATION (F(1,18)=101.1,
p<0.001) with SIXTEEN-degrees (99.58%) having the highest percent correct
score, followed by ZERO-degrees (89.17%) and FOUR-degrees (36.%) having
the lowest score. There was a significant main effect of FEEDBACK
(F(2,22)=9.14, P<0.01) with PERPENDICULAR producing a lowest percent
correct score (72.57%) followed by COINCIDENT (75.17%) and then
COMPUTER (78.55%). There was also a significant PERTURBATION *
FEEDBACK interaction (F(4,44)= 3.17,p<0.05).
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Planned comparisons were conducted between PERPENDICULAR and
COINCIDENT feedback for each of the perturbations. A significant difference
was found at the ZERO-degree perturbation (F(1)=4.72, p<0.05) with
COINCIDENT (90.8%) having a higher percent correct score than
PERPENDICULAR (84.03%). No significant differences were found at either
FOUR (F(1)= 0.61, p=NS) or SIXTEEN (F(1)=0.2, p=NS) degrees.
Planned comparisons were also completed between COINCIDENT and
COMPUTER for each perturbation size. A significant difference was found at
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the FOUR-degree perturbation (F(1)=10.19, p<0.01) with COMPUTER
(46.76%) having greater percent correct judgments than COINCIDENT
(36.81%). No significant differences were found at either ZERO (F(1)=0.03,
p=NS) or SIXTEEN (F(1)=0.05, p=NS) degrees (Figure 4.5).
Figure 4.5: FEEDBACK*PERTURBATION interaction. Participants have higher percent
correct judgments at the ZERO-degree perturbation with physically coincident
visual feedback
compared to visual feedback presented perpendicular to the actual movements.
Higher percent
correct judgments are also produced by visual feedback entirely controlled by
the computer
compared to coincident self-generated feedback. The single asterisk (*) denotes
significant
differences at p<0.05, whilst the double asterisks (**) denote a significant
difference of
p<0.01.
4.4: Discussion
Performance on the coincident condition demonstrates a similar pattern to that
observed by the control group in the previous chapter, participants performing
close to chance with the small 4-degree perturbation whilst performing above
SECTION 1: AGENCY AND THE RIGHT HEMISPHERE CHAPTER 4
chance with the 0 and 16-degree perturbations. When physical coincidence of
the visual feedback was removed in the perpendicular condition, however,
participants performed normally for the 4 and 16-degree perturbations whilst
producing significantly fewer correct (self) judgments for the 0-degree
perturbation. Performance on the computer conditions, in which participants
had to detect perturbations applied to movement trajectories controlled entirely
by the computer, also differed from the coincident condition. For this
condition, performance was similar to with self-generated movements for the 0
and 16-degree perturbations, but a higher percentage of correct judgments
(perturbed/other) was recorded for the 4-degree perturbation.
Removing the spatial relationship between the actual movements and
the visual feedback reduced the amount of self-judgments given to unperturbed
(self) visual feedback. These results are in line with the participants basing
their judgments on agency as opposed to detecting visual-kinematic
discordance. If the participants were basing their judgments on the visual-
kinematic discrepancies, removing physical coincidence would make the
discrepancies more difficult to detect, thus predicting more self-judgments to
perturbed (other) visual feedback. The current experiment, however, found an
increase of other judgments given in response to unperturbed (self) visual
feedback. In addition to this, some of the participants spontaneously reported
to
feel less in control of the movements in this condition, which again would not
be expected if the judgments were not based on agency.
Detection of visual-proprioceptive discordance is likely to have an
effect on the sense of agency. Previous studies testing the performance of
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deafferented patients on a self/other judgment task over actual and perturbed
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visual feedback, found patient performance to be impaired in comparison to
control performance (Farrer et al., 2003b and Balslev et al., 2007). However,
this had the effect of increasing self-judgments to perturbed visual feedback,
suggesting that in the absence of proprioception, the patients were less able to
detect the perturbations. Non-physically coincident visual feedback reduces the
usefulness of proprioception in the current task, as the actual limb position no
longer corresponds directly to the virtual hand. However, in the current
experiment an increase in other and not self-judgements was found, which
suggests that the change in performance is likely to be the result something
other than reduced usefulness of proprioception, such as visual feedback being
outside of peripersonal space. In addition, although performance was reduced
with the deafferented patients (Farrer et al., 2003b and Balslev et al., 2007),
they did not perform at chance level, again suggesting that the task involves
more than detection of visual-proprioceptive discordance.
For computer-generated vs. self-generated movement it was expected
that more correct judgments would be observed with self-generated movement.
This was because more accurate predictions would be made due to the extra
information available on which to make such predictions, namely the efference
copy of the motor commands. This, however, was not what was found.
Judgments for the computer-generated movement show an increase in correct
detection of the 4-degree perturbation compared to when the movements were
self-generated. This indicates that the predictions made over the computer-
generated movements were more accurate, so that when the visual feedback
deviated from the predicted path, it was easier to detect. However, a possible
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explanation for the current results is that the computer-generated movements
had less noise.
In the current experiment an attempt was made to simulate noise of
actual reaches for the computer-generated reaches, by applying curvature to the
movement trajectory. However, there were only three different sizes of
curvature throughout the experiment, all with peak curvature occurring at the
same point in the movement. This was not representative of actual reaches,
which do not show this systematic, consistent pattern of curvature. It has been
found that when reaching between two targets, similar to that in the current
study (start point and target), participants normally produce relatively
straight
hand trajectories. Moreover, when asked to apply curvature to their reaches,
the curvature observed is not uniform (Abend et al., 1982) like that applied to
the computer-generated movements of the current study. In addition to this, the
velocity of the virtual reaches also differed from that of actual reaches, as
the
virtual hand in the computer-generated condition moved at a constant velocity.
Actual human limb movements do not move at a constant velocity, but
demonstrate a bell shaped velocity profile (Abend et al., 1982). Therefore, the
computer generated reaches in the current study are not equivalent to the self-
generated reaches, and it is this lack of noise of the computer-generated
movement that is likely to account for the difference in results (perturbations
were easier to detect with computer-generated movement). However, the fact
that a difference was found in the perpendicular condition suggests that
participants were basing their judgments on more than just predictions based
on initial reach trajectory, as if this were the case, no difference would be
expected as a result of changing the orientation of the visual feedback.
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4.5: Conclusions
The current results suggest that self/other judgments over actual and spatially
perturbed visual feedback of reaching movements is a useful method for the
investigation of agency attribution. The participants in the current study were
unlikely to be basing their judgments on visual-kinematic discordance alone,
due to the detection of perturbations being unaffected by perpendicular visual
feedback (reducing the usefulness of proprioception). Whether or not the task
involves prediction mechanisms equivalent to those used for externally
generated movements remains unclear due to experimental confounds with the
computer-generated movements. However, the reduction in self-judgments
with perpendicular feedback suggests that, even if these processes are similar,
there is something special about self-generated movement that differs from
other forms of motion prediction and allows for the experience of agency. The
following experiment investigates this further by examining performance of
neurologically intact controls on a similar task with and without TMS over the
right inferior parietal lobe (area identified by previous neuroimaging studies 
Farrer et al., 2003). Transient disruption in this manner should help, not only
to
specify brain region more specifically in neurologically normal participants
(opposed to the abnormal brain of T.C.A. in Chapter 3), but also to determine
the nature of the mechanisms involved.
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Chapter 5
Misattribution of Actions Following Right Parietal
TMS
5.1: Introduction
Results from previous experiments (including those from Chapter 3) place the
neural processes involved in agency attribution within the right hemisphere,
specifically implicating the rIPL. For example, Farrer et al. (2003a) and Farrer
and Frith (2002) identified activation localised in this area when participants
detected a spatial incongruence between their own actions and visual feedback
(making an other judgment). Due to disorders involving agency and other
forms of self-awareness being associated with the right parietal lobe (e.g.
asomatognosia, Paysant et al., 2004 and Schizophrenic delusions of control,
Spence et al., 1997) the activation was interpreted as representing a feeling of
agency over the movement, although the exact nature of the processes
underlying this activation remains unclear.
Previous studies have also found the rIPL to be involved with different
forms of self-processing. For example, in an fMRI study by Uddin et al. (2005)
participants made self/other judgments over images of faces that were morphed
between their own face and that of a gender matched familiar other. Increases
in rIPL activations were found to correspond with participants making self-
judgments. A later follow up study (Uddin et al., 2006) found that following
application of repetitive TMS (rTMS) to the rIPL a significant increase in self-
judgments was observed. However, the activity recorded by Farrer et al. (2003)
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and Farrer and Frith (2002) is likely to reflect a different underlying process
than that found by Uddin et al. (2006) due to the increases in rIPL activity
being associated with other and not self-judgments. In addition to this, cases
of
abnormal experience of agency such as schizophrenic delusions of control do
not appear to be a result of a general deficit in self-recognition as although
some schizophrenic patients have been found to have problems with
recognising their own voice (Allen et al., 2004) a similar deficit has not been
identified for self-face recognition (Lee et al., 2007), suggesting that
self/other
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judgments over actions involve separate underlying mechanisms to that of
self/other judgments of faces.
A further possibility for the mechanisms underlying the rIPL activity
observed by Farrer et al. (2003a) and Farrer and Frith (2002) could be that
opposed to being responsible for feelings of agency or control over an action,
the rIPL detects general incongruence between visual and proprioceptive
inputs. There is a large body of evidence implicating the parietal lobes with
sensory integration. Single cell recordings in monkey parietal neurons have
found an increased firing rate on receipt of simultaneous visual and tactile
information (Avillac et al., 2007). This has also been found in humans, not
only with visual and proprioceptive/tactile information (Riccardi et al., 2006)
as from self-generated movements, but also with sensory integration of
different modalities. For example, detecting spatially congruent audio and
visual information (picture and bark of a dog) (Dhamala et al., 2007).
However, these instances of sensory integration found greater activation in the
rIPL when the relevant senses were coincident or congruent, whilst Farrer et al.
(2003a) and Farrer and Frith (2002) observed increased activation when the
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visual and proprioceptive signals were conflicting. Moreover, the results of
Chapter 4 suggest that participants are not making their judgments solely on
visual-kinematic discordance, as reducing the spatial relationship between
visual and proprioceptive feedback (proprioceptive feedback is less useful)
reduced feelings of agency (self-judgments) opposed to reducing the ability to
detect the perturbations (other judgments).
Outlined in Chapter 1 are two main theories of agency, firstly there is
the narrative approach in which it was suggested that high-level conscious
processes retrospectively infer agency over our actions based on prior
knowledge and beliefs (Stephens and Graham, 2000). Secondly there is the
comparator model of agency in which low-level mechanisms detect
mismatches between the predicted and actual, and the desired and actual state
of the motor system (Frith et al. 2000). Recent theorists have suggested that
opposed to agency being caused by either high or low-level processes that it is
informed by both (Syofzik et al., 2007, Gallagher, 2007). Therefore the activity
of the rIPL observed in the aforementioned imaging studies may reflect either
of these processes.
Increased activity of the rIPL has been observed in schizophrenic
patients whilst experiencing delusions of control (Spence et al. 2007). Whilst
lying in a PET scanner the patients made random movements with joystick,
over which they reported to have feelings of external control. Whilst having
this experience hyperactivity of the rIPL was recorded in comparison to
schizophrenic patients not experiencing delusions of control, and a non-
schizophrenic control group. There is evidence in the literature that
schizophrenics may have difficulty with both high and low-level agency. For
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example, Bulot et al. (2007) conducted an experiment in which the participants
were required to stop a swinging pendulum by applying sufficient grip force to
a force cell. All participants were instructed to use the minimum grip force
possible to stop the pendulum, whilst not letting the force cell slip through
their
fingers (not applying enough force). It was found that healthy participants
demonstrated an advantage for releasing the pendulum themselves opposed to
the experimenter releasing it (less grip force used). The same was not true of
the schizophrenic group, who applied a similar degree of grip force regardless
of who was releasing the pendulum. This was interpreted as a low-level deficit
in using predictions based on self generated actions.
The prediction element of the comparator model is the predicted state
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representation, which is a prediction of the next state of the motor system
based on the efference copy of the issued motor commands, and is compared to
the estimated actual next state of the motor system that is based primarily on
afferent feedback. The predicted state representation has been connected with
imagined movements (Frith et al., 2000) as they not only involve similar
networks in the brain (Decety et al., 1994) but also conform to the same
constraints imposed on actual movement (Decety and Michel 1989).
Schizophrenic patients suffering from passivity on the other hand do not
demonstrate these constraints over their imagined movements, suggesting that
they have a deficit in motor imagery (Maruff et al. 2003). In addition they have
also been found to be impaired in answering questions that require imagining
movement (Maruff et al. 2003) and mental rotation of body parts (de
Vignemont et al. 2006). Therefore, the activity in the rIPL could be associated
with the low-level predictive mechanisms involved in the comparator model.
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However, schizophrenic patients also demonstrate abnormal beliefs.
The narrative (high-level) approach to agency emphasises a great importance
on internal dialogue. This particular process is likely to be disturbed in many
schizophrenic patients, because patients suffering from symptoms of passivity
often also suffer from, or have suffered from, auditory hallucinations (Jones
and Fernhough, 2007). Harvey et al. (1985) suggested that these auditory
hallucinations represent a failure to recognise inner speech as being produced
by the self. Therefore, disrupted inner speech and abnormal beliefs that are
characteristic of schizophrenia suggest that it could be a high and not
low-level
deficit that is responsible for delusions of control, and is represented by the
hyperactivity seen in the rIPL of these patients (Spence et al., 1997). However,
the activity observed by Farrer et al. (2003) was found to increase with
increasing size of perturbation, which is more in line with a low-level
comparator system (detecting larger and larger comparator mismatches)
opposed to high-level deficits of internal dialogue (associated more with the
left hemisphere, McGuire et al., 1996).
With most previous experiments that attempt to identify the functional
properties underlying pre-determined brain activity, it is difficult to
differentiate between high and low-level mechanisms. For example, in the
rTMS experiment by Uddin et al. (2006), because rTMS involves prolonged
exposure to low frequency stimulation (in this case 20 minutes of 1Hz TMS)
the neurons underneath the coil are disrupted for several minutes. Therefore
these neurons are impaired for the entire task and so it cannot be determined
which part of the task is being disrupted. In order to tackle this, the aim of
the
current experiment was to functionally determine a causal role of the rIPL in
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agency attribution, using single pulse TMS. A benefit of single pulse TMS is
that it only disrupts the underlying neurons for a limited time period, so as to
specifically attempt to disrupt low-level opposed to high-level processes. In a
paradigm similar to that used by Farrer et al. (2003a), participants made
judgments about full limb movements while receiving TMS (or no TMS) to
either rIPL or the vertex. The visual feedback received was either an exact
representation of the participants actual movement (self) or had a 4-degree
spatial perturbation applied (other). Crucially, the TMS was delivered when
movement of the hand was occluded from view (i.e. at a time when there was
no discordance between the seen and felt positions of the hand), which was
also the time when the perturbation was applied (before which the visual
feedback was veridical). Therefore an extra burden was placed on the
predictive mechanisms at just the time when the TMS pulse was applied, so
that if the predicted state representation is located within rIPL, this should
be
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affected by the TMS pulse.
Although the finger was obscured from view for an average of 155ms,
total hand occlusion was only achieved for approximately 25ms, restricting
TMS delivery to a single pulse. The vertex was chosen as the control site for
this experiment as it is a frequently used control site to test for non-specific
effects of TMS (e.g. Nyffeler et al. 2006, Muggleton et al. 2006, Bestman et al.
2002). The analogous left hemisphere location, the left IPL, was not used as a
control site due to the associations between this location and other (temporal)
aspects of agency attribution (MacDonald and Paus, 2003) in addition to its
association with movement production (Goldenberg, 2001). Planned
comparisons were conducted to test directly whether TMS stimulation
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disrupted self/other judgments when applied to the rIPL (and not when applied
to the vertex) at a time when spatial discordance could not be detected.
Therefore, planned comparisons were conducted at the rIPL and the vertex
between TMS and no-TMS trials for both the 0 and 4-degree perturbations.
5.2: Method
Participants
A sample of 10 healthy right-handed volunteers consisting of 8 females, and 2
males with a mean age of 22 years, gave fully informed written consent to
participate in the study. All were screened for contraindications to TMS using a
self-report questionnaire based on the TMS Adult safety Screen (Keel et al.,
1999). The study was approved by the University of Nottingham School of
Psychology ethics committee and conformed to the Code of Ethics of the
World Medical Association (Declaration of Helsinki).
Materials
The experimental set was similar to that in Chapter 4. Participants were seated
in front of a horizontal mirror (raised on a wooden board 300mm above a
900x900mm table. A projection screen was suspended horizontally 300mm
above the mirror. A projector was also suspended a further 910mm above the
projection screen. Thus, the image projected onto the screen appeared to the
participant to be in the same plane as the table surface (see Figure 5.1). Hand
movements were recorded using a Polhemus Liberty electromagnetic sensor
attached to the index finger of the reaching (right) hand. A circular plastic
disc
attached to the leading edge of the table was used to mark the start point and a
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life-sized projected colour image of the experimenters (female) hand
positioned in a pointing posture (extended index finger) was used as a
representation of the participants own hand.
A Magstim Rapid TMS machine (the Magstim Company LTD) with
double 70mm coil was used to deliver the magnetic pulse to the appropriate
areas on the scalp marked out using disposable surgical caps. The coil was
placed tangentially to the skull and was set to stimulate at 110% of motor
threshold (defined as the minimal TMS intensity required to cause involuntary
twitching of the contralateral hand in at least 5 out of 10 trials). For the
rIPL
condition the TMS wand was positioned 50mm posterior to the motor hand
area (Nager et al., 2004) and the vertex was found at the intersection between
the naison-inion line and the line between the pre-auricular points.
Figure 5.1: Schematic representation of experimental set up. When looking into
the mirror,
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images projected into the upper screen appear to be in the same plane as the
table surface.
Thus, an unperturbed image of a virtual hand appears to be in the same location
as the
participants actual hand.
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Procedure
The experimental procedure was identical to that described in Chapter 4 except
that movements were only made with the right limb and perturbations of only
4-degrees were used. Participants made unimanual reaching movements
towards the previous position of a target bar that had disappeared prior to
movement onset. During the reach, participants saw the virtual hand image
pass beneath a virtual occluding bar (440x160mm) before re-emerging on the
other side (Figure 5.2).
Figure 5.2: At the beginning of each trial a red target bar appeared for 500ms
and then
disappeared again before movement onset. During the reach, participants saw the
virtual hand
pass beneath a virtual occluding bar before re-emerging on the other side. TMS
was applied on
50% of trials at random while the hand was occluded. On 50% of trials the hand
was also
perturbed from its veridical position while occluded. At the end of the trial
participants made a
verbal self vs. other judgment.
For the first 100mm of the reach the movement of the virtual hand was
veridical with the actual movement before becoming occluded by the virtual
bar. In half of the trials, following occlusion, the virtual hand continued to
accurately represent the actual reach trajectory (self). In the other half,
whilst
occluded, the image undertook a lateral shift (other) equivalent to a cursor
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rotation of 4-degrees beginning at the initial start location so that when the
hand reappeared its spatial position was to one side of the actual hand position
(see Figure 4.3).
In half of the other trials (25% of total trials) this shift was to the left
and in the remaining trials it was to the right. Each participant took part in
two
sequential experimental blocks, one for each stimulation site, the order of
which was counterbalanced between participants. Within each block there were
96 trials (192 in total), which were conducted in a pseudo-randomised order
(perturbed and unperturbed trials with and without TMS). In half of the trials
TMS was applied as a single pulse delivered at the moment the virtual hand
became fully obscured behind the occluding bar. In the remaining trials no
TMS pulse was delivered.
Participants were informed that visual feedback up to the occluding bar
would accurately represent their own movements and that this would also be
true in half of the trials following occlusion. It was explained that in the
remaining trials, when the virtual hand emerged from behind the occluding bar,
visual feedback would be controlled by the computer and would deviate the
path of the virtual hand laterally either left or right of their actual hand
path.
Participants made their responses verbally: being instructed to respond self
if
they felt that the virtual hand accurately represented their movement
throughout the entire reach (i.e. that they were in control of the movement) and
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other if they felt that the hand path, after re-emerging, had been controlled
by the computer. Participants were instructed to move at a comfortable and
natural speed. It was also explained that the target bar, which extended across
most of the display, was intended only as an indicator of the distance that they
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should travel and that there were no directional accuracy requirements. The
width of the target bar was such that it prevented participants from using its
remembered location as a target to use as an indicator of the relative
difference
between their intended and actual reach direction. Note, also, that
perturbations
were in the lateral direction only so that it was not possible to use memory of
the distance of the bar to detect perturbations. Participants were aware that
the
representational image of their hand position was not their own real hand
(although one participant did make this mistake).
5.3: Results
Self/other judgments were converted into percent correct scores for each
participant (correct judgments were self for ZERO-degree perturbations and
other for FOUR-degree perturbations). The data were entered in a 2x2x2
repeated measures ANOVA with the factors STIMULATION (TMS and NOTMS),
BRAIN AREA, (RIPL and VERTEX) and PERTURBATION, (ZERO
and FOUR-degrees).
There were no significant main effects of STIMULATION (F(1,9)=0.031,
p=NS) or BRAIN AREA (F(1,9)=0.909, p=NS). There was, however, a
significant main effect of PERTURBATION (F(1,9)=17.183, p<0.01) with
mean percent correct judgments being greater for ZERO (mean=76.3) than
FOUR degrees (mean=60.4% ).
There was also a significant two-way STIMULATION * PERTURBATION
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interaction (F(1,9)=12.27, p<0.01), but this interaction was not informative as
it used data collapsed across brain areas and can be completely explained by
the results of the planned comparisons (see below). There were no significant
interactions for STIMULATION * BRAIN AREA (F(1,9)=1.56, P=NS),
BRAIN AREA * PERTURBATION (F(1,9)=0.43, p=NS) or STIMULATION
* BRAIN AREA * PERTURBATION F(1,9)=2.794, p=NS.)
Planned comparisons were conducted between the predicted variables of
interest (see Figure 5.3) revealing significant differences in percent correct
judgments between TMS and NO-TMS over the RIPL for the ZERO-degree
perturbation (F(1)=11.96, p<0.01) with percent correct judgments being greater
for NO-TMS (mean=81.25%) than TMS (mean=68.75%) trials. A significant
difference was also found at the RIPL for the FOUR-degree perturbation
(F(1)=6.432, p<0.05) with percent correct judgments being greater for TMS
(mean=62.92%) than NO-TMS (mean=53.75%). No difference was found at
the VERTEX between TMS and NO-TMS trials for either ZERO (F(1)= .332,
p=NS) or FOUR (F(1)=4.3, p=0.07) degree perturbations.
112
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Figure 5.3: Percent correct judgments for ZERO -degree (self) and FOUR -degree
(other)
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perturbations when TMS was delivered (open circles) or not delivered (filled
squares) over
rIPL (left figure) or vertex (right figure). Asterisks denote significant
differences revealed by
planned comparisons.
5.4: Discussion
When TMS was applied over the rIPL, participants were more likely to give a
judgment of other (for both present and absent perturbations) compared to
when no TMS was applied (that is: percent correct judgments were reduced for
the 0-degree perturbation, but increased for the 4-degree perturbation). By
contrast, this TMS effect was not observed when stimulation was over the
vertex. At first glance these results may seem counter-intuitive given the
results of previous imaging experiments using similar paradigms. For example,
Farrer and colleagues (Farrer et al., 2003a and Farrer and Frith 2002) reported
increased activation in the rIPL when participants made other judgments
compared to self-judgments in tasks involving perturbed vs. real feedback of
cursor or joystick movements. In accordance with these findings one might
expect that disrupting the area thought to be heavily involved in other
attribution (rIPL) would lead to a disruption in the ability to make other
judgments -and hence an increase in self-judgments. However, if, as suggested
in the introduction, the rIPL activity reflects prediction processes within the
comparator model, it would follow that disruption to these processes could
result in an inaccurate prediction of the next state of the motor system, thus
producing more other judgments for both perturbed and unperturbed visual
feedback.
Comparator models have been proposed as one of the mechanisms
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responsible for successful agency attribution and it has been suggested that
lesions to the system can result in the abnormal agency attribution seen in, for
example, anosognosia and schizophrenia (e.g. Frith et al., 2000). The transient
nature of the TMS pulse meant that it is more likely to be these low-level
systems, opposed to higher-level conscious processes that were directly
affected by the TMS in the current experiment. The comparator model that was
proposed by Frith et al. (2000) (see Figure 5.5), explains the activity observed
in the rIPL, not as a process for detecting an other movement per se, but
detection of a comparator mismatch between the expected position of the limb,
and the actual (perceived) position of the limb. Whenever the CNS (central
nervous system) plans a movement, a copy of the motor command is generated
(efference copy) and this can be used by the CNS to predict the consequences
of that movement. Such a prediction mechanism can be used in many ways, but
importantly it allows the CNS to anticipate and correct for movement errors,
filter expected sensory input and help maintain the estimate of the current
state
of the motor system. An accurate representation of ones own current limb
position depends on accurate sensory feedback as well as accurate current state
predictions. The study by Farrer et al. (2003a) found that the rIPL activity
increases with perturbations size, which could reflect the comparator detecting
larger and larger discrepancies. Therefore, in terms of the current findings,
the
TMS may have disrupted the predicted state representation (predicted next
state of the motor system); as a result the comparator may no longer have
access to what self is, so that even with accurate visual feedback the
comparator would produce an other judgment (Figure 5.4).
A unique and important factor in the current study relates to the timing of
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the TMS pulse: crucially it occurred when vision of the virtual hand was not
available to the participant. Correct self/other judgments in a task such as
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this,
requires that the participant accurately predicts where their hand will
re-emerge
from behind the occluding bar. Occluding the hand for a portion of the reach
places an extra burden on predictive mechanisms at precisely the time at which
the TMS pulse is delivered. Therefore, it is most likely that it is this
predictive
process that is disrupted. The comparator model of agency attribution explains
schizophrenic delusions of control in a similar way. This suggests that these
patients have impaired predicted state representations and as a consequence
they perceive a false discordance between the predicted and actual states of
their own movement. It is for that reason they feel as though an external agent
is controlling their actions even though the intended goal is still achieved
(the
rest of the system remains intact so that the patient can still successfully
construct and execute the desired movement and their intended goals match
their perceived outcome).
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Figure 5.4: Schematic representation of the comparator model. Frith et al.
(2000) explained the
passivity symptom in schizophrenia (delusions of control), in which patients
perceive self-
movements to be produced by other agents, to be a result of impaired predicted
state
representations. Disruption to the predicted state representation causes the CNS
to loose track
of what self is so that even when actions are carried out as intended the
comparator detects a
false discrepancy between the predicted and estimated state representations
(comparisons
represented by the crossed circles). The current results also demonstrate an
increase of
inaccurate other judgments as a result of the rIPL TMS, suggesting that TMS over
the rIPL is
also disrupting the predicted state representation. Figure adapted from Frith et
al. (2000).
The misattribution of agency observed in the current experiment mirrors
that seen in schizophrenic delusions of control, with participants making more
other judgments. As outlined above, the comparator model predicts that
disrupting predicted state representations would lead to such an increase in
other judgments and as such suggests that it is this element of the comparator
process that is disrupted with rIPL TMS.
In relation to previous studies it has been argued that the rIPL activation
observed in the Farrer et al. (2003a) study might simply reflect the detection
of
spatial discordance rather than the sense of agency itself. In the current
experiment, however, TMS is delivered at a time at which there is no sensory
discordance. The felt position of the limb remains unperturbed and the seen
position of the limb is occluded. While the rIPL may indeed be heavily
implicated in the detection of sensory discordance, that is not the process that
is being disrupted by TMS in the current experiment. Similarly, whilst other,
non-action forms of self/other discrimination have been associated with the
rIPL, such as self-face recognition (Uddin et al., 2005) they are unlikely to
reflect the same processes. Uddin et al. (2005) found increased activity in the
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rIPL when making self-judgments, and found rIPL rTMS to produce an
increase in self-judgements (Uddin et al., 2006). Farrer et al. (2003a) and
Farrer and Frith (2002), on the other hand, found increased rIPL activity when
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making other judgments with rIPL TMS in the current study increasing other
judgments.
It is interesting to note that the planned comparison between TMS and
NO-TMS at the vertex stimulation site also approached significance (p=0.07)
with perturbations of 4-degrees. The direction of the difference here was in the
same direction as the equivalent TMS vs. NO-TMS comparison at the rIPL
stimulation site. This probably reflects a general effect of TMS on the
frequency of other judgments (that is, participants might generally report
'other' more frequently when receiving TMS regardless of stimulation
location). However, unlike rIPL TMS, the difference for 0-degree perturbations
at the vertex did not approach significance. Thus, the effect of TMS over the
rIPL, which significantly affects responses at both the 0 and 4-degree
perturbations, suggests that parietal TMS has an effect that is over and above
any general effects of TMS. As a further point of interest, there appears to be
a
substantial self-judgment bias which can be accounted for as a consequence of
the inherent difficulty of the task: previous research (e.g. Farrer et al.,
2003b)
has demonstrated that whereas participants can easily detect perturbations of
around 10  15-degrees, they find perturbations as small as 5-degrees
particularly difficult and tend to give many more self than other judgments.
The high proportion of self-judgments evident in the current experiment could,
therefore, be a reflection uncertainty, giving self as a default response.
Consequently, more self-judgments would be expected if the TMS pulse was
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simply increasing this uncertainty, the opposite of which was true of the
current results with more other, rather than self-judgments being observed.
Relating the comparator model back to the callosal agenic patient
(T.C.A.) in Chapter 3, the results are quite straightforward. The bulk of the
evidence previously discussed, suggests that agency mechanisms are primarily
rooted within the right hemisphere. In which case, in the fixation RHRP
conditions (isolated left hemisphere) none of the relevant information is
available to the comparator (right hemisphere) so that T.C.A. performs at
chance level. However, in LHLP conditions (isolated left hemisphere) all the
information is available to the comparator so that T.C.A. performs as controls.
5.5: Conclusions
The result of the current study supports the involvement of a neural comparator
in agency attribution and adds further support to the idea that the inability to
accurately predict the consequences of self-generated actions underlies
delusions of control in schizophrenia. In addition, the data presented here
suggest that the comparators involvement directly affects low-level
sensational aspects rather than higher-level judgments.
The comparator model at present (described above) suggests that
self/other judgments are made by comparing the estimated actual state with
efferent signals (predicted state representation). However, a recent study by
Balslev et al. (2006) identified the detection of perturbations of active
(efferent
signals) and passive (no efferent signals) movements to involve the same
neural networks, which include the rIPL. It would be expected that detecting
perturbations applied to passive movements would involve matching visual and
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proprioceptive feedback, as there are no efferent signals available. However, in
the current account of the comparator model, the role of proprioception is
limited to the formation of the estimated actual state, with no reference to
visual-proprioceptive comparisons that could help explain the Balslev et al.
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(2006) findings. The following section attempts to investigate role of
proprioception in relation to agency attribution, by examining self/other
judgments of perturbed and actual visual feedback with both active and passive
movements and relating these findings back to the comparator model.
Section 2
PROPRIOCEPTIVE CONTRIBUTIONS TO AGENCY
SECTION 2: PROPRIOCEPTIVE CONTRIBUTIONS CHAPTER 6
Chapter 6
Active vs. Passive Movements
6.1: Introduction
One criticism of the comparator explanation of agency claims that the model
overstates the role of efferent signals to the neglect of afferent feedback,
particularly proprioception (Synofzik et al., 2007). This type of afferent
feedback is especially pertinent in agency attribution as it originates directly
from the moving limb. Unlike visual information, which could derive from
another agents actions and be mistaken for being self-produced, any
proprioceptive information received could only have self pertained origins.
Therefore proprioceptive signals are reliably and unmistakably feedback from
the actual (self-produced) movement. One method with which previous studies
have attempted to investigate proprioception in agency is through self/other
judgments of active (participants move their own limb) compared to passive
(the participants limb is moved by the experimenter) movements. The theory
underlying this type of paradigm is that active movements involve full efferent
as well as afferent signals whilst the passive movements only involve afferent
signals (the same task in the absence of the motor command). According to the
comparator model, agency judgments are based on information from the motor
command, which is only present in the active conditions, and the absence of
which would result in an inability to successfully complete the task. An
alternative view (Balslev et al., 2006) suggests that the observed action is
compared to proprioceptive information, which is present in both active and
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passive conditions, in which case there will be no difference in task
performance.
Balslev et al. (2006) used the active vs. passive paradigm in a
neuroimaging study in which fMRI analysis revealed no significant difference
in recorded activations between active and passive movements. Participants
made finger movements on a mouse both actively (controlled by themselves)
and passively (mouse was moved, with participants finger on it, by the
experimenter). Visual feedback of the participants movements was provided
that was either temporally synchronous (delay< 50ms) or asynchronous
(between approximately 260ms pre and 460ms post actual movement onset)
with the actual movements. Participants were required to make judgments as to
whether the feedback for each trial was synchronous or not with their own
movements. They found a behavioural difference in the error rate between the
active and passive movements, in that there were more errors recorded for the
asynchronous passive trials (participants were less able to detect the delays
when the movements were passive). Importantly, the activations evident in the
task were similar to those identified in previous agency experiments (e.g.
Farrer et al., 2003a and Farrer et al., 2002) predominantly in the right
temporoparietal cortex (including right inferior parietal lobe). However, the
additional finding of this study is that both passive and active movements
produced equivalent brain activity with no significant differences. This means
that activity recorded in the brain was of a similar magnitude and location
regardless of whether the task involved active or passive movements, thus
suggesting that both tasks were completed using the same process regardless of
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the presence or absence of the motor command. Therefore, Balslevs results do
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not support the comparator explanation of movement recognition in which
visual feedback is compared to the motor command in order to identify a
movement as being produced by the self. The lack of difference in brain
activity suggests that both tasks are completed using the same strategy. As no
efferent signals are present in the passive conditions this strategy cannot
include the motor command.
The passive movements in the Balslev experiment, however, were
highly predictable. The movements were tightly controlled to eliminate any
confounding variables so that each passive movement was always performed
with a straight trajectory at the same distance and speed. A consequence of
these controls, however, leaves open the possibility of participants forming
anticipatory motor commands and actively assisting the passive movements.
Moreover, a spatial dissociation was introduced between the participants own
movements, which were always performed moving away from and back
towards the participant, and the visual feedback, which was presented so that
the cursor representing their movements traveled either to the left or the
right.
The purpose of this translation was to prevent anticipatory saccades
(participants did not know whether the movement would be towards the left or
right as it varied randomly between trials). However, it may have changed the
nature of the task, as there is evidence that movements with similar
translations
are processed differently in the brain compared to regular movements. For
example, Clower and Boussaoud (2000) found that when visual feedback was
not presented so that it shared close physical coincidence to the actual
movements, the aftereffect normally following prism adaptation was
significantly reduced. The visual feedback presented in the Balslev et al.
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(2006) study was also not physically coincident in addition to the
aforementioned directional translations applied.
MacDonald and Paus (2003) conducted a similar experiment using
rTMS that also looked at ability to detect temporal discrepancies as a function
of agency. Participants wore a cyber-glove, which could represent movements
of the actual hand on a computer screen. In the active conditions participants
were required to extend either their index or middle finger and in the passive
conditions the participants finger was extended by the experimenter.
Judgments were given at the end of each movement as to whether the visual
feedback was perceived to be synchronous or not with their actual movement
(varying delays were applied to the movement onset of the virtual hand). The
experiment was performed under normal conditions (no TMS), following
rTMS over the left parietal cortex (experimental site) and following rTMS to
left temporal cortex (control site). No significant behavioural difference was
found in delay detection of active and passive movements. However, rTMS
over the left parietal lobe reduced the accuracy of active and not passive
movements. These findings implied that there was a difference between the
neural networks involved in each task and it was interpreted that this
difference
was the efferent signals present in the active conditions. However, MacDonald
and Paus stimulated the left parietal cortex, which has been predominantly
associated with action execution (e.g. apraxia, Goldenberg et al., 2001)
opposed to action awareness (for reviews of see Decety and Chaminade, 2003
and Barresi and Moore, 1996). Therefore, it is possible that the TMS was
affecting a different part of the process concerned with producing the active
movement rather than feelings of control. The participants may have failed to
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successfully produce the planned movement, although, this explanation would
also implicate the motor command as being the significant component
separating the two tasks.
Farrer et al. (2003b) used the active vs. passive paradigm in a
behavioural study using a sample of neurologically intact participants. The
participants were required to make joystick movements, the visual feedback of
which was either an accurate representation of their actual movement or had a
spatial angular perturbation applied. In their experiment they used an array of
eight different perturbation sizes (0, 5, 10, 15, 20, 30, 40, 50) all presented
in
equal proportion of the total trials. For each trial the participants had to
identify
if the feedback they received was spatially concordant or not with their actual
movements (yes or no verbal response). This task was performed both when
the participants actively made the movements themselves and when the
movements were made passively by the experimenter pulling the joystick
forward with a metal rod (whist the participant was holding on to the joystick.)
On average participants became aware of the perturbation (over 50% correct)
at the same degree for both active and passive movements. However, they were
also more accurate in the active conditions with the larger perturbation sizes.
These results suggest that whilst people are more accurate at determining self
from other movements when allowed to produce a motor command (active
conditions), they can still successfully complete the task when relying
predominantly on proprioceptive signals. It could be argued, however, that
even in the passive conditions a motor command was not completely absent
due to the predictability of the passive movements. The metal rod used to
create these movements always pulled the joystick in a straight trajectory
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towards the top of the screen. This could allow participants to make an
anticipatory motor command and even actively assist the passive movement.
An attempt was made to control for this by monitoring muscle signals with
EMG to ensure that the participants were not assisting the movement.
However, this control was only conducted on two participants not included in
the actual results and who may have been aware of the purpose of the study
and altered their behaviour accordingly.
Other studies, however, have found proprioceptive information to have
less of a role in agency attribution. Tsakiris et al. (2005) conducted a study
in
which participants also had to make self/other judgments over active and
passive movements for which they found performance in the passive
conditions to drop close to chance level. In their experiment, however, they
used small finger movements in which the participants right index finger was
lifted on a lever that was controlled by either the participants own left hand
(active) or the experimenter (passive). A key difference between this study and
that of Farrer et al. (2003b) is that the actual observed action was always
passive. In the active conditions the active element was indirect to the
observed
action (left hand controlling the lever out of view). Although one benefit of
this
method is that it reduces the possibility of assisting or producing an
anticipatory motor command for the passive movements, which are meant to
be completely absent of efferent signals (even in the active conditions a motor
command is not made for the right index finger). It immediately presents a
problem as the active conditions not only have the extra motor command of the
movement, but also extra proprioceptive information from the active left hand
as well as the passively moved right index finger. This could mean that the
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difference in accuracy observed between the conditions may not be completely
explained by the additional efferent signals in the active conditions, but could
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also be explained by the extra afferent information that was available.
Moreover, as the participants had extra information in the active condition of
exactly when the movement was to commence they could have actively raised
their right index finger to assist with the movement. Therefore, in this
particular paradigm it is likely that there is substantially more information
absent in the passive compared to active conditions than just the motor
command.
The nature of other in the Tsakiris experiment also differs from the
other aforementioned studies as instead of a perturbed self-produced
movement, they used a separate image of the experimenters finger undergoing
the same action. Therefore, participants would have made a judgment of
whether the image presented was that of their own finger moving or the
experimenters. The task required judgments to be made exclusively on
movement onset (temporal discrepancies) because the possibility of spatial
discrepancies was eliminated given that the path of the observed index finger
would always follow the same rise and fall of the lever. Any trials with grossly
deviating other movements were removed thus making the task very difficult.
In the other aforementioned studies some of the feedback was also very
ambiguous when the perturbations were small, however, this was combined
with trials in which the distortions were much more obvious so that the
participants could be more confident of their response, opposed to being
uncertain throughout the entire experiment, for which case it is arguable
whether the participants would ever actually feel a sense of agency. Another
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consequence of this paradigm is that it does not provide any indication as to
what degree of perturbation (spatial or temporal) is still considered self,
because the exact amount of deviation between self and other movements was
not controlled or recorded.
All these previous studies used relatively small movements, movements
of a single finger (MacDonald and Paus, 2003, Balslev et al., 2006 and Tsakiris
et al, 2005) or the wrist (Farrer et al., 2003b). Despite the presence of a
greater
number of muscle spindles in the finger than along the arm, reaches that
involve extension the entire arm are more complex with greater degrees of
freedom. Such movements involve rotation at the shoulder, elbow as well the
wrist (see Figure 6.1). These extra rotations provide further, detailed
information about that spatial location of the reaching limb. Therefore, in such
instances proprioception may have a greater role in self-identification of
action
simply because the information obtained is more useful. The current
experiment uses full limb reaching movements in order to reduce the likelihood
of overestimating the role of efferent signals due to underestimation of the
role
of proprioception in this way.
Interestingly most of the previous studies, found that the difference
Figure 6.1: Schematic representation
demonstrating the rotations evident in a
reaching movement involving the entire
limb. Rotation takes place at the shoulder,
elbow and wrist.
between active and passive movements was specifically due to a reduction in
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accuracy on the passive other trials only. In other words participants were less
able to detect perturbed (other) visual feedback when their limb was moved
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passively. One exception to this observation is the study by Tsakiris et al.
(2005) as they found a reduction in accuracy for both the self and other passive
trials. One explanation that can account for this is due to a function of
difficulty. All other aforementioned tasks, aside from Tsakiris et al. (2005)
used an array of perturbation sizes from very small (difficult to detect) to
very
large (easier to detect). In the study by Tsakiris et al. (2005), however, any
larger discrepancies between self and other were screened for and removed,
therefore making the task more difficult, which could have resulted in a
difference on the self as well as other trials. However, uncertainty seems to be
reflected by a greater number of self-judgments due to the smaller (more
difficult) perturbations yielding a large percent self-performance opposed to
performance of chance (e.g. Farrer et al., 2003b). The passive conditions in the
Tsakiris study do show greater percent correct judgment for self than other,
however, this is secondary to a more global reduction in accuracy. Therefore,
perhaps this difference in pattern of results reflects a difference in the
nature of
the task and not just difficulty per se. In all aforementioned studies in which
a
reduction in accuracy was evident on the other trials only, the passive
movements had a degree of predictability (possible anticipatory motor
command). This was not the case in the Tsakiris et al. (2005) study, however,
in which the active movements had additional information available (aside
from the motor command) in comparison to the passive movements. The
current study intends to eliminate these limitations, reducing the
predictability
of the passive movements and controlling for differences between active and
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passive conditions in order to gain more insight into the exact role of
proprioception.
The current study is the first of a series of experiments attempting to
examine how proprioceptive signals contribute to the experience of agency.
Participants were required to make self/other judgments over perturbed (other)
and unperturbed (self) visual feedback of both active and passive full arm
reaching movements. A robot arm motion-tracking device was used in order to
track the active movements and produce the passive movements. An attempt
was made to control for the predictive nature of the movements in the passive
conditions by withholding exact knowledge of reach endpoint prior to
completion of the trial (arm could be passively moved to any one of four target
locations). Similarly the robot would be inaccurate to a given target by X and
Y distances selected from a Gaussian distribution. This not only aided with
eliminating predictability but also reduced the possibility of completing the
task using visual information only (based on accuracy). For this reason a delay
was also introduced between the disappearance of the targets and the
movement onset to allow for decay of any target after-image. It was predicted
that responses would be far greater than chance for both the active and passive
conditions. However, there would be a significant reduction in percent correct
judgments of the passive movements but this would be specifically at the larger
16-degree perturbation due to previous studies generally finding any
differences on the other (perturbed) conditions, particularly Farrer et al.
(2003b) who also used spatial perturbations. To investigate this, therefore,
planned comparisons were conducted between the active and passive
movements at each perturbation size.
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6.2: Method
Participants
An opportunity sample of 12 participants was used (3 male 9 female) with a
mean age of 23 years (range of 20 -29 years). All were right handed with
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normal or corrected to normal vision and gave informed consent to take part in
the study.
Materials
Movement trajectories were recorded at 1000Hz using a vBOT 2D robot arm
motion tracking device of which the participants had to grasp the handle with
their right hand so to fully depress the activation button at all times.
Participants were seated in front the robot with a horizontal mirror
(1220x580mm) positioned 450mm above the base of the robot handle. A
projection screen (1220x840mm) was suspended horizontally 450mm above
the mirror and a Toshiba EZ pro 610H projector was also suspended a further
420mm above the projection screen so that the image projected onto the screen
was reflected on to the mirror so that it appeared to the participant to be in
the
same spatial plane as the robot handle (Figure 6.2). The movements were
tracked so that visual feedback could be presented to the participant online in
the form of a white circular cursor (10mm in diameter) that represented the
robot handle (the same location as the participants actual hand).
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Figure 6.2: Schematic representation of experimental set up. Images projected
onto the
projection screen are reflected in the mirror to appear in the same spatial
plane as the actual
movements. The robot recorded active movements and produced the passive
movements.
Procedure
Active Movements
Before the commencement of each trial the robot arm moved the participant's
arm to the predefined start location directly in front of the their midline.
Following a delay of 500ms four circular targets appeared, each 30mm in
diameter. Two of the targets were 200mm forward from the robots start
position, one to the left and one to the right (both 40mm from the centre of the
screen). The remaining two targets were 300mm from the start location (one to
the left and one to the right). Three of the targets were red and one was green.
The position of the green target varied randomly within the four target
locations between trials. After a further 500ms the targets disappeared and
were subsequently followed (after 1000ms) by a tone, which indicated for the
participant to begin their reach. The participants had 1000ms in which they
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were required to reach toward the previous location of the green target with
their right hand which was holding on to the robot (Figure 6.3b). In half of the
trials the movements of the cursor were unperturbed from the coordinates of
the robots actual trajectory (accurate representation of participants reach).
In
the remaining trials, an angular, linear perturbation was applied which rotated
the trajectory of the white cursor by either four or sixteen degrees (each
making up 25% of total trials) from the actual reach trajectory (half to the
left
and half to the right).
Passive Movements
The passive conditions were almost identical to the active conditions except
that all four targets were red so that the participants were unaware of exactly
where the final reach location would be (Figure 6.3a). A further difference was
that instead of the participant moving the robot with their reach, the robot arm
passively moved the participants limb. The passive movements were created
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based on the minimum jerk model of human movement (Flash and Hogan,
1985). This model imitates biological movement by maximising smoothness of
the reach (minimises jerk), producing similar velocity profiles to that found in
normal reaches. Minimum jerk algorithm:
Timeterm = (15t4 -6t5 -10t3)
t
= t/tf , in which t = time and tf = time at the end of the movement. Timeterm
is then substituted for time in to the standard equation for velocity.
Speed = distance / time
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tf was programmed to vary between trials and was selected from a normal
distribution of movement times with a mean of 700ms and a standard deviation
of 50ms. A degree of error for both X and Y coordinates was applied to the end
point of each passive reach the distance of which was independently selected
from a Gaussian distribution with a mean of 0mm and a standard deviation of
10mm.
At the end of each trial participants had to make a verbal judgment as to
whether the movement of the cursor was perturbed (other) or not (self) from
their actual movements. The experiment took place in four experimental blocks
two active and two passive in an ABBA design that was counterbalanced
(ABBA, BAAB) between participants.
Figure 6.3: a) Passive conditions in which all targets were red and movements
were created by
the robot, using minimum jerk algorithm. b) Active conditions in which
participants reached
toward the prior location of the green target.
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Verbal responses
Participants were informed that in half of the trials the movement of the cursor
would accurately represent their actual movements (corresponding to the centre
of the robots handle they were holding) and in the remaining trials the
feedback would be controlled by the computer to deviate laterally either left or
right from the actual hand path. Participants gave their self/other judgments
verbally responding self if they felt like the cursor accurately represented
their
movements and other if they felt its trajectory had been deviated from the
actual path of their moving limb. These instructions were the same for both the
active and passive conditions, participants stating whether or not the cursor
accurately represented the actual movements of their limb.
6.3: Results
Responses were converted to percent correct scores for each participant for
each perturbation size (self being the correct judgment for a ZERO-degree
perturbation and other being the correct judgment for the FOUR and
SIXTEEN-degree perturbations). The data were then analysed using a repeated
measures 2x3 ANOVA with the factors; MOVEMENT (ACTIVE and
PASSIVE) and PERTURBATION (ZERO, FOUR and SIXTEEN-degrees).
There was a significant main effect of MOVEMENT, (F(1,11)=6.101, p<0.05)
with ACTIVE (68.14%) having greater percent correct judgments than
PASSIVE (63.29%) (see Figure 6.4). A significant main effect was also found
of PERTURBATION (F(2,22)=212.184, p<0.001) with FOUR-degrees having
the lowest percent correct judgments (29.2%) followed by ZERO (78.67%) and
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SIXTEEN-degrees having the highest percent correct judgments (87.33%).
There was also no significant MOVEMENT * PERTURBATION interaction
(F(2,22)=2.71, p=NS).
Figure 6.4: Percent correct judgments for main effect MOVEMENT. Passive
movements (open
bar) revealing a lower percent correct score than the active movements (filled
bar). The asterisk
denotes a significant difference and error bars represent standard error.
Planned comparisons were conducted at each perturbation size (Figure 6.5)
between ACTIVE and PASSIVE MOVEMENT revealing a significant
difference at the SIXTEEN-degree perturbation (F(1)=5.661, p<0.05) with the
ACTIVE movements having higher percent correct judgments (92.87%) than
PASSIVE (81.53%). There were no significant differences, however, at the
FOUR (F(1)= 0.66, p=NS) or ZERO (F(1)= 2.203, p=NS) degree perturbations.
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Figure 6.5: Percent correct judgments for 0 (self) 4 (other) and 16 (other)
degree perturbations
with movements actively produced by the participant (filled squares) or
passively produced by
the robot (open circles). The asterisk denotes a significant difference. Error
bars show standard
error.
6.4: Discussion
When the movements were passively created by the robot the error rate for
distinguishing between self and other was found to be higher (lower percent
correct judgments) compared to when the movements were actively produced
by the participant. However, this is predominantly explained by the difference
at the 16-degree perturbation, as planned comparisons revealed a significant
difference at this perturbation size only. Such results mirror those found in
the
previous studies. For example, in the Farrer et al. (2003b) experiment in which
they also found accuracy of judgments to be significantly reduced in the
passive conditions only at the larger perturbation sizes. The current experiment
reveals this difference despite using full arm reaching movements with more
degrees of freedom from which limb position can be determined.
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Another important finding from the current as well as the Farrer et al.
(2003b) study, is the accuracy at which participants performed in the passive
conditions. Percent correct judgments at the 16-degree passive condition were
still well above chance level (>80%) which, similar to the findings of the
Farrer study (performance of participants surpassed 50% correct at the same
size perturbation for active and passive movements), indicated that the
participants can still successfully complete the task in the absence of making a
complete motor command and despite the controls for predictability. Accuracy
of perceived limb position for an unseen stationary limb decreases over a short
time period, only to be attenuated following active or passive movement
(Brown et al., 2003). However, when a limb is moved passively there is still a
reduction in signal output from proprioceptive receptors compared to when the
movement is active (Jones et al., 2001). This marginal difference in receptor
output could explain the small behavioural difference found in the current and
other previous studies. This would mean that despite a small behavioural
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difference, the current findings are compatible with the idea of a single neural
network for self/other identification of active and passive movement as
suggested by Balslev et al., (2006) who also found a similar difference in
accuracy. This explanation implies that recognition of our own bodily
movement is achieved using the same processes regardless of whether or not
we actively planned the movement.
Within the current version of the comparator model the only space for
proprioceptive signals is in the formation of the estimated actual state, for
which these signals are incorporated along with visual information. In order to
make a self/other judgment, the estimated actual state is then compared to the
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predicted state, created from an efference copy of the motor command (Figure
6.6a). The extra controls incorporated into the design of the current study to
prevent the formation of an anticipatory motor command and assistance of the
passive movement, (holding back information of the exact end point of the
reach through target ambiguity and the addition of error to the reach) help to
confidently suggest that proprioceptive information has a role over and above
what has been currently proposed in the comparator model. Therefore, in
addition to aiding with the formation of the estimated actual state (which is in
turn compared to predictions based on the motor command), proprioception is
likely to have a further independent role in which signals are compared directly
to the visual feedback (Figure 6.6b).
Figure 6.6: a) Comparison between predicted state and estimated actual state
found in
comparator model (Frith et al. 2000). b) Proposed comparison between
proprioceptive and
visual signals.
An alternative explanation for the current results, however, is that the
participants knowledge of limb position is being disrupted by their gaze
direction (cursor position). Vision of the workspace adjacent to an unseen limb
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has been found to enhance knowledge of limb position (Newport et al., 2001).
However, when the participants gaze is 11-degrees away from the unseen
limb, it serves as a distracter, thus leading to greater uncertainty of limb
position (Blangero et al., 2005). This effect is found to desist again after a
distance of around 20-degrees (Henriques and Crawford, 2000). The difference
between the active and passive conditions in the current experiment, is most
apparent at the 16-degree perturbation. In this condition the participants are
fixating on a cursor 16-degrees adjacent to their unseen limb, which is a prime
distance for creating uncertainty of limb position. The active movements could
be less affected by the gaze direction due to the additional information
available, such as efferent signals and heightened proprioceptive signals, which
occur with active movements (Jones et al., 2001). If this explanation were true,
a gaze distance of 4-degrees would be expected to aid knowledge of limb
position as it is below the critical distance of 11-degrees. However, the
percent
correct judgments for the 4-degree perturbation were substantially lower than
the other perturbation sizes on both active and passive trials, suggesting there
is
no such benefit. The current results also mirror findings for which no spatial
properties were shared between the actual action and visual feedback (Balslev
et al., 2006) for which gaze direction would have no such detrimental effect.
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6.5: Conclusions
The current findings support the importance of proprioception in self/other
attribution of actual and perturbed movements. Participants were successfully
able to complete the task in the absence of efference signals (passive
movements). However, a noteworthy problem with using an active vs. passive
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movement paradigm to investigate a sense of agency is that agency is defined
as a feeling of being the cause of an action or event (Gallager, 2000). Passive
movement by its very nature requires an absence of control and therefore lacks
a feeling of agency. It is also questionable whether a difference in behavioural
performance on such a task can give a true indication of shared or distinct
processes. Balslev et al. (2006) found a significant difference in performance
between active and passive movements but no difference in brain activity,
whilst MacDonald and Paus (2003) found no difference in behavioural
performance but a difference in effect of rTMS. The following chapter,
therefore, expands from these results by examining performance on an
identical task, comparing correct self/other judgments with normal and
disrupted proprioceptive feedback. This will be achieved using a patient with
somatosensory loss following stroke and by reducing proprioception in
controls using tendon vibration.
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Chapter 7
Contributions of Proprioception to the Experience of
Agency
7a: Evidence from a Patient with Somatosensory Impairment
7a.1: Introduction
Fourneret et al. (2002) conducted an experiment examining action recognition
performance in deafferented patient G.L. Patient G.L. is a middle aged woman
who suffered two episodes of sensory polyneuropathy (simultaneous
malfunction of a large number of peripheral nerves). This involved the
permanent loss of large sensory myelinated fibres in all four limbs, resulting
in
her almost complete deafferentation from the nose down. In the experiment
G.L. and a group of healthy control participants were required to draw a
continuous straight line on a graphics pad whilst receiving only virtual
feedback of their movements. The visual feedback of their movements had
angular perturbations applied, which increased in size (1-degree for each trial)
incrementally throughout the trials in a clockwise direction.
The visual perturbation meant that the participants had to deviate their
own movement trajectory at an equivalent degree anti-clockwise in order to
maintain a straight line with the visual feedback. After each trial they were
given a reference sheet with lines drawn at different angles from a start
location and were asked to verbally state which line corresponded most
accurately with their own actual hand trajectory. Like controls G.L. performed
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the task accurately, with her performance actually more stable than the control
group at the larger perturbation sizes. However, her verbal report indicated
that
she was unaware of her actual reach trajectory and so unaware of the
perturbation. Control participants, on the other hand, realised the deviation at
an average perturbation size of 6-degrees.
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These findings are interesting as G.L. was still unaware of the deviation
in a post hoc version of the experiment with deviations as large as 40-degrees
for which she successfully compensated for. Therefore, G.L. was making
significant changes to her motor commands yet remained unaware of this,
whilst controls with normal proprioception became aware of the mismatch
early on in the study. One possible explanation is that although the
perturbations became large, each angle was only slightly bigger than the last;
therefore, no mismatch of the comparator was significant enough to result in an
other judgment. Controls were also unaware of the changes made to their
motor command for the same reason. However, as they have normal
proprioceptive input they could detect a mismatch between the seen and felt
position of their hand and thus became aware of the perturbation. This
detection of a proprioceptive mismatch might explain the variability apparent
in the controls performance not observed with G.L. An other output from this
additional comparison could be preventing the participants from feeling a full
sense of agency over the feedback, leading to a reduction of control and
accuracy.
Farrer et al. (2003b) examined the feeling of agency more explicitly with
patient G.L., recording her judgments as to whether visual feedback of
unimanual reaching movements accurately represented her actual movements
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or not. G.L. was asked to make movements with a joystick (attached to her
right hand) in a predefined direction (either the top, left or right of the
screen).
Visual feedback of her movements was presented in the same spatial plane as
her actual movements and was either; an exact representation of her
movement, or was her movement but with a spatial perturbation applied. Seven
perturbation sizes were used including 0-degrees (0, 40, 50, 60, 70, 80 and 90).
At the end of each reach she was then required to make a yes or no verbal
response as to whether the movement on the screen corresponded exactly with
the actual movement or not. It was found that G.L.s performance was
significantly reduced compared to an aged matched control group lending
support to the suggestion that proprioception plays an important role in the
task. However, due to limitations of her condition, G.L. had to make the
movements with her eyes closed and thus made the self/other judgments based
on the final position of the limb rather than the movement itself. This minor
alteration could be argued to change the very nature of the task as the judgment
is made only when the limb is stationary and so that self/other judgments are
not made in response to the action but the stationary position of the limb.
A further problem with the Farrer et al. (2003b) experiment is that they
do not control for effects of movement accuracy. Previous studies have found
that in the absence of vision and proprioception, movement accuracy is
impaired. Ghez et al. (1995) found that vision of the hand or even a cursor
representing the hand on a computer screen, significantly improved accuracy of
reaching movements made by deafferentated patients (including G.L.),
compared to movements made in the absence of vision. Vision of the limb
moving prior to occlusion was also found to aid reach accuracy. This fits in
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with the Fourneret et al. (2002) study on G.L. in which she was able to
accurately complete the task (drawing a straight line) by adapting her actual
movements based on the previous visual feedback, despite not noticing the
perturbation. Fourneret at al. (2002) also conducted a second task almost
identical to the first except that visual feedback of the beginning of the
movement was occluded. Control participants adjusted their movement
trajectory after occlusion (feedback was visible) whilst G.L. made these
adjustments before receiving visual feedback (during occlusion). This
demonstrates that G.L. is more proficient at using prior visual information in
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order to produce accurate movements (movement planning), likely to be
compensatory strategy learnt due to her absence of proprioception. In the
Farrer et al. (2003b) study, G.L. had vision of her stationary limb prior to
movement onset, but not vision during the movement or of any previous
movements. As the accuracy of G.L.s movements was not recorded it cannot
be discounted that she was unable to accurately perform a planned movement.
Leaving the possibility that her poor performance on the task was due to
execution of the movement and not agency per se.
Farrers (2003b) result could also be explained by general attentional
factors as deafferented patients have been found to have a deficit in dividing
their attention between making a movement and an additional cognitive task
(in this case making a self/other judgment). Ingram et al. (2000) conducted an
experiment on deafferented patient I.W., a 43-year-old male with a complete
loss of proprioception below the neck that was a result of an acute large fibre
sensory neuropathy at the age of 19. In the experiment I.W. had to make a
reaching movement toward a target, attempting to be as accurate as possible.
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Trials were completed under normal conditions and with a cognitive load
(counting backwards). I.W.s performance was significantly impaired in
comparison to controls in all conditions. Moreover, the effect of the cognitive
load was far more pronounced with I.W. than with controls, in that his reach
errors, relative to the target, increased by over 60% whilst controls less than
10%. Therefore, it was concluded that in the absence of proprioception, more
attention is needed for accurate control of movement. As such, in situations
that involve attention to be divided between an action and an additional task,
deafferented patients are likely to perform poorly. This again was not
controlled for in the Farrer et al. (2003b) study leaving the possibility that
the
result can be explained by a general attentional deficit.
Baslev et al. (2007) conducted an experiment similar to that of the
Farrer et al. (2003) study using deafferented patient I.W., for this study I.W.
was now 53, having suffered his deafferentation 34 years prior to the
experiment. Balslev and colleagues (2006) used temporal rather than spatial
perturbations in an attempt to eliminate errors in movement accuracy as an
explanation for the results. An additional control experiment was also included
in order to rule out any differences being explained by general attentional
factors. In their experiment, finger movements were made on a mouse that was
adapted with a constraint so that movements could only be made along the Y
axis (eliminate spatial discrepancies). Visual feedback, in the form of a filled
white square, was presented on a computer screen in front of the participant,
the movement onset of which occurred either synchronously or asynchronously
(pre or post) with the actual movement. At the end of each trial the
participants
had to make a me (synchronous) or not me (asynchronous) verbal response. To
SECTION 2: PROPRIOCEPTIVE CONTRIBUTIONS CHAPTER 7
increase the difficulty of the task the movement of the cursor was always in the
horizontal plane, randomly to either the left or the right, whilst finger
movements were made forwards and backwards on a mouse pad. The purpose
of this translation was so that the task could only be completed using the
temporal onset of the movement as no spatial properties were shared. A second
task was conducted to control for attentional factors and involved the same
finger movements but with the cursor jumping to either the left or the right. In
this case the participants had to state in which direction the cursor had moved.
The results of the study revealed that I.W. made significantly more errors in
the
agency task than controls despite no significant difference in movement onset.
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In addition, I.W.s performance was actually better than of controls in the
attentional task.
Balslev et al. (2006) claimed that their experiment gave support for the
role of proprioception in agency attribution whilst avoiding many of the
criticisms of the Farrer et al. (2003b) study. Whilst this may be the case for
some criticisms (I.W. performed the task with eyes open and there was no
difference found in measured error (reaction time and duration) of the
movements), it does not eliminate all alternative explanations. For example, the
attentional task may not have truly controlled for all attentional factors. In
the
experiment by Ingram et al. (2000), in which greater movement errors were
recorded in deafferented patients when also completing a cognitive task, I.W.
had to attend to the motor component of the task in order to produce an
accurate movement, so that although the tasks were separate, each required a
significant amount of attention. In the Balslev et al. (2006) experiment,
however, the constraint imposed in order to eliminate spatial attributes to the
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movement also had the effect of reducing movement complexity, meaning that
less attention was needed to control the movements, as there were less degrees
of freedom over which to control. However, in the agency task, attention had to
be paid to the movement in order to make an accurate self/other judgment
because the movement made had a direct relationship on the cognitive element
of the task. The movements produced in the attentional task, on the other hand,
did not require this level of attention, as the movement made had no direct
bearing on the task goal (verbal judgment based on direction of the visual
feedback, not directly related to the actual movement). Therefore, in the
agency task the participants were likely to be consciously attending to their
movement in order to inform their verbal judgment, whilst in the attentional
task the movements may have been under automatic control allowing full
conscious attention to be paid to the cognitive component of the task.
The aim of the current experiment was to compliment the
aforementioned studies using patient A.B. a 55-year-old male who suffered
proprioceptive impairment due to a thalamic lesion. A.B.s proprioceptive
impairment is central rather than peripheral and as a result affects only the
right
side (evident from clinical pre-tests), which allowed him to so act as his own
control. At the time of testing A.B.s symptoms had greatly improved, although
he still had problems identifying objects placed in his right hand and imitating
left limb postures with his right limb. This improvement helps to expand from
previous studies as it reduces the aforementioned complications normally
associated with complete deafferentation, and in addition, it allows for further
insight into the scale of importance of afferent signals, as his proprioceptive
input is unreliable opposed to absent. Moreover, a complete absence of
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proprioception has been found to be particularly detrimental for performing
accurate multi-joint actions (Sainburg et al., 1993), therefore, due to A.B.s
deficit being not complete, the current experiment avoids this problem,
allowing full arm reaching movements to be used. A.B. and a group of 12
healthy controls made reaching movements with both hands using the vBot 2D
manipulandum. Participants had to make self/other verbal judgements over
visual feedback of their movements that was either an accurate representation
of the actual movements (self) or had an angular spatial perturbation applied
(other). It was predicted that A.B.s performance with his impaired right limb
would fall below performance of his unimpaired left limb and that of controls.
7a.2: Method
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Participants
Patient: A.B. is a right-handed 55-year-old male who suffered unilateral
somatosonsory loss of the right upper limb, following a heamatoma within the
left thalamus and internal capsule four months prior to testing (see Figure
7.1).
At the time of testing A.B.s symptoms had greatly improved, although he still
complained of numbness and reduced sensation on the right side. On a battery
of proprioceptive tests A.B. still had problems with matching the position of
his iplilesional (left) limb with his contralesional (right) limb although no
problems were observed in the reverse condition. In addition to this he was
also found to be impaired on his right compared to left side with two point
discrimination and identifying objects that were placed in his right hand (a
spoon and a key) although other object were identified successfully (pen, coin
and brush).
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Figure 7.1: MRI scans of A.B. reveals a small lesion in his left thalamus and
internal capsule.
Controls: The control group consisted of 10 healthy participants, 8 female and
2 male, with a mean age of 20 years (range of 19  26 years). All participants
had normal or corrected to normal vision and were right handed.
Materials
The materials were identical to those in Chapter 6. A vBot 2D motion tracking
device enabling online visual feedback of movement to be presented on a
mirrored surface so that they appeared in the same spatial plane as the actual
movements. (see Figure 6.2).
Procedure
The procedure was identical to Chapter 6 except that all participants completed
both active and passive conditions with their left and right limbs in separate
blocks (4 conditions in total, completed using an ABCDDCBA design).
Therefore, in summary, participants made reaching movements with the vBOT
(robot arm) towards a green target. Their movements were represented by a
white cursor, which either exactly represented their movements (50% of total
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trials) or had a linear perturbation applied, that was either 4 (25% of total
trials)
or 16 (25% of total trials) degrees. Participants had to make a verbal response
at the end of each trial as to whether the cursors movements exactly
represented their actual movement (self) or not (other). The experiment was
completed in 8 blocks, 4 of which the participants reach moved the robot
(active), whilst in the remaining blocks the robot movements passively moved
the participants arm (passive).
7a.3: Results
Responses were converted to percent correct scores for each participant at each
perturbation size (self = correct judgment for a ZERO-degree perturbation and
other = correct judgment for the FOUR and SIXTEEN-degree perturbations).
95% confidence intervals were calculated from the control group for each
condition in order to compare A.B.s scores against them. The experiment had
three factors; MOVEMENT; with two levels (ACTIVE and PASSIVE), LIMB;
also with two levels (LEFT (unimpaired) and RIGHT (impaired)) and
PERTURBATION; with three levels (ZERO, FOUR and SIXTEEN).
Active Conditions
In the ACTIVE conditions when A.B. was reaching with his RIGHT (impaired)
LIMB (Figure 7.2a) no significant difference was found at the ZERO-degree
PERTURBATION. A significant difference was found, at FOUR with A.B.s
percent correct score (0%) falling outside and below the control groups 95%
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confidence intervals (23.13%). A significant difference was also found at
SIXTEEN, A.B.s score (68.75%) falling below confidence intervals (89.63%).
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Figure 7.2: Percent correct judgments for patient A.B. (open circles) and
controls (filled
squares) for the ACTIVE conditions. a) RIGHT (impaired) LIMB: A.B.s scores are
significantly lower than that of the control group for both the FOUR and
SIXTEEN-degree
perturbations. There is no significant difference at ZERO-degrees b) LEFT
(unimpaired)
LIMB. A.B.s score is greater for the ZERO-degree perturbation and reduced for
FOUR-degree
perturbation when compared to the control group. There is no significant
difference at
SIXTEEN-degrees. Error bars show 95% confidence intervals. Asterisks denote
significant
differences.
When reaching with his LEFT (unimpaired) LIMB (see Figure 7.2b) A.B.s
percent correct score at the ZERO degree PERTURBATION (100%) was
significantly greater than controls (84.29%). At the FOUR-degree
PERTURBATION A.B.s score (12.5%) falls below that of controls (25.65%).
No significant difference was found at SIXTEEN.
Passive Conditions
In the PASSIVE conditions when A.B. was reaching with his RIGHT
(impaired) LIMB (see Figure 7.3a) his percent correct score at the ZERO-
degree PERTURBATION (100%) was significantly greater than controls
SECTION 2: PROPRIOCEPTIVE CONTRIBUTIONS CHAPTER 7
(80.87%) At the FOUR degree PERTURBATION A.B.s score (0%) fell
below the controls confidence intervals (29.38%) and also at SIXTEEN with
A.B.s score (62.5%) also falling outside and below 95% confidence intervals
(75.63%).
Figure 7.3: Percent correct judgments for patient A.B. (open circles) against
the controls group
(filled squares) for the PASSIVE conditions. a) RIGHT (impaired) LIMB: A.B.s
score on the
ZERO-degree perturbation is significantly greater than controls whilst
performance for both the
FOUR and SIXTEEN-degree perturbations falls below that of the control group. b)
LEFT
(unimpaired) LIMB: A.B.s score is significantly greater than controls for the
ZERO-degree
perturbation, but reduced for the FOUR-degree perturbation. There is no
significant difference
at SIXTEEN-degrees. Error bars show 95% confidence intervals. Asterisks denote
significant
differences.
When reaching with his LEFT (unimpaired) LIMB (see Figure 7.3b) A.B.s
percent correct score at the ZERO-degree PERTURBATION (96.88%) was
significantly greater than controls (80.78%) above the 95% confidence
intervals. At the FOUR-degree PERTURBATION A.B.s, score (0%) falls
below that of controls (22.86%). There was no significant difference at
SIXTEEN.
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Reach Error
Reach error was calculated for A.B. in degrees from the target location with
two separate measures endpoint error; defined as the furthest position along the
Y axis and error at 25% of the reach defined as 25% of total reach distance.
Paired samples t tests revealed no significant difference (see Figure 7.4a and
b)
between LEFT (unimpaired) and RIGHT (impaired) LIMB for Endpoint error
(T(1)= 0.528, p = NS) or error at 25% of the reach (T(1)= -0.823, p =NS).
Figure 7.4: Absolute reaching error for A.B. LEFT and RIGHT LIMB. a) Endpoint
error: there
is no significant difference between conditions in which A.B. reached with the
LEFT
(unimpaired) compared to RIGHT (impaired) LIMB. b) Error at 25% of the reach:
there is no
significant difference between conditions in which A.B. reached with the LEFT
(unimpaired)
compared to RIGHT (impaired) LIMB.
7a.4: Discussion
All control participants had difficulty detecting the smaller 4-degree
perturbation, as their self/other judgments were consistently less than 50%
correct. Judgments for the 0 and 16-degree perturbations, on the other hand,
reliably produced percent correct scores in excess of 70% for both active and
passive conditions. The pattern apparent for A.B., however, is slightly
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different. When reaching with his right (impaired/contralesional) limb, he
performs as expected, his performance dropping significantly below that of
controls for both the 4 and 16-degree perturbations with the active and passive
trials. In addition to this, however, his performance also drops below that of
controls when reaching with his left (unimpaired /ipsilesional) limb at the
4degree
perturbation of the active and passive conditions and, in the same
conditions, his percent correct scores for the 0-degree perturbation are greater
than that seen with controls.
These significant differences observed when reaching with his
ipsilesional (left) limb are likely to reflect a deficit in the detection of the
smaller 4-degree perturbation, as although in these conditions he appears to
have little difficulty in detecting the 16-degree perturbation, he is responding
self to almost every this else (high percent correct score for the 0-degree
perturbation and low percent correct score for the 4-degree perturbation). With
his contralesional hand A.B. also shows this pattern except his deficit in
performance also extends to the detection of the 16-degree perturbations as
well. Therefore A.B. demonstrates reduced performance compared to controls
with both limbs. When reaching with his ipsilesional limb an impairment is
only evident in the difficult trials (4-degree perturbations), whilst reaching
with
his contralesional limb, A.B.s impairment is evident for both the difficult
(4degree
perturbations) and easy (16-degree perturbations) trials.
One possible explanation for A.B.s ipsilesional impairment is due to the
age difference, as A.B. is 35 years older than the mean age of the control
group. However, A.B. may also have additional impairments as a result of the
stroke he suffered four months prior to testing that were not detected by the
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clinical tests. Afferent neurons that provide feedback from the proximal
muscles have ipsilateral as well as contralateral connections (Gazzaniga, 2000).
Previous studies have found evidence for ipsilesional impairment following
brain damage particularly in tasks that require monitoring of proprioceptive
feedback (e.g. Haaland and Delaney, 1981), similar to those required for the
current experiment. Therefore, A.B.s brain damage may have disconnected
ipsilesional connections, as well as those on the contralesional side, the
resultant effect being a mild/sub-clinical deficit in his ipsilesional limb, in
addition to the observable clinical deficit in his contralesional limb.
In order to clarify the results further, an additional analysis was
conducted in which, as opposed to A.B.s performance being compared
directly against the control group, the difference in intra-limb performance was
calculated for each participant. This analysis allowed for examination of
performance of A.B.s contralesional/more affected limb relative to his
ipsilesional/less affected limb, avoiding any problems of possible sub-clinical
deficits. The original data were converted a new intra-limb difference score by
subtracting the percent correct score obtained when reaching with the left limb
from the percent correct score reaching with the right limb for each
perturbation size. This was completed for both A.B. and each member of the
control group from which 95% confidence intervals were calculated to help
determine if A.B.s intra-limb differences were significantly different from
that
expected with controls (see Figure 7.5).
It was found that the control participants did not differ greatly between
hands for either the passive or the active conditions and any difference that
was
apparent was mainly demonstrated by a relative impairment of the left (non
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dominant) hand (represented by a positive score on the graph). A.B., on the
other hand, does not follow this pattern.
Figure 7.5: The intra-limb differences calculated for A.B. (filled bar) and
control group (open
bar) a) the ACTIVE conditions, A.B. demonstrates a greater difference between
his hands than
controls, with his right hand performing significantly worse than his left
(negative scores) in
comparison to controls for all perturbation sizes. b) PASSIVE conditions A.B.
demonstrates a
greater difference between his hands than controls with his right hand
performing significantly
worse than his left in comparison to controls for the 16-degree perturbation
only. Asterisks
denote significant differences, error bars show 95% confidence intervals.
In the active conditions, A.B.s intra-limb difference in performance was
greater than that observed with controls for all perturbation sizes (falling
outside control group confidence intervals) demonstrating consistent
impairment with his right (contralesional) limb (negative score on the graph).
In the passive conditions A.B. also falls outside the control groups confidence
intervals but only for the 16-degree perturbation. With 0 and 4-degree
perturbations A.B.s intra-limb differences are no different from that seen with
controls.
The control group demonstrated a sizable difference in intra-limb
performance for the 16-degree perturbation in the active condition. This
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difference, however, was in the opposite direction to that observed with A.B.,
as performance was reduced when reaching with the left limb (positive score
on the graph). This difference can be explained in terms of motor dominance as
Daprati and Sirigu, (2002) found that participants demonstrated greater
accuracy in self-recognition of movement produced with their dominant hand
compared to those performed with their non-dominant hand. As the control
group and A.B. are all right handed any difference in level of performance
would be expected to favour reaching with their right hand. The intra-limb
deficits observed with A.B., however, were favouring his left, non-dominant,
limb so cannot be explained in the same way.
An additional explanation for A.B.s intra-limb differences, could be
due to deficits in motor production. Ingram et al. (2000) found that
deafferented patients had difficulty in distributing attention between making a
movement and an additional simultaneous cognitive task (self/other judgment)
which was found to result in increased reaching error. This, however, was
unlikely to account for the results found with A.B., as he was not fully
deafferented and so was unlikely to have this deficit in dividing his attention.
In addition, the results were also unlikely to be caused by a motor deficit of
the
contralesional limb brought on by his stroke, as no significant differences were
found in reach error between reaches of his left and right limbs for either of
the
measures analysed (25 and 100% of the reach). Therefore, the reduced
accuracy of self/other judgments observed when reaching with his right
(contralesional) limb is most likely to be a direct result of the reduced
proprioceptive feedback received from his right compared to left limb, as
evident from the results of the clinical tests. The results, therefore,
compliment
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findings from previous studies (Farrer et al., 2003b, Balslev et al., 2007) in
which the absence of proprioceptive feedback was found to also reduce
accuracy of self/other judgments. Additionally, however, the current results
demonstrate that this effect can occur with reduced as well as absent
proprioceptive signals.
Interestingly, the deficits observed in A.B.s performance were only
evident on the perturbed trials, in that he responded self more to perturbed
visual feedback. Performance in the unperturbed trials, however, was
unaffected, in fact, in three out of four conditions he exhibited a greater
percent
correct score than seen with controls i.e. responding self more to unperturbed
visual feedback. Similar results were also found in the previous studies with
deafferented patients giving more self-judgments in response to other visual
feedback (Farrer et al, 2003b, Balslev et al. 2007). Therefore, these results
suggest that, for high-level self/other judgments at least, proprioception is
useful in the detection discrepancies opposed to directly informing the
experience of agency.
However, a problem with single subject patient data, which is
highlighted by the ipsilesional deficits seen with A.B., is that brain damage
can
result in numerous additional symptoms that could complicate the results.
Therefore, in order to strengthen the current findings the following experiment
uses tendon vibration to recreate A.B.s impairment in neurologically intact
participants. This method helps to investigate the affects of reduced
proprioceptive signals in the absence any additional complications that are a
result of deafferentation or brain injury.
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7b: Evidence from Healthy Controls using Tendon Vibration
7b.1: Introduction
A further method to investigate the contribution of proprioception in a given
task is to temporarily disrupt proprioceptive signals in neurologically normal
participants. One approach commonly used for this, is to induce ischemia to
the limb. Obstructing blood flow from afferent receptors decreases their ability
to fire a signal, therefore reducing sensory (proprioceptive) signals coming
from the limb. For example, Mazzaro et al. (2005) introduced ischemia to the
leg by inflating a pneumatic cuff positioned just above the knee. With this
technique they were able to successfully degrade proprioceptive feedback in
order to investigate the role of afferent signals in human walking. However,
this method can be painful for participants, therefore, an additional approach
has been considered of tendon vibration.
Roll and Vedel (1982) investigated the effect of vibration on afferent
signals of the arm. They used vibration of the tendons in the biceps or triceps
of healthy controls and were able to distort proprioceptive feedback. It was
found that such vibration induced a constant illusion of joint rotation at the
elbow. It was reported that the illusion gave the sensation as if the vibrated
muscle was stretching. Therefore, vibration of the triceps felt as if the arm
was
drifting towards the body (rotating at the elbow) and vibration of the biceps
produced an illusion of the arm rotating away from the body. Roll and Vedel
(1982) experimented with several vibration frequencies ranging from 10 to
120Hz. The perceived velocity of the illusion was found to steadily increase
from 10 to 80Hz and then decrease again from 80 to 120Hz. Goodwin et al.
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(1972) had completed similar studies in which they also found the same
illusion. Instead of measuring velocity of the illusion they looked at
magnitude.
The participants demonstrated the perceived position of the vibrated limb by
moving their non-vibrated limb so that they felt aligned. This method revealed
mismatches of up to approximately 40-degrees with vibration of 100Hz.
However, although this method of distorting proprioceptive feedback is
less uncomfortable than ischemia it does not simply reduce the sensation but
induces incorrect sensations from the vibrated limb. Cordo et al. (1995) also
found similar illusions evident in moving limbs as vibration of the biceps lead
participants to over estimate the rotation of their elbow during passive
movement. The participants arms were moved about the elbow during which
they were required to open their hand at a predefined target angle. This task
was completed both with and with out bicep vibration of the moving limb, for
which accuracy was exceptionally high in the absence of vibration. With
vibration, however, participants constantly undershot the target, corresponding
to overestimating the stretch of the vibrated muscle.
To try to eliminate this problem Bock et al. (2007) conducted an
experiment in which they applied simultaneous vibration to both the agonist
and antagonist muscles of the forearm. Healthy participants took part in a
series of tasks investigating the strength of proprioceptive sensation whilst
vibration was applied to both the flexor and extensor muscles of the forearm
and also with no vibration. It was found that whilst vibration to either one of
the flexor and extensor muscles of the forearm produced converse illusions
(extension and flexion respectively), simultaneous vibration to both sides
induced a general derogation of the proprioception. Moreover, verbal reports
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from the participants stated that simultaneous vibration of both sides of the
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forearm produced a feeling of numbness in the arm opposed to illusionary
movements.
In the current experiment participants were required to make self/other
judgments over perturbed (other) and unperturbed (self) visual feedback of
both active and passive full arm reaching movements. A robot arm motion
tracking device was used in order to track the active movements and produce
the passive movements. Participants completed the study with tendon vibration
to the agonist and antagonist muscles of the forearm so to degrade
proprioceptive sensation coming from the reaching limb. Participants
underwent the experiment with vibration at two different frequencies one at
approximately 100Hz, which should reduce the afferent signals, and one at
40Hz, which should not have this effect (Roll and Vedel 1982).
The lower vibration speed was used opposed to no vibration to ensure
that any difference could not be due to attensional factors of a vibrating
sensation on the limb. It was predicted that when the forearm is vibrated at
100Hz performance would be impaired in comparison to when the arm is
vibrated at 40Hz, similar to the differences found in A.B. between his
contralesional and ipsilesional limbs. Therefore, planned comparisons were
conducted between the two vibration frequencies (100 and 40Hz) for each
perturbation size of the active and passive movements.
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7b.2: Method
Participants
An opportunity sample of 12 neurologically normal participants was selected,
10 female and 2 male with a mean age of 26 years (range 19  30 years). All
participants had normal or corrected to normal vision and were right handed.
Materials
The materials were identical to those in Chapters 6 and 7a except with the
addition of two physiotherapy vibrators. The vibrators were both three speed
Omax rechargeable massagers (Figure 7.6) which have a counter-weight
mechanism in the head. The Omax is a rechargeable handset with a 5800rmp
motor and a running time of 25 minutes at top speed from full charge. The two
vibrators were attached to the participants arm using a stretch bandage and
secured with tape. Short breaks were introduced between each block in order to
top up the Omax charge.
Figure 7.6: The Omax physiotherapy vibrator. Three-speed (40Hz, 75Hz and 100Hz)
rechargeable handset with revolving counter-weight system in the head. Figure
adapted form
omax website.
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Procedure
Before the experimental trials commenced, the appropriate muscle tendons
were located. Participants closed their eyes and outstretched their right arm. A
vibrator was then placed at different locations along the muscle whilst
vibrating at the maximum (100Hz) frequency. The participants were asked to
report any perceived movement of the limb so that the location at which the
illusion was induced could be marked on the arm with a washable marker. This
was completed for both the extensor and flexor muscle tendons of the forearm
following which both vibrators were attached to the arm, with the head of each
vibrator secured over the marked area.
Participants then performed 4 experimental blocks of active and passive
movements (2 active and 2 passive) identical to those described in Chapters 6
and 7a. Unimanual reaching movements were made with the right limb (whilst
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holding the robot arm) towards a green target. Their movements were
represented by a white cursor, which either exactly represented their
movements (self) or had a linear perturbation applied of 4 or 16-degrees
(other). At the end of each trial participants had to make a verbal response as
to
whether the cursor movements were that of self or other. Two of the
experimental blocks (one active and one passive) used 100Hz tendon vibration
of the flexor and extensor muscles, with the remaining blocks using 40Hz
tendon vibration. The active and passive blocks for the same frequency were
always completed sequentially. The order of movement type (active and
passive) and frequency (100Hz and 40Hz) was counterbalanced between
participants.
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7b.3: Results
Self/Other Judgments
Self/other judgments were converted to percent correct scores for each
participant for each perturbation size (self being the correct judgment for a
ZERO-degree perturbation and other being the correct judgment for the FOUR
and SIXTEEN-degree perturbations). The data were then analysed using 2x2x3
repeated measures ANOVA. With the factors MOVEMENT, with two levels
(ACTIVE and PASSIVE), VIBRATION, also with two levels (HIGH and LOW
frequencies) and PERTURBATION, with three levels (ZERO, FOUR and
SIXTEEN-degrees).
There was a main effect of MOVEMENT (F(1,11)=17.318, p<0.01 with
ACTIVE (72.21%) having a greater percent correct score than PASSIVE
(62.15%). There was also a significant main effect of PERTURBATION
(F(2,22)=89.58,p<0.001) with FOUR (27.17%) having the lowest percent
correct score followed by ZERO (86.92%) and then SIXTEEN (87.44%). There
was no main effect of VIBRATION (F1,11)=0.68, p =NS, however, there was
a significant interaction (Figure 7.7) of VIBRATION * MOVEMENT
(F(1,11)= 14.02,p<0.01) with LOW ACTIVE having the highest percent correct
score (74.23%) followed by HIGH ACTIVE (70.2%), HIGH PASSIVE (62.9%)
and LOW PASSIVE (61.39) having the lowest. All other interactions were non
significant (minimum, F(2,22)= 0.741, p<NS).
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Figure 7.7: Interaction VIBRATION * MOVEMENT: Vibration frequency has more
effect on
percent correct scores for the ACTIVE conditions than compared to the passive
conditions.
Percent correct scores for LOW ACTIVE are greater than those recorded for HIGH
ACTIVE.
Planned comparisons were conducted between the predicted variables of
interest (see Figure 7.8) revealing a significant difference in percent correct
judgments between HIGH and LOW VIBRATION for the ACTIVE movements
at the FOUR degree PERTUBATION (F(1)=5.14,p<0.05) with LOW (38.5%)
having a greater percent correct score than HIGH (29.17%). There was no
significant difference between ACTIVE HIGH and LOW at the ZERO
(F(1)=0.019, p=NS) or SIXTEEN (F(1)=0.708, p=NS) PERTURBATION.
There were no significant differences between HIGH and LOW VIBRATION
with PASSIVE MOVEMENT for ZERO (F(1)=0.689, p=NS), FOUR (F(1).074,
p=NS) or SIXTEEN (F(1)=0.001, p=NS).
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Figure 7.8: Planned comparisons between HIGH (100Hz) and LOW (40Hz) FREQUENCY
for
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each PERTURBATION size. a) ACTIVE: LOW (filled squares) FREQUENCY percent
correct
scores were significantly greater at the FOUR-degree PERTURBATION than with HIGH
(open circles) FREQUENCY vibration. There were no significant differences at
ZERO or
SIXTEEN. b) PASSIVE: There were no significant differences between HIGH (open
circles)
and LOW (filled squares) FREQUENCY at any PERTRUBATION sizes. The asterisk
denotes
the significant difference.
Reach Error
Reach error was calculated in degrees from the target location with two
separate measures (Figure 7.9a and b) endpoint error; defined as the furthest
position along the Y axis and error at 25% of the reach; defined as 25% of total
reach distance. Paired samples t tests revealed no significant difference
between HIGH and LOW VIBRATION for endpoint error (T(1)= 0.62, p = NS)
or error at 25% of the reach (T(1)= 0.26, p =NS).
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Figure 7.9: Absolute reaching error for HIGH (100Hz) and LOW (40Hz) vibration
frequencies.
a) Endpoint error; there is no significant difference in reach accuracy when the
vibrators were
oscillating at the HIGH FRQUENCY compared to when oscillating at the LOW
FREQUENCY. b) Error at 25% of the reach; there is no significant difference in
reach
accuracy when the vibrators were oscillating at the HIGH FRQUENCY (filled)
compared to
when oscillating at the LOW FREQUENCY (open).
7b.4: Discussion
In the active conditions, when the vibrators were oscillating at 100Hz, percent
correct scores were, in general, lower than when the vibrators were oscillating
at 40Hz. This was particularly evident at the 4-degree perturbation, the only
perturbation size to reveal significant difference with the planned comparisons.
This effect, however, did not extend to the passive conditions, at which there
were no significant differences due to vibration. This initially seems counter
intuitive as the passive conditions rely more heavily on proprioceptive signals
so it would be expected that performance in these conditions would be more
greatly affected than when movements are performed actively. There are two
possible explanations to this; firstly participants could be using a different
strategy for the active and passive trials, with proprioception being more
important for the active task. For example, in the passive conditions
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participants could be making their judgments based on vision only, on how
accurate the cursor is to the target. However, this is unlikely due to the
controls
implemented in the experiment in order to prevent such a strategy form being
used. A delay was introduced between the target's disappearance and the onset
of the reach to reduce the presence of a target after image on the retina. End
point error was also added to the robots reach so that even in the self
conditions the robot was still not completely accurate. Consequently, you
would expect that if the participants used vision only their performance would
be lower. The second possible explanation for the results is that the vibration
may only be affecting the active element of proprioception. Jones et al. (2001)
found that when a movement is actively produced the afferent receptors in the
limb elicit a greater signal than when movement is passive. This difference,
Page 88
Preston_Thesis
albeit marginal, could account for the results, eliminating the proprioceptive
advantage of the active movement.
As with A.B, there was no significant difference in reaching error
between the high and low frequencies at either the 100% or at 25% of the
reach. This means that the results cannot be explained by the stronger vibration
frequency disrupting reach accuracy, so that the reach did not match the
original motor command. Therefore, it is most likely a specific reduction in
signal strength from the afferent receptors of the limb that produced the change
in performance. This is important as it also helps to support the suggestion
that
the results in experiment 7a are due to a proprioceptive deficit and not any
additional factors attributable to the brain lesion.
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Interestingly, similar to A.B.s performance, described in 7a, the deficit
present with high frequency tendon vibration was only at the 4-degree
perturbation (the difficult part of the task). The fact that the difference in
percent correct judgments is only evident in the active movements,
demonstrates that tendon vibration of this nature only degrades part of the
afferent output from the muscles. This, therefore, may explain why the
performance deficit did not extend to the 16-degree perturbations, as the
signals getting through from the muscles, not affected by the tendon vibration,
were enough to inform the high-level conscious processes (responsible for
making self/other judgments) of large but not small mismatches.
It is important to note the current experiment shows a general reduction
in performance on the passive compared to active trials, an effect also
observable (although not analysed) in the preceding experiment (7a) for both
controls and A.B. This is in line with the results of the experiment in Chapter
6, in that participants are more accurate at the task when forming a motor
command. The replication of this finding suggests that it is robust, and
furthermore, that all participants across the three experiments were using the
same strategy for the task.
7b.5: Conclusions
The current findings along with those from the preceding chapters suggest that
proprioceptive signals play a greater role in agency attribution than is
described
by the comparator model. In addition to this, the current results suggest
proprioception to have only a negative effect on agency, in that, it informs on
the presence of other movements opposed to directly contributing to a sense of
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agency. In fact, reducing proprioceptive signals was found to increase the
sense of agency (more self-judgments). However, it remains unclear as to the
relative importance of proprioceptive and efferent signals in regards to both
high and low-level agency mechanisms. This is addressed in the following
section of the thesis, specifically, Chapter 8 utilises both visual and physical
perturbations in order to manipulate the accuracy of the visual feedback and its
relationship to the actual limb position (proprioceptive feedback). Therefore,
the effects of accurate and perturbed visual feedback can be directly compared
against the effects of accurate and perturbed proprioceptive feedback, for low-
level mechanisms, measured by the motor response to the perturbation, as well
as high-level mechanisms measured by the self/other judgments.
Section 3
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Chapter 8
Weighting of Afferent and Efferent Signals
8.1 Introduction
Visual and proprioceptive signals have been found to contribute to the accurate
guidance of human movement. For example, Lateiner and Sainburg (2003)
found that visual information was of particular importance in planning
movement direction and distance. In their experiment, participants had to reach
towards targets using a virtual reality set up in which visual feedback was only
presented prior to movement onset (cursor representing their limb disappeared
immediately after the movement was initiated). In some of the trials the cursor
(visual feedback) exactly represented the actual position of the limb
(proprioceptive feedback) whilst in other trials the cursor location was shifted
in comparison to the actual limb position. The participants were found to adjust
the direction and distance of their reaches in accordance with the visual and
not
proprioceptive feedback. A similar study conducted by Bagesteiro et al. (2006)
agreed with these findings, that vision was responsible for planning movement
distance and direction, as the initial movement direction, peak velocity and
time to peak velocity of a given movement were dependent on the location of
the visual feedback. However, Bagestiero et al. (2006) also found that other
elements of the reach, such as time at peak velocity, were more strongly
influenced by the actual limb position (proprioceptive feedback), suggesting
that these signals are more useful for the on-line correction of movements.
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In terms of localisation of limb position, visual feedback has been
found to help strengthen proprioceptive signals (Blangero et al., 2005) even if
the feedback itself is non-informative (Newport et al. 2002). However, if the
visual feedback contradicts the actual limb position, it can dominate over
proprioception changing the perceived position of the limb in accordance with
the visual input. This is known as a visual dominance or visual capture effect.
For example, Holmes and Spence (2005) conducted an experiment in which
asymmetrical visual feedback of right arm movements was provided by a
mirror reflection of the left arm, located just in front of the right limb.
However, the left limb was positioned so that it appeared in the mirror to be
either nearer or farther from the body than the actual position of the right
limb.
Initially participants performed in phase tapping movements with both hands
whilst looking at the reflected image of the left hand. This was done in order
to
strengthen the illusion that the reflected left hand movements corresponded to
right hand movements. Following this, participants made a unimanual right
arm reaching movement towards one of two targets. Accuracy of the reaches
was found to have strong directional effects according to the position of the
left
hand. Participants moved their right hand as if it was nearer to the location of
the left limb as it appeared in the mirror. Another example of the strong
influence of visual signals on perception comes from phantom limb patients.
These are patients who, following limb amputation, still feel, and can
sometimes perceive voluntary movement of, the amputated limb. Phantom
limb pain, akin to involuntary clenching of the phantom fist, can become
alleviated by viewing the mirror image of the existing fist unclenching when
the reflection appears spatially concordant with the phantom (Ramachandran
Page 90
Preston_Thesis
SECTION 3: TWO ASPECTS OF AGENCY CHAPTER 8
and Rogers-Ramachandran, 1996b). This occurs despite full knowledge that
the image seen is just a mirror reflection.
However, the integration of visual and proprioceptive signals is not
always that straightforward. The degree to which visual information presides
over proprioception has been found to be task dependent and there are even
some instances in which proprioception becomes the dominant modality.
Warren and Schmitt, (1978) found that the context in which the reach was
made had a strong influence on the relative visual and proprioceptive
contributions to reach accuracy. If participants were required to reach towards
propriocetively defined targets they used predominantly proprioceptive
feedback on which to guide their movement, even in the presence of
conflicting visual feedback (no visual capture). Similarly when reaching to a
visually defined target, participants relied more on visual feedback. The
previous two chapters have helped to highlight the importance of
proprioceptive information in agency attribution using patients and controls. In
Chapter 6, neurologically intact participants made self/other judgments over
active and passive movements for which only a small behavioural difference
was found between the two tasks. This demonstrated that successful
completion of the task can still be achieved despite the absence of efferent
signals. Chapter 7 took this further by examining performance on the same task
of participants with proprioceptive feedback reduced by pathology (following
stroke) and tendon vibration (neurologically intact participants). In these
experiments the target was purely visual and yet in the passive condition
participants did not appear to be basing their judgments on visual accuracy
alone, likewise performance was reduced with impaired proprioceptive
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feedback. The current experiment attempts to expand on this by investigating
the exact nature and magnitude of proprioceptive influence in relation to visual
and efferent signals.
The visual dominance/visual capture effect can explain results in which
visual perturbations are applied incrementally so that relatively large
disparities
go unnoticed, which when presented in a non-incremental fashion are easily
detected. For example, Michel et al., (2007) found neurologically normal
participants to remain unaware of a 10-degree prismatic shift, following
gradual adaptation to increasingly larger perturbations presented incrementally
(2  10-degrees). The effect of the incremental perturbations meant that the
overall visual-proprioceptive disparity became gradually larger over a series of
trials. When directly exposed to the 10-degree perturbation, however, the
participants became immediately aware of the shift. Slachevsky et al. (2001)
used an incremental paradigm when applying perturbations to visual feedback
of participants attempting to draw a straight line. At the end of each trial
participants were asked whether the line presented via the visual feedback
matched the line they actually drew. The mean angular deviation at which the
participants noticed the perturbation was relatively large, approximately
14degrees.
The reason for this being that motor system adapted to the small
changes in perturbation size from trial to trial, so that visual feedback did
not
deviate sufficiently from that predicted to become noticeable. The accurate
visual feedback dominated over any conflicting proprioceptive signals until
approximately 14-degrees angular deviation from the actual limb position
(although one neurologically intact participant remained unaware of the
perturbations throughout the experiment, up to 42-degrees). Such experiments
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directly relate visual dominance to action awareness and suggest that
proprioception only becomes important at larger visual-proprioceptive
deviations.
Interestingly, previous studies investigating agency with impaired or
absent proprioception (including the two experiments in the previous chapter)
have found the resultant effect to be an increase in self-judgments rather than
performance dropping towards chance. This too suggests that proprioception
contributes to detection of comparator mismatches rather than directly
informing the experience of agency (feeling in control of an action). In this
explanation, the roles of vision and proprioception in action awareness extend
logically from their roles found in the accurate guidance of movement. Vision
influences initial planning of direction and distance, so that the small visual
mismatches influence the adaptation of the motor command, whilst
proprioception is utilised for on-line corrections and the detection of
discrepancies during the movement.
Relating this further to the comparator model, there are two main
possibilities for the role of proprioception. Firstly, that proprioceptive
information is important only in the formation of the estimated actual state,
which is in turn compared to the predicted state (based predominantly on the
efference copy). The estimated actual state is constructed mainly from visual
and proprioceptive feedback originating from the actual movement. When
disparities between these two modalities are small, the actual limb position is
perceived in a location between the two. Due to the visual dominance effect,
the new location is mainly perceived nearer to the position of the visual
feedback (van Beers et al., 1999). Therefore, small perturbations remain
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unnoticed as long as the visual feedback matches that predicted (Slachevsky et
al., 2001). However, when the disparity becomes larger, the perceived limb
position moves further away from the visual feedback. This means that the
estimated actual state is more ambiguous and no longer matches the predicted
state, even if the visual feedback remains accurate. Consequently, participants
no longer feel a sense of agency over the action (noticing the perturbation and/
or producing an other judgment). Furthermore, when proprioceptive signals are
weakened by pathology or tendon vibration (Chapter 7), less information is
available to contradict the visual feedback when forming the estimated actual
state. Therefore, visual dominance presides for larger perturbation sizes. Under
such circumstances a self/other judgment is based predominantly on matching
the visual feedback to the predicted state representation, which in the
experiments in Chapter 7 were likely to be ambiguous due to the targets size
relative to the cursor and disappearance of the target prior to movement onset.
In short, this explanation suggests a self/other judgment to be predominantly
determined on the accuracy of the visual feedback unless the
visualproprioceptive
deviation is large.
The problem with this explanation is that it only recognises a
proprioceptive contribution in the formation of the estimated actual state,
which is in turn compared to the efferent signals in order to attain successful
self/other attribution. It cannot therefore, account for passive movement
recognition, for which there is no efferent information (motor command)
available. Balslev et al. (2006) found no significant differences in brain
activation between active and passive movements when participants had to
distinguish between synchronous and asynchronous visual feedback, despite
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there being significantly more errors in the passive condition. This finding
suggests that both tasks implement similar neural processes and therefore,
could represent activation of the same comparator system. The reason for the
increased response accuracy for the active movements being that actively
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producing a movement allows for the recruitment of an additional component
of the comparator, comparing the estimated actual state (comprised
predominantly of visual feedback due to visual capture) to the predicted state
representation (efferent signals). Therefore, the second possibility for the
role
of proprioception in the comparator model, is that in addition to forming the
estimated actual state, proprioceptive signals make a second, independent
contribution in which they are compared directly to the available visual
information. In this case visual-proprioceptive congruence or incongruence
would have a significant affect on self/other judgments. Thus, independent of
reach accuracy, a self-judgment would be more likely when the visual and
proprioceptive feedback were congruent than in the presence of even a small
disparity.
One of the main problems with previous experiments investigating
agency attribution is that they do not differentiate between high and low-level
mechanisms. Self/other verbal responses, which are the measurement of choice
in most of these experiments, represent the high-level processes only.
Therefore it is possible that whilst proprioception only informs high-level
verbal judgments to large discrepancies, it may have a more direct, positive
contribution to low-level agency mechanisms. Therefore in the current
experiment, not only are the high-level self/other judgments recorded for actual
and perturbed visual feedback, but also the low-level motor response.
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Previous experiments using rotated visual feedback generally consist of
trials that have both visual-proprioceptive and visual-efference discrepancies
(inaccurate visual feedback), as the cursor is perturbed away from the target
and away from the actual limb position (Farrer et al., 2003b). Whilst other
studies consist of trials in which the discrepancies present between the visual
and proprioceptive information are obtained using incremental perturbations
(Founeret et al., 2002 and Slachevsky et al., 2001). In such trials the visual
feedback remains accurate whilst the visual and proprioceptive signals are in
conflict. The current study extends on these previous experiments by including
trials akin to both those described above (in addition to unperturbed trials)
with
the exception that instead of using incremental perturbations to produce a
visual-proprioceptive discrepancy with accurate visual feedback, a similar
affect was achieved in a single trial by simultaneously applying equivalent and
opposing visual and physical perturbations. This allowed the actual limb
(proprioceptive feedback) to be perturbed away from the target whilst
maintaining accurate visual feedback, due to the cursor being perturbed back in
the opposite direction so that in continued along the original trajectory. A
further condition was also implemented in the current experiment in which a
physical perturbation deviated the actual hand from the original trajectory
whilst the visual feedback remained unperturbed. The desired affect of this
condition was that both the visual and proprioceptive feedback were perturbed
away from the target, maintaining visual-proprioceptive congruence, yet the
visual feedback was inaccurate relative to the target.
Participants made unimanual reaching movement towards visually
presented targets and were required to make self/other judgments as to whether
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visual feedback exactly represented their movement (self) or was manipulated
by the computer (other). In order to attempt to differentiate between the
possible roles of proprioception, a small perturbation size was required.
Previous studies have found varying results for the size of a detectable
discrepancy with accurate visual feedback. For example, Slachevsky et al.
(2001) found participants to only become aware of the deviation at an average
of 14-degrees, whilst Fourneret et al. (2002) found awareness to be achieved at
an average of just 6-degrees. The current study used 4-degree perturbations to
ensure that it falls below that found to be noticeable in the previous studies
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in
order to avoid ceiling effects.
It was predicted that both visual-proprioceptive and visual-efferent
(predicted compared to estimate actual state) comparisons would affect the
percentage of self-judgments. Therefore, planned comparisons were conducted
for percent self-judgments between the unperturbed trials and all other
conditions, and also between the trials in which visual feedback was accurate
but there was a visual-proprioceptive incongruence and the trials in which the
visual feedback perturbed away from the target but visual-proprioceptive
congruence was maintained (one having visual-proprioceptive congruence only
and one having visual-efferent congruence only). In addition to self/other
judgments, accuracy of the visual feedback was also recorded using two
measures, degrees of error at 25% of the reach and degrees of error at 100% of
the reach. This measure was included not only to examine the effects of reach
accuracy on a self/other judgment but also to measure the low-level motor
response to the perturbations. It was predicted that the trials in which both
physical and visual perturbations were applied (opposing directions), would
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demonstrate error equivalent to the unperturbed conditions for both measures
(accurate visual feedback). Whereas, it was predicted that error would be
increased in comparison to the unperturbed trials, for both physical only and
visual only perturbation conditions (inaccurate visual feedback). Consequently
planned comparisons were also conducted between the unperturbed and all
other conditions for both, error at 25% and, error at 100% of the reach.
8.2: Method
Participants
An opportunity sample of 12 healthy participants was used consisting of 6
males and 6 females with a mean age of 25 years (range 21 -31 years). All
participants had normal or corrected to normal vision, and were right handed.
Materials
The materials were identical to those in Chapter 6. A vBot 2D motion-tracking
device was used to enable online visual feedback of movement to be presented
on a mirrored surface so that it appeared in the same spatial plane as the
actual
movements (see Figure 6.1).
Procedure
The procedure was identical to that of the active conditions in Chapters 6 and
7; participants made reaching movements with the vBOT (robot arm) towards a
green circular target that disappeared prior to movement onset. However, one
key difference was the nature of the perturbations. Only the smaller 4-degree
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perturbation was used and in addition to the visual perturbations, physical
perturbations were also applied to the movements (see Figure 8.1).
Figure 8.1: Schematic representation of the four different conditions V1 and V0
referring to the
presence and absence of a visual perturbation respectively (white arrow) that
pushed the cursor
(white circle) away from the robot arm (open circle). P1 and P0 referring to the
presence and
absence of a physical perturbation (yellow arrow) that pushed the robot arm away
from the
target (T). Solid lines represent limb position at the beginning of the
movement. Dashed lines
represent the relative limb position at the end of the movement.
In 25% of the trials the movements of the white cursor exactly represented the
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participants actual movements, in a further 25% of the trials the cursors
movements had a 4-degree angular perturbation applied. Another 25% of the
trials involved the cursor trajectory being unperturbed, however, the
participants actual movements were physically perturbed by 4-degrees (cursor
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and arm deviated from original trajectory). In the remaining trials the
movements had both physical and visual perturbations applied in opposite
directions. This allowed the participants actual reach trajectory to be
perturbed
away from the target, whilst the cursor would continue along the approximate
initial trajectory (towards the target). Therefore, although the actual limb
trajectory was perturbed the visual feedback was accurate in relation to the
target.
All perturbations were equally distributed between leftward and
rightward directions (For all outcomes see Figure 8.2). The experiment took
part in two identical successive blocks each composed of 40 trials (ten of each
condition). The physical perturbations were created in a similar way to the
visual perturbations (see Chapter 2) physically pushing the participants limb
away from the target.
At the end of each movement participants had to give a verbal
judgment as to whether the feedback received accurately represented their
movements (self) (i.e. they were in full control of the cursor movements), or
whether is had been manipulated by the computer (other).
Figure 8.2: Table depicting the key features of each of the four different trial
types. V1 and V0
referring to the presence and absence of a visual perturbation respectively
whilst P1 and P0
refer to the presence and absence of a physical (proprioceptive) perturbation
respectively.
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8.3: Results
Self-Judgments
The data were converted into percentage self-judgments and analysed using a
repeated measures 2x2 ANOVA. There were two factors: VISUAL
PERTURBATION with two levels; present (V1) and absent (V0) and
PHYSICAL PERTURBATION also with two levels; present (P1) and absent
(P0). There was a significant main effect of VISIUAL PERTURBATION
(F(1,11)= 22.132, p<0.001) in that V0 mean percentage of self-judgments
(78.86%) was greater than V1 (50.08%). There was also a significant main
effect of PHYSICAL PERTURBATION (F(1,11)= 5.350, p< 0.05) with P1
having greater percentage of self-judgments (68.5%) than P0 (60.43%). There
was also a significant VISUAL PERTURBATION * PHYSICAL
PERTURBATION interaction (F(1,11)= 18.228, p<0.01) (see Figure 8.3).
Planned comparisons revealed no significant difference between V1-P1 and
V0-P1 (F(1)=2.147, p=N.S). A significant difference was found between V1P1
and V0-P0 (F(1)=10.402, p<0.01) with V0-P0 (84.5%) having the greater
percent self-judgments compared to V1-P1 (63.81%). A significant difference
was also found between V1-P0 and V0-P0 (F(1)=56.3, p<0.001), with V1-P0
(36.35%) having fewer percent self-judgments than V0-P0 (84.5%). No
significant difference was found between V1-P0 and V0-P0 (F(1)=3.97, p=NS).
Error at 25% of the Reach
Error at 25% of the reach was measured in degrees from the target at 25% of
the total reach distance. The data were then analyzed using a 2x2 repeated
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measures ANOVA for which there were two factors: VISUAL
PERTURBATION with two levels; present (V1) and absent (V0) and
PHYSICAL PERTURBATION also with two levels; present (P1) and absent
(P0). There was a significant main effect of VISUAL PERTURBATION
(F(1,11)=21.49, p<0.001) with V1 (9.98°) having greater degrees of error than
V0 (6.58°). There was a significant main effect of PHYSICAL
PERTURBATION (F(1,11)=11.56, p<0.01) with P0 (9.22°) having greater
degrees of error than P1 (7.35°). There was also a significant VISUAL
PERTURBATION * PHYSICAL PERTURBATION interaction (F(1,11)=
90.37, p<0.001).
Planned comparisons revealed a significant difference between V0-P0 and V0P1
(F(1)=20.92, p< 0.001) with V0-P0 (4.59°) having less degrees of error
than V0-P1 (8.57°). A significant difference was also found between V0-P0
and V1-P0 (F(1)=112.95, p<0.001) with the error for V1-P0 (13.85°) being
greater than for V0-P0 (4.59°) There was no significant difference between V0P0
and V1-P1 (F(1)=3.09, p=NS.
Endpoint Error
Endpoint error was measured in degrees from the target at the furthest point on
the Y axis. The data were then analyzed using a 2x2 repeated measures
ANOVA for which there were two factors: VISUAL PERTURBATION with
two levels; present (V1) and absent (V0) and PHYSICAL PERTURBATION
also with two levels; present (P1) and absent (P0). There was a significant
main effect of VISUAL PERTURBATION (F(1,11)=24.62, p<0.001) with V1
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(6.92°) having greater degrees of error than V0 (4.83°). There was a significant
main effect of PHYSICAL PERTURBATION (F(1,11)=14.3, p<0.01) with P0
(6.47°) having greater degrees of error than P1 (5.28°). There was also a
significant VISUAL PERTURBATION * PHYSICAL PERTURBATION
interaction (F(1,11)= 39.22, p<0.001) (see Figure 8.4).
Planned comparisons revealed a significant difference between V1-P0 and V0P0
(F(1)=73.34, p<0.001) with V1-P0 (8.63°) having greater degrees of error
than V0-P0 (4.31°). No significant difference was found between V0-P0 and
V1-P1 (F(1)=3.13, p=NS) or between V0-P0 and V0-P1 (F(1)=4.247, p=NS).
Figure 8.3: Self-judgments all four conditions. V1 and V0 refer to the presence
and absence of a
visual perturbation respectively. P1 and P0 refer to the presence and absence of
a physical
perturbation respectively. Error bars show standard error. Graph depicts the
percent self-scores
for all four conditions. Condition V0-P0 (unperturbed) produces significantly
more self-
judgments than both V1-P1 and V1-P0. No significant difference was found between
V0-P0
and V0-P1.
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Figure 8.4: Error results for all four conditions. V1 and V0 refer to the
presence and absence of
a visual perturbation, respectively. P1 and P0 refer to the presence and absence
of a physical
perturbation respectively. Error bars show standard error. Graph depicts degrees
of error for
the cursor relative to the target for all four conditions at both 25% and 100%
of the reach. No
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difference was found between V0-P0 and V1-P1 at either 25% or 100% (accurate
visual
feedback). Condition V0-P0 demonstrates significantly less error than both V1-P0
and V0-P1
at 25% of the movement and less than V1-P0 at 100% of the reach. No difference
was found
between V0-P0 and V0-P1 at 100% of the reach.
8.4: Discussion
Condition V0-P0 was an exact representation of the actual movement, with no
visual or physical perturbations applied and therefore had visual-proprioceptive
congruence and accurate visual feedback at both 25% and 100% of the
movement. This condition also produced the highest percentage of self-
judgments, which, for this condition only, was the correct judgment. Condition
V0-P1 had a physical but not a visual perturbation applied that resulted in
visual-proprioceptive congruence, as the cursor was not perturbed away from
the limb, but greater reach error relative to the target when compared to
condition V0-P0. Interestingly, the increase of error was not apparent
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throughout the entire reach, becoming statistically equivalent to condition V0P0
at 100% (endpoint) of the movement. Percent self-judgments were also not
significantly different from condition V0-P0.
Condition V1-P0 had only a visual perturbation applied, which deviates
the cursor (visual feedback) from the actual limb position and away from the
target, therefore producing visual-proprioceptive incongruence and inaccurate
visual feedback. This condition also resulted in by far the fewest percent self-
judgments and remained inaccurate even at 100% of the reach. Condition V1P1
had both visual and physical perturbations applied. The physical
perturbation deviated the limb away from the target, whilst the visual
perturbation was applied in the opposing direction, deviating the cursor back
towards the target (along initial trajectory). As such, condition V1-P1 had
visual-proprioceptive incongruence whilst maintaining accurate visual
feedback (cursor) relative to the target, error not differing significantly from
V0-P0 for either 25% or 100% of the reach. Percent self-judgments for this
condition were not significantly lower than the percent self-score for V0-P1,
but were lower when compared to V0-P0. The aim of the current experiment
was to investigate the relative contributions of visual-proprioceptive
congruence and accuracy of the visual feedback (attaining the goal) in forming
a self-judgment.
Visual-proprioceptive Congruence
One possible factor on which to base a self/other judgment is
visualproprioceptive
congruence. Participants are more likely to give a self-judgment
if the cursor position (visual feedback) matches the actual limb position
SECTION 3: TWO ASPECTS OF AGENCY CHAPTER 8
(proprioceptive feedback). In the current experiment the absence of a visual
perturbation reflected the presence of visual-proprioceptive congruence (visual
perturbations perturb the cursor away from the limb). Even in condition V0-P1,
in which the cursor is initially perturbed away from the target, the cursor
deviation only occurred as a consequence of the robot perturbing the actual
limb trajectory. Therefore, the significant main affect of vision represents a
significant main affect of visual-proprioceptive congruence, for which more
self-judgments were given in response to trials in which congruence was
maintained (absent visual perturbation, V0). The planned comparisons further
demonstrate this, as no difference was found in percent self-judgments between
the conditions V0-P0 and V0-P1 (cursor position matches actual limb position).
However, it is unlikely that self/other judgments are based on this one
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factor alone. If participants only made self-judgments when there was
perceived visual-proprioceptive congruence, fewer self-judgments would be
expected when visual and proprioceptive signals were incongruent, regardless
of cursor accuracy. Whilst fewer self-judgments were recorded for condition
V1-P0 in which there was visual-proprioceptive discordance and inaccurate
visual feedback (cursor perturbed away from the unperturbed limb position).
Condition V1-P1, in which visual-proprioceptive discordance was present but
visual feedback remained accurate, produced statistically equivalent self-
judgments to condition V0-P1 (visual-proprioceptive congruence). The key
difference between V1-P0 and V1-P1 is that the latter has accurate visual
feedback relative to the target. Degrees of error between the cursor and target
position were not found to differ significantly between V1-P1 and V0-P0
(unperturbed condition) for either 25% or 100% of the reach, whilst V1-P0
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demonstrated significantly more reach error than V0-P0 for both these
measures.
Accuracy of the Reach
The second factor that could inform a self/other judgment is reach accuracy.
The aim of the task in the current experiment was to reach towards a visually
presented target, i.e. an accurate movement results in the cursor (visual
feedback) reaching the (visual) target. Condition V0-P0, (unperturbed) had the
lowest degrees of error between the cursor and target positions for both 25%
and 100% of reach and also produced the highest percentage of self-
judgements. However, the amount of self-judgments recorded for V0-P0 did
not differ significantly from those produced in condition V0-P1, despite the
latter condition demonstrating significantly greater error at 25% of the reach.
Likewise, when compared to V0-P0, the error recorded for condition V1-P1 did
not differ significantly at either 25% or 100% of the reach, yet V1-P1 produced
significantly less self-judgments. Therefore, accuracy throughout the reach
cannot solely account for the current results.
Endpoint Error (Attaining the Goal)
The third main factor that could underlie a self-judgment is error at 100%
(endpoint) of the reach, whether or not the cursor reached the desired location
(is accurate with respect to the target). The percentage of self-judgments for
condition V0-P1 did not differ significantly from V0-P0, despite demonstrating
greater error at 25% of the reach. However, at 100% of the reach, cursor error
did not differ significantly between these two conditions. Condition V1-P1 also
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demonstrated equivalent endpoint error to both V0-P0 and V0-P1, whilst also
producing a high percentage of self-judgments (not differing significantly from
V0-P1). Condition V1-P0 on the other hand, had the greatest error recorded at
100% of the reach, whilst also producing the fewest self-judgments. Therefore,
at first glance, accuracy at 100% of the reach seems to correspond with amount
of times participants made a self-judgment. However, despite self-judgments
for V1-P1 not being significantly different from V0-P1, they were significantly
lower than for V0-P0. If a self-judgment was based on endpoint error alone
(100% of the reach) it would be expected that amount of self-judgments for
these two conditions would be equivalent. Crucially, however, the number of
self-judgments to accurate visual feedback was reduced with visualproprioceptive
incongruence.
A Self-Judgment
The current results demonstrate that neither, visual-proprioceptive congruence
or reach accuracy (at 25% and/or 100% of the movement) can solely account
for a self-judgment. Reach accuracy, particularly at 100% of the reach, does
appear to play an important role in self/other judgments. However, self-
judgments to accurate visual feedback are reduced if there is also a
visualproprioceptive
disparity. Likewise, visual-proprioceptive congruence is shown
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to be important for a self-judgment, however, even with an incongruence of
this nature, self-judgments are increased if the visual feedback is accurate
relative to the target (V1-P1). One explanation for the processes underlying
these findings is that when the proprioceptive feedback conflicts with the
visual feedback (such as in condition V1-P1) the actual limb position is
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perceived to be between the two.
According to the comparator model, in order to form a self/other
judgment, the predicted state representation is compared to the estimated actual
state. The predicted state representation is constructed from the efference copy
of the motor command whilst the estimated actual state is constructed
predominantly from afferent signals received from the movement (vision and
proprioception). Van Beers et al. (1999) found that with small
visualproprioceptive
conflicts, instead of participants noticing that the two types of
feedback were at different locations, they perceived their limb (estimated
actual state) to be at a single location between the two and that due to the
dominance of vision (visual capture), the new location was nearer to the visual
feedback. If this is what was happening in the current experiment the recorded
reach accuracy, which was measured as the cursor relative to the target, may
not reflect the participants perceived accuracy of the reach (relative to their
estimated actual state). Thus, the perceived trajectory of the limb would be
less
accurate than the cursor, but more accurate than the actual limb position (see
Figure 8.5a).
Furthermore, for the V1-P0 trials, which also have visual-proprioceptive
discordance as the cursor was perturbed away from the unperturbed limb and
away from the target, the perceived limb location would again be in between
the two and nearer to the cursor position. However, in these conditions the
cursor is inaccurate, therefore, the perceived location of the limb will be
further
away from the target than for V1-P1 when the cursor was accurate (see Figure
8.5b). As such, this explanation can account for the self-judgments in V1-P1
being lower than the condition with equivalent cursor accuracy (V0-P0), yet
SECTION 3: TWO ASPECTS OF AGENCY CHAPTER 8
higher than the condition with an equivalent visual-proprioceptive
incongruence (V1-P0). With this explanation, endpoint accuracy would be of
key importance for forming a self/other judgment. The effect of conflicting
proprioceptive feedback (of only 4-degrees), being to distort the participants
perceived accuracy of their movement and hence indirectly affecting a
self/other judgment. However, considering this along side condition V0-P1 and
V1-P0 in which the participants appear to increase accuracy of their movement
throughout the reach (compensating for the perturbation), if the actual limb
position is perceived to be less accurate than the measurements recorded from
the cursor, similar corrections to the limb trajectory would be expected, but
relating the perceived limb position (not the cursor) to the target.
Figure 8.5: Schematic representation of actual limb trajectory (solid line),
cursor trajectory
(dashed line) and perceived limb trajectory (dotted line) relative to the target
(T) for a)
condition V1-P1 and b) V1-P0.
Adapting Motor Commands
When examining the low-level motor response to the perturbations, the role of
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proprioceptive feedback becomes clearer. For both V0-P1 and V1-P0 endpoint
error (100% of the reach) is reduced in comparison to the error recorded at
25% of the reach. This indicates that in both conditions the participants
attempted to compensate for the perturbation that had perturbed the cursor
away from target. In an attempt to clarify this observation, the original error
data were converted into a single measure by subtracting error at 100% of the
reach from error at 25% of the reach (25%-100%). These data were then
entered in a 2x2 repeated measures ANOVA with two factors: VISUAL
PERTURBETION, present (V1) and absent (V0) and PHYSICAL
PERTURBATION: present (P1) and absent (P0). The results revealed no
significant main effects (minimum F(1,11)= 3.41, p=0.09) but a significant
VISUAL PERTURBETION * PHYSICAL PERTURBATION interaction
(F(1,11)=58.34, p<0.001)(see Figure 8.6)
Figure 8.6: Graph depicting the significant VISUAL PERTURBATION * PHYSICAL
PERTURBATION interaction for error at 25% of the reach  error at 100% of the
reach (25%100%).
This measure represents the amount of correction participants made during the
movement. Conditions V0-P0 and V1-P1 demonstrate little online movement
correction whilst
conditions V0-P1 and V1-P0 demonstrate relatively large connections. Error bars
show
standard error.
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These additional results confirm that in conditions V1-P1 and V0-P0
participants did not deviate their trajectory significantly throughout the reach
(low 25%-100% scores). When considering this in conjunction with the
original error data, both these conditions demonstrated low and equivalent
degrees of error at both 25% and 100% of the movement. It is therefore likely
that because the cursor was accurate relative to the target participants did not
need to change their limb (and hence the cursor) trajectory in order to reach
their intended goal, regardless of the presence of conflicting proprioceptive
feedback. Thus, these results indicate the participants were using
predominantly visual feedback opposed to proprioceptive feedback to guide
their reaches (most likely due to the visual nature of the target). V0-P1 and
V1P0,
on the other hand, both demonstrated far higher 25%-100% scores, which
reflect changes in limb trajectory throughout the reach. Both these conditions
also demonstrate significant error at 25% of the reach (compared to V0-P0)
indicating that at this stage of the movement the cursor was relatively
inaccurate in relation to the target (a consequence of the perturbations).
Therefore, in order for the participant to reach their goal (the target)
alterations to their limb trajectory (motor commands) were required. Such
alterations are reflected in the 25%-100% scores for which condition V0-P1
demonstrates a lower score than V1-P0 (less online correction). Conversely, it
is condition V0-P1 (lower 25%-100% score) that demonstrates greater endpoint
accuracy (equivalent to the unperturbed reaches), despite the inaccuracy of the
cursor in both the conditions being the result of an equivalent 4-degree
perturbation. This can be explained by the large difference in error between the
two conditions at 25% of the reach, V0-P1 demonstrating greater accuracy.
SECTION 3: TWO ASPECTS OF AGENCY CHAPTER 8
Thus, suggesting that in condition V0-P1 compensation strategies are
implemented earlier in the reach (prior to 25% of reach distance) compared to
V1-P0.
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If the alterations to reach trajectory observed in V0-P1 were only in
response to inaccurate visual feedback, a similar degree of compensation
would be expected for V1-P0, due to both these conditions having visual
feedback that was perturbed by an equivalent amount (4-degrees) away from
the target. This, however, was not the finding of the current results, V0-P1
demonstrating lower degrees of error than V1-P0 at both 25% and 100% of the
reach. The key difference between these two conditions is that V0-P1 also had
perturbed actual limb trajectory (visual-proprioceptive congruence) this being
the same condition with earlier implementation of the compensation strategy
and higher endpoint accuracy. However, it is also unlikely that the earlier
compensation strategy is only in response to the perturbed actual limb
trajectory (proprioceptive feedback inaccurate relative to the target). Previous
studies have shown that proprioceptive feedback is more instrumental than
vision for online corrections of reaches (Bagesteiro et al., 2006), however, if
the motor system was only making corrections based on proprioceptive
feedback alone, similar changes of limb trajectory would be expected in all
trials with physical perturbations, regardless of nature of the visual feedback.
Condition V1-P1 has a similar perturbation applied to the actual limb (physical
perturbation), however, an additional perturbation was applied to the cursor
trajectory so that it remained accurate in relation to the target. As previously
discussed this condition demonstrates very little difference between the error
recorded at 25% and 100% of the reach, both scores being in line with error
SECTION 3: TWO ASPECTS OF AGENCY CHAPTER 8
observed in the unperturbed trials (V0-P0). Therefore, even if the final
self/other decision was based predominantly on endpoint accuracy, the greater
accuracy observed in condition V0-P1 is most likely to be a result of
congruency between the visual and proprioceptive signals, which enhance low-
level motor responses that lead to the more accurate movement.
However, an additional explanation for the successful corrections
evident in V0-P1 is that the participants may have consciously felt their limb
being pushed by the proprioceptive perturbation and so pushed back against it.
The physical nature of the perturbations may have altered high-level processes
that implemented the correction mechanisms. In condition V1-P0, on the other
hand, participants had to wait until there was a sufficient visual deviation
before they noticed and could begin to correct their movement. Although this
explanation can account for the early compensation strategy implemented in
V0-P1, it does not account for the high proportion of self-judgements. The very
nature of the task required participants to look out for such deviations to
their
actual movement. Although the properties of the perturbations were not fully
described prior to the experiment, such a deliberate manipulation of their
reach,
if consciously perceived, would surely produce more high-level other
judgments and post-hoc anecdotal reports also suggested that most of the
participants were unaware of the perturbations. Moreover, this would again be
unable to explain the lack of compensation for the physical perturbation
apparent in condition V1-P1.
Two Aspects of Agency
An additional point of interest here, is that compensation strategies, albeit
less
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successful, were still implemented in condition V1-P0. In fact this condition
demonstrated the largest difference between 25% and 100% of the reach
(highest 25%-100% score). These findings suggest that online alterations were
made to the motor command in order to attempt to produce a more accurate
movement. Thus, these results could imply that, on some level at least, the
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visual feedback was treated as self despite being incongruent with
proprioceptive feedback and inaccurate relative to the target. Synofzik et al.,
(2007) and Gallager (2007) have criticised the comparator model for not
differentiating between lower-level sensational aspects of agency and the
higher-level judgments. The lower-level feelings of agency are described as
bottom-up processes derived from the motor system, whilst higher-level
judgments are top-down conceptual processes, which are based on
phenomenological knowledge (prior knowledge and beliefs etc).
The results for conditions V0-P1 and V1-P0 help to highlight the
dissociation of these two aspects, the compensation strategy reflecting lower-
level feelings of agency, whilst the verbal responses at the end of the trial
reflect the high-level judgments of agency. For example, in condition V1-P0
adjustments are made to the motor commands of the reach in an attempt to
overcome the perturbation and guide the cursor to the target. Because the
motor system makes these changes to the motor commands it must be treating
the cursor movements as self (under the control of the participant). However,
despite this the self/other judgments made for this condition were
predominantly other. Although in this particular condition the alterations to
the
motor command in order to compensate for the perturbations were not entirely
successful (greatest endpoint error), participants did manage to reduce the
error
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in respect to the target throughout the reach (i.e. participants were
controlling
the cursors trajectory). However, due to the nature of the task, in which
participants were required to detect such deviations from their own movements
their high-level verbal judgment, based on this prior knowledge of the task,
was more likely to be other.
In regards to the role of proprioception in these two aspects of agency,
visual-proprioceptive congruence appears to enhance the low-level feelings of
agency causing earlier, more effective adaptations to the motor command. As a
consequence of this, proprioception also has an indirect influence the higher-
level judgment. Therefore, the current findings, particularly for condition
V0P1,
suggest not only that proprioception is important for feelings of agency but
also that it can contribute to enhancing those feelings opposed to a role
limited
for the detection of discrepancies only. However, in terms of higher-level
judgments this may only be indirect process, via producing a more accurate
reach, and does not necessarily support the existence of an independent
visualproprioceptive
comparison within the comparator model. In the explanation of
the comparator model by Frith et al. (2000), it was suggested that afferent
feedback is used, in addition to the formation of the estimated actual state, to
fine-tune motor commands and thus contributes to the predicted consequences
of the actions (predicted state representation). The results of the current
study
initially appear compatible with this explanation. In condition V1-P0 the motor
commands are altered based on only visual feedback, whilst in condition V0P1
the motor commands are more affectively fine-tuned due to the succinct
visual and proprioceptive signals (both affecting the motor commands in the
same way). However, in condition V1-P1 the inaccurate proprioceptive
SECTION 3: TWO ASPECTS OF AGENCY CHAPTER 8
feedback does not affect the motor commands at all (cursor demonstrates error
levels equivalent to those in the unperturbed conditions at both 25% and 100%
of the reach), possibly due to visual dominance, enhanced by the visual nature
of the task. Visual-proprioceptive incongruence does, however, appear to have
an affect on the verbal judgments, as previously discussed, this could be due
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the proprioceptive signals altering the estimated actual state sufficiently to
result in a mismatch with the predicted state representation. The reason for
proprioceptive signals lack of influence over alterations to the motor command
could be because the desired state is to get the cursor to the target location
for
which the proprioceptive feedback is not essential. However, why then the
predicted state representation should be so greatly affected by
visualproprioceptive
congruence in V0-P1 is less clear. For a thorough explanation of
the current results the comparator model requires information from an
additional component that determines the relevance of the incoming afferent
feedback and may in turn also have an influence on higher-level judgments. An
independent visual-proprioceptive comparison, which enhances low-level
feelings of agency over afferent feedback, achieves this.
The Comparator Model and a Sense of Ownership
A further criticism made by Synofzik et al., (2007) is that the comparator
model does not successfully account for a sense of ownership (recognition that
it is my body moving) because a sense of ownership does not require efference.
The addition of an independent visual-proprioceptive comparison within the
comparator model, as described above, can account for this and as a result can
directly associate the sense of ownership with the sense of agency. The similar
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brain activations observed by Balslev et al. (2006) for detecting perturbations
applied to both active and passive movements supports the relationship
between a sense of ownership and a sense of agency. In the passive conditions
participants had to detect temporal differences between their own finger
moving and the presented visual feedback. In this circumstance participants do
not produce a motor command and efference copy on which to form a
predicted state representation. Therefore, the normal processes of the
comparator cannot be functioning and judgments are over ownership of the
movement opposed to agency. However, if the comparator also had an
independent visual-proprioceptive comparison, which can function in the
absence of the motor command, this aspect of the network would be activated
with both passive and active movements. Balslev et al. (2006) found that there
was a behavioural difference between the two conditions, in that participants
produced more errors with passive movements. This is also compatible with
this explanation because when the movements are passively made judgments
are only based on the visual-proprioceptive comparison (ownership), whilst in
the active movements there is additional information available from the
predicted and estimated actual state, and the desired and actual state
comparisons, on which to form a judgment (agency).
8.5: Conclusions
The current findings suggest that high-level self/other judgments are strongly
influenced by end point accuracy, whether or not the action matches the
intentions. However, visual-proprioceptive incongruence can increase other
judgments for accurate visual feedback. Taking these results in conjunction
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with those from the Chapter 7, in which reducing proprioceptive feedback
increased self-judgments, suggests that proprioceptive signals have a negative
affect on agency, alerting the high-level processes to discrepancies. In terms
of
low-level agency mechanisms visual-proprioceptive congruence enhances the
response to the perturbation, which leads to a more accurate movement and
thus a higher percentage of high-level self-judgments. Therefore, these results
suggest a greater role for proprioception than is given credit in the comparator
model, supporting the presence of a separate visual-proprioceptive comparison.
Such a comparison within the comparator model would mean that parts of the
same network would be activated with feelings of agency and ownership. This
therefore explains the results of Balslev et al. (2006) in which they found no
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significant difference in neural activity when detecting perturbations of active
(agency) and passive (ownership) movements.
The proceeding chapter will further attempt examine the interactions
between high-level judgments and low-level motor responses in relation to
endpoint accuracy and visual-proprioceptive congruence. Adaptation using
incremental perturbations has been said to occur without conscious awareness
(Michel et al., 2007) so that low-level changes to the motor commands are
made without informing high-level processes. Therefore, applying incremental
perturbations in a self/other judgment task can help to examine the relative
importance of endpoint accuracy and visual-proprioceptive congruence to
high-level judgments. The perturbed trials will be accurate, due to adaptation,
but also have visual-proprioceptive incongruence. Exposure to unperturbed
trials, however, will produce inaccurate visual feedback (adapted to the absent
visual perturbation) whilst visual-proprioceptive congruence is maintained.
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Chapter 9
Dissociating High and Low-level Agency Mechanisms
9a: Agency and Intentions
9a.1: Introduction
The comparator model account of agency (Frith et al., 2000) involves low-level
mechanisms based around a forward model that compares the estimated actual
state of the motor system to a pre-formed predicted state representation.
Initially a representation is produced of the desired next state of the motor
system that is based on prior intentions. Following, and based on this, the
movements required in order to achieve that desired state are specified, and the
motor commands for executing these movements are issued. Simultaneously an
efference copy is formed of the motor commands, which is used to create a
predicted state representation (representation of the predicted next state of
the
motor system) that can then be compared to actual next state that is estimated
primarily on the basis of sensory feedback. Whilst minor discrepancies of these
comparisons go on to inform further specifications of the motor commands as a
normal part of motor learning, larger discrepancies are interpreted as actions
that are controlled or influenced by another agent. Within this account of
agency, however, there is no reference to how this comparator output is
conveyed to, and interpreted by, the high-level conscious processes that
produce the verbal judgement of agency, which is that measured in the current,
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as well as in numerous previous (e.g. Farrer et al., 2003a, Farrer et al.,
2003b,
Tsakiris and Haggard, 2005), experiments.
A high-level account of agency has been described by Stephens and
Graham (2000), who suggest that intentions and hence a sense of agency is
only inferred over our actions retrospectively based on prior knowledge and
behaviour in a similar way to how we infer the intentions of other people. This
account, however, suffers a similar criticism as it fails to recognise input
from
any low-level agency mechanisms. More recently, researches have begun to
link these two aspects together (Synofzik et al., 2007 and Gallagher, 2007)
suggesting the experience of agency can be affected by top-down and bottom-
up processes. However, it is as yet unclear how these mechanisms interact in
order to produce normal, as well as specific examples of abnormal, experience
of agency.
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The results from Chapter 8 demonstrate empirical evidence for a
distinction between high and low-levels of agency. Participants made
unimanual-reaching movements whilst holding onto a robotic manipuladum.
Similar to all the experiments in the current thesis, visual feedback (cursor)
was provided of these movements that was either synchronous with their actual
limb trajectory or was rotated by 4-degrees away from the limb. However, an
additional manipulation was applied to the movements, the presence or absence
of a physical perturbation, which shifted their actual limb trajectory by an
equivalent 4-degree angle. Therefore, within Chapter 8 there were four
experimental conditions; Unperturbed -when the feedback was veridical, an
actual representation of their intended action that was accurate relative to the
target (to which participants were aiming) and the visual feedback was
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congruent with the true position of the limb (visual-proprioceptive
congruence). Visually Perturbed  the spatial location of the cursor was
inaccurate with respect to the actual limb position (no visual-proprioceptive
congruence) and the target, being rotated away from the unperturbed limb
trajectory by 4-degrees. Physically Perturbed  The cursor was accurate with
respect to the actual limb position (visual-proprioceptive congruence),
however, was perturbed by 4-degrees away from the target as a result of a
4degree
perturbation being applied to actual limb trajectory. Visually and
Physically Perturbed  The actual limb trajectory was perturbed by 4-degrees
away from the target whilst a simultaneous opposing visual perturbation was
applied so that the cursor remained accurate with respect to the target, yet
there
was no congruency between the visual and proprioceptive signals.
It was found that proprioceptive information was ignored by low-level
mechanisms (measured by the degree of motor response to the perturbation) in
the presence of accurate visual feedback, so that the cursor remained accurate
relative to the target (as accurate as in the unperturbed trials) throughout the
entire reach when both visual and physical perturbations were applied, despite
the actual limb position being inaccurate with respect to the target. Similarly
the reaches that only had visual perturbations applied (visually perturbed)
remained inaccurate throughout the movement with respect to the target
(cursor perturbed away from the unperturbed limb). Of particular interest were
the results for the physically perturbed trials in which the cursor was
perturbed
by an equivalent degree away from the target as in the visually perturbed
trials,
but as a result of the perturbed limb trajectory and so maintaining
visualproprioceptive
congruence. In these trials, after showing initial inaccuracy, the
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reaches became accurate at the end of the movement (equivalent to
unperturbed reaches). This degree of correction leading to an accurate endpoint
seemed to be in direct response to visual-proprioceptive congruence and
occurred without reaching conscious awareness (evident by the high
percentage of self-judgments given in response to these trials). As such it was
argued that visual-proprioceptive congruence enhanced low-level motor
responses, which resulted in the motor system implementing more effective
correction mechanisms.
High-level judgments, on the other hand, as measured by the self/other
verbal response, were found to predominantly correspond with high endpoint
accuracy, in that the most accurate movements (cursor relative to target)
yielded the highest percentages of self-judgments. However, the presence of
visual-proprioceptive incongruence reduced the likelihood of a self-judgment
to accurate visual feedback (visually and physically perturbed reaches).
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Therefore, the results of Chapter 8 suggest that high-level judgments are
mainly informed by end point accuracy (intentions), whilst only being
negatively informed by proprioceptive feedback (detecting discrepancies).
Interestingly, there was also a low-level motor response in the visually
perturbed conditions, in that similar correction mechanisms to that seen in the
physically perturbed conditions were implemented. This attempt at correction
was, however, not successful, these trials being the most inaccurate and thus
yielding the fewest percent self-judgments. Nevertheless for the motor system
to implement alterations to the motor commands in an attempt to correct the
movement, they were, in effect, treating the feedback as self. Therefore
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demonstrating that actions that are judged by high-level processes to be other,
can still be treated by the low-level components of the motor system as self.
Previous experiments have also demonstrated instances of low-level
motor responses occurring in absence of high-level conscious awareness. For
example, Goodale et al. (1986) conducted an experiment in which participants
were required to reach towards a target, the spatial location of which was
shifted during the course of the movement. The participants were found to
make the necessary on line adjustments to their reach in order to be accurate to
the target whilst remaining unaware of both the alterations made to their
reaches and the movements of the target. Therefore, the information
concerning the shifting target location must have been available to the low-
level aspects of the motor system responsible for adapting the motor
commands (in order to correct the movement), yet did not reach high-level
conscious awareness.
In a later experiment conducted by Slachevsky et al. (2001) participants
were found to remain unaware of relatively large alterations made to their
actual movements by gradually introducing larger and larger visual
perturbations. The participants were required to draw straight lines with a
stylus on a graphics tablet, whilst perturbations were applied to the visual
feedback of these movements that gradually increased in size over consecutive
trials. Therefore, in order to produce the desired straight line, the
participants
had to make larger and larger alterations to their actual movements away from
the straight line direction. At the end of each movement the participants were
asked whether the movement that they actually produced matched that
presented via the visual feedback. However, because these visual perturbations,
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and hence motor adaptations, were implemented incrementally, the visual
feedback never deviated significantly from that intended. Consequently the
participants did not become consciously aware of the perturbations until a
mean perturbation angle of 14-degrees. These results also (in accordance with
that found in Chapter 8) suggest the high-level judgments to be concerned with
the goal of the movement whilst remaining unaware of the precise movements
implemented in order to achieve that goal.
The reason that participants become aware of incrementally presented
perturbations at all is likely to be a result of the grossly conflicting visual
and
proprioceptive information. In a study similar to that completed by Slachevsky
et al. (2001), Fourneret et al. (2002) found deafferented patient G.L. to remain
unaware of such visual perturbations, that she was able to successfully
compensate for, even with an angle 40-degrees (the largest size perturbation
tested in their experiment). Moreover, there have been many studies (including
those in Chapter 7 of the current thesis) that have consistently shown that
reduced or absent proprioceptive feedback impedes the detection of such
perturbations (increases in self-judgments) (Farrer et al., 2003 and Balslev et
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al., 2006). Therefore, considering these results in conjunction with those
discussed above from Chapter 8, lends further support to the role of
proprioceptive feedback only having a direct effect on high-level judgments
through the detection of discrepancies (detecting other movements).
Therefore, if high-level judgments are predominantly informed by the
outcome of a given movement as opposed to the low-level precise motor
responses, it should be possible to covertly adapt participants reaches, via
the
application of incremental perturbations, so as to increase the percentage of
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self-judgments in response to perturbed visual feedback. The reason for this
being that, due to the adaptation, of which the participants have little or no
conscious awareness, it will be the perturbed rather than unperturbed reaches
that produce accurate visual feedback. In addition to this, as the participants
are
unaware of the magnitude of their motor adaptations in response to perturbed
visual feedback, when presented with a true representation of their actual,
adapted movements (unperturbed) such trials should be more likely to elicit an
other judgment, irrespective of the presence visual-proprioceptive congruence.
Therefore in the current experiment participants made self/other
judgments over perturbed (other) and unperturbed (self) visual feedback of
unimanual reaching movements toward a target. In one condition, perturbations
were applied incrementally so that over the course of the experiment larger and
larger alterations were made to the actual movements in order to produce
accurate reaches (in response to the larger and larger perturbations).
Throughout the experiment, however, participants were periodically exposed to
unperturbed visual feedback, revealing the actual inaccurate trajectory of their
limb. In a second condition, equivalent perturbations were applied but this time
presented in a random order. It was predicted that participants would give a
higher percentage of self-judgments over perturbed visual feedback and a
lower percentage of self-judgments over unperturbed visual feedback with
incrementally compared to randomly presented perturbations. Therefore,
planned comparisons were conducted between equivalent perturbations sizes of
the incremental and random conditions.
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9a.2: Method
Participants
A sample of 12 participants consisting of 7 females and 5 males with a mean
age 27 years (range 22  33 years) took part in the study. All had normal or
corrected to normal vision and were right handed.
Materials
The visual feedback was displayed by the Mirage system (Chapter 2) so that
participants could view real time video footage of their actual reaches from the
same perspective as if viewing the actual hand. Participants sat at a 260 x
1220mm table with a 215 x 480mm mirror placed on a wooden surface that
was suspended 320mm over the table top. 320mm above the mirror was a
iMAC OSX 10.4.1, 2.8GHz computer positioned so that the image on the
screen was reflected into the mirror so as to appear as if it was in the same
spatial plane as the table top (actual movements). An additional mirror (230 x
390mm) was positioned underneath the first mirror so that the reflective
surface was pointing down towards the table. A small monochrome Basler
A601F firewire CCD (charge-coupled device) camera (sampling at 60 Hz) with
a Tamron 6mm fixed focal length lens was positioned on the edge of the
tabletop approximately in line with the participants midline and the midline of
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each mirror. The camera lens was pointing up at an angle of 75-degrees so that
it captured the images reflected in the down-facing mirror (see Figure 9.1).
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The camera relayed these visual images back to the computer, which were
displayed on the screen so that they were reflected in the up-facing mirror.
This
allowed real time visual images of the participants reaching movements to be
reflected in the up-facing mirror to appear in the same spatial location as the
actual movements. The position and angle of the camera and mirrors allowed
for the visual feedback to be presented of the participants actual limb
movements (video footage) from the same perspective as if actually viewing
the hand. Relaying the images through the computer enabled the application of
manipulations to the feedback. An infrared reflective marker was attached to
the index finger of the reaching (left) hand and a short-range 8-diode infrared
camera was positioned on top of the CCD camera. The infrared camera had 8
light emitting diodes positioned around the circular periphery and a small light
sensor at the top. The light sensor was obscured in order for the camera to be
used in the absence of complete darkness. This set up allowed the participants
movements to be monitored by tracking the brightest point on the image
display (infrared reflective marker). Black cloth covered the surface on which
the mirror rested and was also draped over the back of the computer.
The computer programme was written in LabVIEW 8.2 running on windows
XP and an additional standard 15-inch monitor was attached so that the
experimenter could observe the experiments progression. A plastic nut was
positioned on the leading edge of the table in order to give the participant a
proprioceptively defined start point.
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Figure 9.1: Schematic representation of the experimental set up. The camera (a)
was angled at
a 75º angle pointing towards the down-facing mirror (d) so that it captured the
participants
actual movements, which when presented on the computer screen were reflected in
the up-
facing mirror (c) so as to appeared in the same spatial location as the actual
movements. The
infrared diodes (b) allowed tracking of the infrared reflective marker (e)
attached to the index
finger of the reaching hand (brightest point of the image). The angle and
positioning of the
CCD camera (a) and mirrors (c) (d) allowed viewing of real time video footage of
the actual
reaches from the same perspective as if viewing the actual hand.
Procedure
Participants sat at the table and looked down into the mirror in which they
could see a black screen (a reflection of the image from the computer).
Participants placed their left index finger on the start point positioned on the
leading edge of the table, just out of the view of the CCD camera. Their hand
was positioned in a pointing posture, and they were required to return to the
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same start position at the end of each trial. At the beginning of each trial a
white circular target approximately 100mm in diameter appeared and there was
a sound of a tone. The tone indicated to the participant to make a unimanual
reaching movement towards the location of the target, which disappeared
shortly after movement onset (disappeared as soon as the marker was
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detected). The target position varied between four possible locations that were
200mm or 220mm forward and 50mm or 150mm right of the start location.
During the reach the participants saw a live (delay ~16.7ms) monochrome
video image of their actual moving hand.
Of a total of 80 trials, in ten the image was unchanged from that
captured by the computer (unperturbed). Whilst the remaining 70 trials were
evenly divided between ten different sized (leftward) linear perturbations (1 
10-degrees) so that for each perturbation size there were 7 trials. The
perturbations were formed by rotating the image away from the actual limb
trajectory as described in Chapter 2. At the end of each trial the participants
were required to make a verbal judgment as to whether the feedback received
was an accurate representation of their actual movements (self/unperturbed) or
not (other/perturbed). The video image of the movements remained on screen
for 750ms after disappearance of the target for the participant to complete
their
reach following which the screen turned blank and the participant was
prompted for their verbal response.
All participants took part in two conditions, which were conducted on
two consecutive days. The order of which the sessions were completed was
counterbalanced between participants. In one condition the perturbed trials
were ordered incrementally (see Figure 9.2a) so that within the experimental
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block there were ten consecutive steps (one for each size of perturbation)
running directly after each other, starting with a 1-degree perturbation and
running in order to the 10-degree perturbation. Within each of these steps there
were 8 trials, 7 of which were perturbed trials (all of the same size
perturbation) and one unperturbed trial. An unperturbed trail was randomly
assigned to one of the 8 trials within each step. In the other condition the
order
of all trials was random (Figure 9.2b). Importantly the trials within each
condition were equivalent, with equal numbers of each perturbation size in
both conditions and a mean perturbation size of 5-degrees. The fundamental
difference being the order in which the trials were presented. At the beginning
of each session participants took part in a practice block consisting of 20
unperturbed trials in order to get participants accustomed to the set up (seeing
their own hand in the mirror) and the timing of the reaches.
Figure 9.2: Example of distribution of perturbations over trials for a)
incremental and b)
random conditions. The data in both graphs is equivalent, only differing by the
order of the
trials.
215
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9a.3: Results
The data were converted into percent correct judgments and were separated
into six bins per condition, bin ZERO contained unperturbed trials only (0degree
perturbation) whilst bins ONE to FIVE each contained two (sequential)
perturbation sizes (e.g. bin two contained responses to trials with 1 and
2degree
perturbations whist bin three contained responses to trials with 3 and 4degree
perturbations). These data were then entered in to a 2x6 repeated
measures ANOVA with 2 factors; CONDITION, for which there were two
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levels, RANDOM and INCREMENTAL, and BIN NUMBER, for which there
were six levels, ZERO, ONE, TWO, THREE, FOUR and FIVE.
There was no significant main effect of CONDITION (F(1,11)=0.96, p=NS). A
significant main effect was found of BIN NUMBER (F(5,55)=16.15, p<0.001)
for which bin ONE (1 and 2-degree perturbations) had the greatest percentage
of self-judgments (85.88%) and bin FIVE (9 and 10-degrees) having the fewest
percent percentage of self-judgments (58.93%). There was also a significant
CONDITION * BIN NUMBER interaction (F(5,55)=10.54, p<0.01).
Planned comparisons (Figure 9.3) revealed a significant difference between
RANDOM and INCREMENTAL for bins ZERO (F(1)=20.38, p<0.001), with
RANDOM (67.22%) having a higher percentage of self-judgments than
INCREMENTAL (40.19%), THREE (F(1)=5.55, p<0.05) with RANDOM
(76.6%) having a greater percentage of self-judgments compared to
INCREMENTAL (62.5%) FOUR (F(1)=4.14, p<0.05), with INCREMENTAL
(66.01%) having greater percent self-judgments than RANDOM (53.89%), and
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FIVE (F(1)=20, p<0.001) with INCREMENTAL (58.92%) having greater
percent self-judgments than RANDOM (32,14%). No significant differences
were found for bins ONE (F(1)=0.55, p=NS) or TWO (F(1)=2.34, p=NS).
Figure 9.3: Graph showing percent self-judgments for each BIN NUMBER of the
RANDOM
(open circles) and INCREMENTAL (filled squares) conditions. Self-judgments were
significantly fewer for the unperturbed trials (ZERO) when the perturbed trials
were presented
in incremental steps (with an unperturbed trial embedded with in each step) than
when all
perturbations (including 0-degree perturbations) were presented randomly. Small
to medium
sized perturbations for both conditions produced a high percentage of
self-judgments, whilst
for the larger perturbations a greater number of self-judgments were produced
for the
incrementally presented perturbations compared to when randomly presented. Error
bars
represent standard error and asterisks denote significant differences (*=
p<0.05, **=p<0.001).
9a.4: Discussion
When the perturbations were applied to the reaches in an incremental (multistep)
fashion the participants appeared to adapt their perception of self in
accordance with the perturbations; significantly increasing their percent self-
judgments for the larger perturbation sizes compared to when all the
perturbations were randomly assigned across the trials. In addition to this, the
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self-judgments to the unperturbed trials that were embedded within the steps of
the INCREMENTAL condition were significantly reduced in comparison to the
responses for to the unperturbed trials in the RANDOM condition. In fact, in
the INCREMENTAL condition, participants gave other judgments more often
than self-judgments in response to unperturbed (self) visual feedback. These
results clearly demonstrate that by covertly adapting the low-level motor
system to perturbed visual feedback it is possible to induce a false other
judgment to unperturbed (self) visual feedback. These results support those
from Chapter 8 suggesting that reach accuracy was the strongest predictor of a
self-judgment. In order to produce an accurate reach with perturbed visual
feedback, the actual reach trajectory was deviated away from the target. This
Page 110
Preston_Thesis
meant that when the participants saw their actual movement it was inaccurate
and thus they were more likely to give an other judgment.
Updating Low-Level Mechanisms
Interestingly it was noted that during the incremental part of the experiment,
not only were participants more likely to give an other judgement in response
to the unperturbed trials but also they appeared to be more likely to give an
other judgment to the trials that immediately followed the unperturbed trials.
For example, Participant 7 responded other to both the unperturbed trial and
the trial immediately following the unperturbed trial on 8 out of 10 occasions.
On further examination of the reach trajectories it was discovered that
despite having given an other judgment to the inaccurate unperturbed trial,
(one participant frequently laughed at these trials exclaiming; definitely
other) on the subsequent trial the participants misreached in the opposite
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direction (see Figure 9.4). This means that the participants were still making
adaptations to their motor commands on the basis of the preceding trial despite
having judged it to be other.
Figure 9.4: Hand paths from Participant 7 of the visual feedback on 3
consecutive trials in the
INCREMENTAL condition. The first reach (black solid line) is the trajectory of a
reach that
was adapted to the perturbed visual feedback (10-degree perturbation) and was
most accurate
to the target (black circle) in response to which the participant gave a
self-judgment. The
second reach (grey solid line) is an unperturbed trial (participants saw their
actual inaccurate
movement) in response to which an other judgment was given. The third trial
(dashed line) is
the subsequent perturbed trial in which the participant misreached in the
opposite direction and
also gives an other judgement. Note: hand paths illustrated do not show reaches
from a fixed
start point as reaches are shown in relation to a fixed target location (actual
target location
shifted) and the experimental set up prevented recordings of the beginning of
the reach.
Therefore, although high-level processes were judging the observed
action to be other, low-level mechanisms were using information concerning
the observed reach error of that same movement to update the motor
commands. Therefore, in effect, treating the movement as self. As a
consequence when the perturbations were reintroduced in the trials that
immediately followed the unperturbed trials the participants were also
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inaccurate with respect to the target and as such were more likely to respond
other compared to trials with equivalent perturbations.
To clarify this further the incremental data were re-plotted (Figure 9.5)
this time segregating the data into just 5 bins (identical to bins ONE  FIVE in
the original analysis, two consecutive perturbation sizes per bin) whilst also
separating the unperturbed trials and then the trials subsequent to the
unperturbed trials into equivalent bins. Therefore, the percentage of self-
judgments were calculated for the perturbed trials at each step of the
experiment, in addition to this, the percent self-judgments were also calculated
for the unperturbed trials that corresponded to each step, and in a similar
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manner the percent self-judgments were calculated for the perturbed trials that
immediately followed the unperturbed trials for each step. 95% confidence
intervals were then calculated to examine whether the percentage of self-
judgments for both trial types deviated significantly from the mean self-
judgments at each step.
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Figure 9.5: Re-plotted data of mean percent self-judgments for the perturbed
trials (open
circles) unperturbed trials (black crosses) and also incorporating data points
for the perturbed
trials that immediately followed the unperturbed trials (filled squares). Note
that the crosses
and squares follow a very similar pattern, both falling outside the 95%
confidence intervals
(error bars) calculated for the circles. Asterisks denote significant
differences.
From the graph in Figure 9.5 it is clear that the percent self-judgments
given in response to the trials immediately following the unperturbed trials
closely follows the pattern observed for the unperturbed trials, both of which
were significantly different from mean percent self-judgments at each bin as
measured by 95% confidence intervals. This result demonstrates that although
the participants made a high-level judgment of other over the unperturbed
visual feedback, the low-level components of the motor system were still
treating the feedback as self.
Presumably we all have an initial set of pre-learned forward models that
allow us to accurately reach to objects in our environment. During prism
adaptation, in which our visual environment is shifted relative to our body,
these original forward models prove unsuccessful, as misreaches occur in the
direction of the prismatic shift. Therefore the forward models are replaced by
SECTION 3: TWO ASPECTS OF AGENCY CHAPTER 9
adapting the motor system to the new visual environment and restoring
accuracy to our reaches. However, the original forward models were never
actually lost as following removal of the prismatic shift, so that our visual
environment returns to normal, despite initial misreaches in the opposite
direction, the motor system rapidly reverts back to the original forward models
so that our reaches, once again, become accurate. In the current experiment the
participants original forward modes were adapted/replaced in accordance with
the perturbed visual feedback, however, following presentation of unperturbed
visual feedback, in which the participants were exposed to their actual
(inaccurate) limb movement, the adapted forward model quickly reverts back
towards its original state, hence misreaching in the same direction as the
perturbation in the subsequent trial.
One reason for this rapid reversal in adaptation could be due to the
original forward models being triggered by the presence of visualproprioceptive
congruence. The results from Chapter 8 have already
demonstrated that when feedback from these two modalities is in agreement it
can have a profound effect on updating low-level correction mechanisms:
adapting to perturbations that shift the visual feedback in conjunction with the
limb faster and more effectively than perturbations that lead to inaccuracy of
the visual or proprioceptive information alone.
Interestingly although more self-judgments were made to the perturbed
visual feedback in the incremental condition, it is clear from the graph that
self-
judgments gradually decreased with increasing size of perturbation. This was
likely to be a result of the increasing visual-proprioceptive incongruence,
which has been found to increase the likelihood of an other-judgment to
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accurate visual feedback (Chapter 8). The responses given for the unperturbed
trials demonstrated a similar pattern, in that the amount of self-judgments
deceased with the progression of the experiment (increasing perturbation size
of the surrounding trials). The reason for this is also likely to be because of
endpoint accuracy, for larger perturbations, the participants actual movements
would have to deviate further from the target location in order for the visual
feedback to remain accurate. Therefore when presented with visual feedback of
their actual movement (unperturbed trial) it would be more inaccurate
compared to the preceding unperturbed trials earlier on in the adaptation
(actual movements compensating for smaller perturbations). Therefore the
number of self-judgments to unperturbed visual feedback are consistent with
the relative accuracy of the movement, the more inaccurate the reach, the more
likely the participant will give an other judgment. Similar results are also
evident to the trials immediately following the unperturbed trials. The greater
the error observed in the unperturbed trial, the greater the degree of
correction
implemented by the low-level mechanisms, so the greater the inaccuracy on the
subsequent perturbed trial. These results suggest that endpoint accuracy is the
strongest predictor of a self-judgment and, whilst visual-proprioceptive
incongruence can increase the likelihood of an other-judgment to accurate
visual feedback, visual-proprioceptive congruence appears to have little effect
on directly contributing to a self-judgment.
Shifting the Perception of Self
Another point of interest observed in the current results is the pattern of
self-
judgments across the perturbation sizes in the RANDOM condition. Instead of
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participants simply producing fewer self-judgments with increasing
perturbation size (such as that found in the results for the experiment in
Chapter 2 and also found by Farrer et al., 2003b) The point at which the
participants gave the greatest number of self-judgments was shifted towards the
mean (5-degrees). Similar to in the current study, participants in Chapter 2
made self/other judgments over actual and perturbed visual feedback of
unimanual reaching movements. In Chapter 2, five perturbation sizes were
used that were randomly assigned across trials and the number of trials for each
perturbation were equally divided between leftwards and rightwards direction.
For example, there were 24 4-degree perturbations, 12 towards the right
(+4degrees)
and 12 towards the left (-4-degrees). For the original analysis in
Chapter 2 the data were collapsed across direction, giving rise to a one sided
slope in which the percentage of self-judgments decreased with increasing size
of perturbation (Figure 9.6a). Therefore, on the basis of these results, a
similar
pattern would be expected in random condition of the current experiment,
which also involves the application of randomly assigned perturbations to
visual feedback of self-generated movement, however, this was not what was
found (Figure 9.6b).
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Figure 9.6: a) Original data from Chapter 2 with percent self-judgments
collapsed across
perturbation direction. The number of self-judgments decreases with size of
perturbation so
that the highest number of self-judgements was given in response to the smallest
(0-degrees)
perturbation. b) Predicted curve of self-judgements based original graph from
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Chapter 2 (black
line) and actual percent self-judgements from the current experiment (open
circles). In the
current experiment the highest number of self-judgments is found in bin TWO (3
and 4degrees)
opposed to bin ZERO (0-degrees).
There was, however, a fundamental difference between the
perturbations in the current experiment and those used in Chapter 2, that is,
whilst Chapter 2 used equivalently sized leftward and rightward perturbations
all those in the current experiment were always towards the left. This meant
that in Chapter 2 the 0-degree perturbation was also the mean perturbation,
whilst in the current experiment the mean perturbation was 5-degrees. When
re-plotting the data from Chapter 2 so that each perturbation has a separate
data
point (Figure 9.7) this relationship becomes clearer as the graph now reveals a
bell shaped curve (normal distribution) in which the highest percentage of self-
judgments correspond with the mean (0-degree) perturbation size.
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Figure 9.7: a) Data from Chapter 2 were re-plotted so that each perturbation has
a separate data
point (negative values refer to leftward perturbations, positive refer to
rightward perturbations).
The new graph reveals a normal distribution, it is clear from the graph that the
highest number
of self-judgments is given in response to the 0-degrees perturbation which is
also the mean. b)
RANDOM data from the current chapter. Peak self-judgments approaches the mean.
Previous studies on motor learning in response to unpredictable visual
perturbations (similar to those in Chapter 2 and the random condition of the
current study) have found that participants tend to learn the mean of the
distribution from which the perturbations are selected (Körding and Wolpert,
2004). In these experiments the participants are most accurate with the mean
perturbation size. If high-level self-judgments are more likely to be given in
response to the most accurate reaches, which, with such a random array of
perturbations are likely to be reaches with the mean perturbation applied, then
it follows that the point at which participants give the highest number of self-
judgments is also likely to be the mean. However, the highest percent self-
judgments in the current experiment occurred in bin TWO consisting of 3-and
4-degree perturbations, whereas the overall mean was 5-degrees. Peak percent
self-judgments may have been lower than the mean due to the relatively small
number of trials (most motor learning experiments use in the region of 200
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trials e.g. Scheidt et al., 2001) particularly as the aim of the task was not
focused on accuracy. Alternatively, as the presence of visual-proprioceptive
incongruence has been found to reduce the likelihood of a self-judgment to
accurate visual feedback this may, therefore, have imposed a limit upon the
peak of the curve.
Extending the Model
The current results help to further demonstrate that humans are largely unaware
of the precise nature of their actions. As high-level conscious awareness, even
in a task such as this, in which participants are required to look out for
discrepancies between actual and visually presented movements, is more
concerned with the outcome of an action rather the precise motor adaptations
required to achieve that outcome. Relating this to the comparator model, the
current results, in conjunction with those from Chapter 8, suggest that low-
level feelings of agency that are associated with the forward model component
of the comparator and measured by the motor response to the visual
perturbations, are concerned predominantly with comparisons between the
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predicted and estimated actual state and between visual and proprioceptive
feedback. High-level judgments, on the other hand, that are most likely
associated with mechanisms outside the comparator and are measured by the
verbal self/other judgments, are mainly concerned with comparator output
deriving from the comparison between the desired and estimated actual states,
whether or not an action achieves its goal. Therefore, on the basis of the
current experiment in conjunction with results from the preceding chapters the
following additions to the comparator are proposed (Figure 9.8).
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Figure 9.8: The centre of the diagram is equivalent to the original comparator
as described by
Frith et al. (2000) with the surrounding elements added on the basis of evidence
from the
current thesis. High-level judgments are mainly informed by the
desired-[estimated] actual
state comparison (solid black arrow) and negatively informed (dashed arrows) by
low-level
mechanisms and the visual-proprioceptive comparison. Low-level agency mechanisms
are
informed by the predicted-actual state comparison and the visual-proprioceptive
comparison.
The visual-proprioceptive comparison is an integral part of the comparator
model, under
normal circumstances there is no conflict and these signals form the estimated
actual state.
Firstly, on the far left hand side of the diagram is the visualproprioceptive
comparison. Under normal circumstance visual and
proprioceptive signals are produced directly from the actual movements and as
such, are largely in agreement. The information derived from these signals is
then used to help create the estimated actual state, which is used for further
comparisons within the model. Therefore, these signals and thus the
visualproprioceptive
comparison are interregnal components involved in the internal
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workings of the comparator, even though under normal circumstances no
conflict is produced. In prism adaptation and in the current experiments,
however, a dissociation is introduced between the visual and proprioceptive
signals in which case information concerning this conflict is fed directly into
the high-level components of agency and can reduce the likelihood of a self-
judgment.
High-level agency mechanisms (right hand side of the diagram) are
conscious processes that are likely to be situated outside the main comparator.
These mechanisms are predominantly concerned with the outcome of a given
action being directly informed by the desired and actual state comparison,
whilst there is only evidence that they are negatively informed by the
visualproprioceptive
comparison and low-level agency mechanisms i.e. reducing
agency feelings. Low-level agency mechanisms refer to the forward model
output of the comparator and so are directly informed by predicted-actual state
as well as the visual-proprioceptive comparisons. These mechanisms can have
a direct effect on the specification of movement that enables more efficient
adaptation of the motor commands leading to a more accurate movement and
thus in turn has an indirect effect on high-level judgments.
9a.5: Conclusions
There is evidence in the current thesis for direct and indirect bottom-up
effects
of agency, in that enhancing low-level feelings of agency can indirectly
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increase the likelihood of a self-judgment (as a consequence of producing more
accurate movements, see Chapter 8) and also that reducing low-level feelings
of agency (comparator mismatches) can directly increase the likelihood of an
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other judgment to accurate visual feedback. For example, the experiment in
Chapter 5 found that disrupting low-level predictive mechanisms by rIPL TMS
can increase the likelihood other judgment to unperturbed (self) visual
feedback. However, evidence for a similar top-down effect on agency is less
forthcoming. In the current experiment, following exposure to inaccurate
unperturbed visual feedback (following adaptation), participants were more
likely to produce a judgment of other, which is in accordance with that
expected based on intentions, whilst their low-level mechanisms preceded to
use the information from the inaccurate reach when planning the subsequent
movement. Therefore, it appears that reducing high-level experience of agency
has no effect on low-level processes. However, it has been proposed by Michel
et al., (2007) that increasing high-level experience of agency for perturbed
visual feedback can increase the low-level correction mechanisms required for
adaptation (low-level agency mechanisms). In the following section this theory
will be discussed alongside evidence from a single neglect patient.
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9b: Agency in Neglect
9b.1: Introduction
Patients suffering from neglect have been found to exhibit enhanced adaptation
to prismatic perturbations (e.g. Rossetti et al., 1998). Neglect is a disorder
that
has been associated with right parietal damage (Driver and Mattingley, 1998),
characterised by the patients failure to acknowledge objects on, or orient
towards the contralesional (normally left) side. Prism adaptation has been used
as a rehabilitative strategy for the symptoms of neglect, using optical prisms
to
shift the visual field initially further to the right (ipsiesional,
non-neglected
side) resulting in an aftereffect over to the left (contralesional, neglected
side)
(e.g. Serino et al., 2007 and Luaute et al., 2006). Interestingly whilst the
aftereffects observed in neurologically intact individuals usually last only a
few
minutes, aftereffects observed with neglect patients have been found to last up
to four days (Pisella et al., 2002) and, in addition, the magnitude of the
aftereffect has been found to be greater than observed with controls (Rossetti
et
al., 1998).
Similar increased aftereffects have been reproduced in neurologically
intact participants. Michel et al. (2007) used a multi-step adaptation paradigm
(similar to the INCREMENTAL condition described above) to enhance prism
adaptation aftereffects in comparison to those produced using a traditional
single-step paradigm. In the multi-step condition the perturbations were
implemented incrementally in 2-degree steps using a separate pair of prism
goggles for each step (ranging from 2 -10-degrees), whilst in the single-step
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In the single-step condition participants immediately showed surprise at
the optical displacement, recognising that the goggles had affected their vision
causing them to misreach. Participants in the multi-step condition, on the other
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hand, failed to notice the perturbation, even in response to direct questioning
at
the end of the experiment. Michel et al. (2007) claimed that by increasing self-
attribution, prism adaptation aftereffects can be increased and therefore the
more pronounced aftereffects evident with neglect patients may be a result of
patients attributing perturbed actions to themselves (over self-attribution).
This
is supported by observations in neglect patients who also do not spontaneously,
or following direct questioning, report awareness of the prismatic perturbations
(e.g. Rode et al., 2003).
Michel et al. (2007) suggested that for prism adaptation at least, neglect
patients exhibit what they referred to as hypernosognosia, and which they
described as self-attribution of the prism-induced errors. However, this
description is misleading, as if the patient felt as though the errors were
self-
produced it would be expected that they would attempt to apply a strategy in
order to correct them, which they do not. A more accurate definition might be
that the patients do not detect the prism-induced errors. In this explanation
the
neglect patients are, in effect, treating the perturbations as self, however,
this is
because they do not detect the perturbations opposed attributing the
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